The War in the East: Japan, China, and Corea

by Trumbull White

H. SAKOMOTO, Commander of the Akagi.

“The Hiyei in the mean time had been receiving the fire of two powerful Chinese vessels. She was manœuvered skillfully and returned their fire, until a shell bursting within her set the woodwork in flames. A second shell exploded in the sick-bay, killing a surgeon and his assistant, and some of those who had been wounded earlier. The captain was compelled to run her out of action, to extinguish the flames, and this having been accomplished his wounded men were transferred to another ship, and he steamed once more into line. The Yoshino had been fought throughout in a magnificent manner. She steamed in advance of the Hiyei when the latter was disabled and was backing out of line. She took the enemy’s fire, and replied with the greatest spirit. She was hit frequently, and her forward barbette was damaged, but her injuries can soon be repaired. The Chinese used their torpedo boats at times and incessant care was necessary to avoid their projectiles. On our war ship, the Akagi, the captain was aloft in the tops watching especially for torpedo movements and signalling by flags directly they were detected. He was in this position when the mast was shot away, and the top-hamper fell with a crash upon the deck. The captain and two lookout men were killed. The first lieutenant took command and fought the ship till darkness stopped the action. Towards the close of the day dense smoke was seen issuing from the war ships Ting-Yuen, King-Yuen, and Ping-Yuen, and it was believed by us that all were on fire. Great confusion prevailed on board them, but they did not retire from action. Firing was still kept up intermittently on the Chinese side, though the guns of many of their ships were silenced. At sundown the Chinese squadron was in full retreat. We took a parallel course intending to renew the battle in the morning. The night was dark, the speed was only equal to that of our slowest damaged ship, and we were compelled to keep at some distance from their course on account of their torpedo flotilla, which might have attempted a night attack. We lost sight of the enemy during the night. At dawn we endeavored to discover their position, but failed. The Chinese squadron must have reached protected shelter. Then we returned to the scene of the action, and found that the war ship Yang Wei, which had been disabled when the battle was half over, had been run ashore. Her crew had abandoned her. We fired one fish torpedo and completed her destruction. This was the only torpedo fired by the Japanese either in the action or after it.”

From a concensus of the opinions of eye witnesses, it appears that the Chinese were at least as anxious to continue the fight as were the Japanese. Before five o’clock the Japanese ceased firing. It was observed that the distance between the fleets was rapidly increasing and the Chinese failed to diminish it. The Chinese then saw the Japanese change course in a westerly direction towards the islands of Yang-tao and Hai-yung-tao. The Celestials followed them for an hour, and saw the course changed again to a southerly direction, while some of the ships of the second Japanese division that had vanished earlier in the fight now joined those of the first. By this time nothing but the smoke of the withdrawing fleet was visible and the Chinese returned. They were joined by the ships which had been partially disabled but were still in condition to proceed, and altogether withdrew towards Port Arthur. A message was sent to the transports from which the troops had disembarked on the banks of the Yalu river, ordering them to weigh anchor and follow the fleet.

It is evident that there remained room for each side to claim the victory in this naval battle. The Chinese succeeded in disembarking the troops, which was the avowed object of their expedition. They fought brilliantly, inflicting considerable damage upon their opponents, and assert that the battle was terminated against their will by the withdrawal of the Japanese vessels.

The Mikado’s men on the other hand, destroyed several of the best battle ships in the Chinese navy with great loss of life to the crews, and plead that the Chinese withdrew from them. The truth probably is that each fleet was so damaged and the men so exhausted with the long contest that they were mutually willing to quit. Inasmuch as casual spectators of impartial mind are not in a position to observe the details of a battle royal of this sort, it seems that the decision must be left unsettled except as the destruction of so many Chinese vessels may be certainly credited as a victory for the Japanese. The withdrawal of the Chinese fleet towards Port Arthur, and its previous inactivity seem to be partially responsible for the handing over of Corea to the Japanese, giving them first the advantage of possession in the invaded country.

