When Kim-ok-Kiun, the leader of the insurrection of 1884, fled to Japan, he was welcomed by the Japanese and received as a protege of the emperor. Repeated demands were made by Corea upon the mikado to surrender him, and the demands were as repeatedly refused. In the spring of 1894 he was lured by means of a dummy draft on a non-existing bank in China, to Shanghai, where on March 28, at the Japanese hotel, and in the absence of his Japanese attendant, he was foully murdered by his pretended friend, Hong Tjyong On, a tool of the Ming faction. This man had been in the employ of the Ming faction of the Corean government with the mission of the assassination entrusted to him, and if the crime was not committed by order of the king of Corea, as was popularly believed, it was surely by order of the queen, who has been strong in her influence. The murderer was arrested; but instead of being tried by the Chinese was handed over to a Corean official, who, with the assassin and the corpse, was sent to Corea. There in spite of the protestations of foreign representatives, the body of Kim was horribly mutilated, parts of it being sent to the different provinces, while the murderer was rewarded with high official honor.
This murder of a Corean by another Corean in a port under Chinese jurisdiction, though coupled with the subsequent brutalities at Seoul, could not be made a subject of diplomatic remonstrance; but it served in Japan to rouse the deepest public indignation and intense disgust. The Japanese government was not only outraged by the assassination of Kim, but by the conduct of Yu, the Corean minister at Tokio. Two brothers named Ken, at the time of Kim’s murder, attempted to bring the same fate upon Boku Eiko, Kim’s fellow conspirator. Their plot having been discovered, they fled to Yu for protection. For three days he refused to give them up, but finally surrendered them and took a hasty and undignified departure from the country. The Japanese foreign office, having in vain sought an explanation of the motives of the king of Corea in connection with Kim’s assassination, and of the precipitate and undiplomatic flight of the Corean representative, was glad to seize the first opportunity which arose before long, when other events occurred which gave Japan occasion to act.
SINKING OF THE KOW-SHING.
For some time past the peninsular kingdom has been in a disturbed condition, owing to the spread of rebellious confederacies among the people. There was now quite a general uprising of Coreans, caused by their want of sympathy with the government, and focussed by their indignation at the horrible fate of Kim. In May, a formidable peasant uprising occurred in northern Corea, caused mainly by the official extortion practiced by tax-gatherers, but having in it elements of remonstrance against the assassination of Kim. The government troops were defeated May 16 at Reisan; and on May 31 Zenshu fell into the hands of the insurgents. Later Chung Jui was captured, and Seoul, the capital, was in a state of great commotion. The discovery of a plot to blow up the government building during the annual official meeting of the king and his ministers caused immense excitement. The plot was confessed by one of the conspirators, and warrants were issued for the arrest of one thousand persons implicated or suspected.
In alarm the government appealed to China for assistance, and early in June an armed Chinese force numbering about two thousand was dispatched, from Chefoo to Asan, a port lying a little southwest of Seoul, where it encamped.
In the treaty of Tien-tsin, both Japan and China agreed to withdraw their troops from the peninsula, neither power to send soldiers thither again, without giving to the other power preliminary notice of the intended action. In the present struggle, Japan has declared from the beginning that she intended to carry her action into Corea no further than the treaty of 1885 allowed, and the necessity for restoring order and stability required her to do. When these troops were sent, the stipulated notification to Japan it is declared, was delayed until after their departure. Actuated by distrust of Chinese motives, and looking to the protection of her commercial interests and the safety of the Japanese residents and traders in Corea, the authorities at Tokio quickly followed by landing a force of six thousand troops on the western coast. A strong force was soon stationed in Seoul, for the protection of the Japanese legation, and the approaches to the capital were securely occupied.
MR. OTORI BEFORE THE COMMISSIONERS.
Then began the diplomatic campaign, Japan seizing the opportunity offered to insist on a final understanding with both China and the Corean government, regarding the matters which had long been the source of friction, and a constant menace to tranquility in the peninsula. On June 28 a communication passed between Mr. Otori, the Japanese minister, and the Corean foreign office, regarding the tributary relations between Corea and China. To this the Corean government returned an evasive reply. July 3, Mr. Otori laid before the Corean government in a courteously worded note, the draft of a scheme of reforms which Japan proposed, as a remedy for the disorders of the country, under the following five general heads: