FIRST SIGHT OF PING-YANG.
When the Japanese troops started from Chemulpo and Seoul to advance on Ping-Yang, a force of thirteen transports, protected by a strong convoy of war vessels, also started for Ping-Yang, carrying some six thousand troops who were intended to co-operate with the forces advancing by land. On the 18th of August these troops were landed in Ping-Yang inlet, and they immediately began their march up the cultivated valley of the Tatong River in the direction of the city. When the force had proceeded some distance, it was suddenly attacked by one thousand Chinese cavalry, who succeeded in dividing the column into two parts. The Chinese artillery at the same time caused great havoc among the Japanese. The latter were thrown into complete disorder, and considerably reduced in numbers they fled to the seashore, pursued by the cavalry who cut down many of the fugitives. As they reached the coast the Japanese came within the shelter of the guns of their war vessels, and the Chinese were consequently compelled to desist from further pursuit.
The land skirmishes of which mention has been made, involved none except the extreme van of the Japanese forces and the outposts of the Chinese. The main body of the Japanese troops, some fifteen thousand strong, found that the daily rate of progress northward did not exceed six miles, so broken was the road by mountains and streams, the passage of which presented great obstacles. This being the rate of advance, the army had pushed some ninety miles from Seoul, when it was decided that a change of military plan must be made. The Chinese assembling in such great force at Ping-Yang, by the union of the two armies, threatened Gensan, on the east coast of Corea. At Gensan there was an important Japanese colony, and from there a trunk road led southward to Seoul. The destruction of the colony, a flanking movement against the Japanese army, and an irruption of Chinese troops into the Corean capital, might have been the result of not including Gensan in the Japanese program of operations. A force of ten thousand men was accordingly transported to Gensan by sea, with instructions to move westward against Ping-Yang, timing its advance and attack with those of the army from Seoul, whose progress northward was suspended to allow time for the passage and disembarkation of this column, and of the column which had been sent from Chemulpo into the Ping-Yang inlet.
BATTLE OF THE YALU—SINKING OF THE CHIH-YUEN.
While these land operations were going on, there were also some naval movements under way, but the latter brought no very definite results. A fleet of Japanese vessels, including a few iron clads and some merchant steamships transformed into cruisers, made a reconnoissance of Wei-hai-wei and Port Arthur about the 10th of August. A few shots were exchanged at long range between the vessels and the forts at each of these places, and the fleet then withdrew. The operations were of little more importance than a mere ruse to draw fire and ascertain the position and strength of the enemy’s guns. No submarine mines were exploded, or torpedoes launched. At the request of the British admiral, Sir Edmund Fremantle, the Japanese promised not to renew the attack upon Wei-hai-wei or to bombard Chefoo without giving forty-eight hours’ notice to him, so that measures might be taken to protect the lives of foreign residents.
The emperor of China, taking personal interest in affairs to greater extent than had been his custom, insisted on a full daily report of the warlike operations and plans. He studied special official reports of the naval attack, and then wanted to know why his commanders allowed the enemy’s vessels to escape. All this time the Japanese fleet was patrolling the China sea, the Gulf of Pechili and the Corean Bay, trying to reach a conflict with the enemy, and to prevent the tribute of rice from going north. Torpedoes were placed in the entrance to Tokio Bay and Nagasaki harbor, to guard against an attack by Chinese war vessels. The war spirit in Japan lost none of its warmth. The detachments sent across the straits into Corea in August numbered nearly fifty thousand men, and early in September the total number of Japanese troops available for activity in the peninsula was nearly one hundred thousand. A war loan of $50,000,000 was desired by the government, and so anxious were Japanese capitalists to subscribe for it that foreign subscriptions were refused and more than $80,000,000 were offered.
Chinese efforts continued also in great degree, but the results were scarcely as happy. Troops to the same number could not be sent into Corea. A very long land march was required before the forces could reach the seat of war by way of Manchooria and it was useless to attempt transporting them by water, so carefully did the Japanese cruisers patrol the sea routes.
