The prisoners of war included the captains of both boats. None offered any resistance and all were glad to go to the Gloucester, as they feared an attack from the Cubans.
When asked to make some statement in regard to the result of the battle Admiral Cervera said: "I would rather lose my ships at sea, like a sailor, than in a harbor. It was the only thing left for me to do."
The work of the American battleships was as rapid as it was terrible. At 9:35 the first vessel headed out past Morro Castle. At 10 o'clock the two destroyers were wrecked and deserted. At 10:15 the Oquendo and Maria Teresa were encircled by the Iowa, Indiana and Texas. At 10:40 both were on the rocks. A few minutes later the Vizcaya was abandoned.
The Cristobal Colon, having the lead, ran farther along the coast before the persistent firing by the Brooklyn and Massachusetts brought her to a stop. She fought for twenty minutes. At noon she was on the rocks, perforated and tattered. Spain's greatest fleet was destroyed in about three hours.
Chief Yoeman Ellis of the Brooklyn was the only American killed In three hours of incessant fighting, while the Spanish loss reached 600 killed, 400 wounded and 1,100 taken prisoners.
ADMIRAL SAMPSON'S OFFICIAL REPORT.
Following is the official report sent by Admiral Sampson to the navy department at Washington:
United States Flagship New York, First Rate, Off Santiago de Cuba, July 15, 1898.—Sir: I have the honor to make the following report upon the battle, with the destruction of the Spanish squadron, commanded by Admiral Cervera, off Santiago de Cuba on Sunday, July 3, 1898:
The enemy's vessels came out of the harbor between 9:35 and 10 am, the head of the column appearing around Cayo Smith at 9:31 and emerging from the channel five or six minutes later. The positions of the vessels of my command off Santiago at that moment were as follows: The flagship New York was four miles east of her blockading station and about seven miles from the harbor entrance. She had started for Siboney, where I intended to land, accompanied by several of my staff, and go to the front to consult with General Shafter. A discussion of the situation and a more definite understanding between us of the operations proposed had been rendered necessary by the unexpectedly strong resistance of the Spanish garrison of Santiago. I had sent my chief of staff on shore the day before to arrange an interview with General Shafter, who had been suffering from heat prostration. I made arrangements to go to his headquarters, and my flagship was in the position mentioned above when the Spanish squadron appeared in the channel.
The remaining vessels were in or near their usual blockading positions, distributed in a semi-circle about the harbor entrance, counting from the eastward to the westward in the following order: The Indiana, about a mile and a half from shore; the Oregon—the New York's place between these two—the Iowa, Texas and Brooklyn, the latter two miles from the shore west of Santiago. The distance of the vessels from the harbor entrance was from two and one-half to four miles—the latter being the limit of day—blockading distance. The length of the arc formed by the ships was about eight miles.