The peculiar constitution of the Chinese navy is partially an explanation of the discipline prevailing. The navy is not properly an imperial or even a national force. The four fleets are provincial squadrons raised, equipped, and maintained by the viceroys or governors of the maritime provinces to which they are attached. No arrangement could possibly be more unsuited for the purpose of naval war, and to it may be partially attributed the previous inaction of the Chinese fleet while their numerically inferior antagonists were using the sea at will. Stirred up at length, doubtless by peremptory orders from Peking, the Chinese admiral, in place of throwing his whole strength into a decisive operation, seems to have committed himself to a subsidiary objective. Naval history teems with examples of the drawbacks that inevitably result from being thus led away. To have attacked the Japanese when convoying troops to Chemulpo, or to have fought a naval battle at Chemulpo or Ping-Yang inlet might have led to important results. In place of adopting such a course, the Chinese utilized their fleet for the first time in convoying troops to the mouth of the Yalu river in the north-east corner of the bay of Corea. The great difficulty experienced in advancing overland from Manchooria doubtless suggested this plan, but the object at best was purely secondary. And with the fleet scattered and partially destroyed it would seem that the troops, both artillery and infantry, with their stores landed at the mouth of the Yalu river, would be practically helpless so far from support or a base of supplies.

The Japanese fleet which met that of China in the battle of the Yalu river was composed as follows: The Matsusima, Itsukusima and the Hasidate, each of four thousand two hundred and seventy-seven tons displacement and seventeen and one-half knots; the[the] Takachiho and the Naniwa, each of three thousand six hundred and fifty tons, and eighteen and seven-tenths knots; the Akitsushima, of three thousand one hundred and fifty tons, and Chiyoda, of two thousand four hundred and fifty tons, and each nineteen knots; the Yoshino, of four thousand one hundred and fifty tons and twenty-three knots; the Fuso, three thousand seven hundred and eighteen tons, and the Hiyei, two thousand two hundred tons, each thirteen knots; the Akagi six hundred and fifteen tons, and twelve knots; beside the Saikio Maru, a steam packet fitted as a cruiser and four torpedo boats. It will be seen that in numbers the fleets were about equal. But in tonnage the Chinese fleet was superior, having several vessels larger than any of the Japanese, while on the other hand the speed of the Japanese vessels averaged very much above that of the Chinese. The armament too of the Japanese fleet was superior to that of the Chinese, being composed more largely of quickfiring guns. In type the vessels of the opposing squadrons differed considerably. While six of the Chinese ships had side armor, only one Japanese vessel was thus protected; and while ten Chinese ships had protection of some form, only eight Japanese carried any armor.

The Japanese had the advantage of their opponents in speed, but to a less extent than might be expected. The number of knots shown for each ship in the lists was of course the best possible, and is equally delusive for both sides. Notwithstanding, the Japanese had so much the greater speed that they were able to steam around their opponents to some extent. There are some lessons to be drawn from this battle by those who have wondered what the result of a contest between the modern war ships would be. The Chinese made one attempt to ram, and discharged one torpedo from a ship and three from a boat. The attempt to ram resulted in desperate damage, though not in destruction to the ship attacked. The rammer herself was afterwards sunk, it was believed by gun fire. All the torpedoes discharged were ineffective. The Japanese tried to use neither the ram nor the torpedo. Beside the Chih-Yuen, the Lai-Yuen and Chao Yung were sunk by shot and the Yang Wei was run aground to avoid foundering in deep water. The Japanese flag ship Matsusima was so severely injured that Admiral Ito had to shift his flag to the Hasidate. The Hiyei was forced out of action for a time, and the armed packet steamer Saikio Maru had to go out of action altogether. The mast of the Akagi was shot away, and by the fall killed the captain and two men, all of whom were on the top. Such being the variety of the ships engaged, important lessons are forthcoming from this first great modern naval battle. Many theories fondly beloved and eagerly proclaimed have had to be abandoned for their holders to fall back upon the old and well tested principles of naval war. The gun has maintained its position as a weapon to which all others are merely accessories. The best protection, as Farragut pointed out, is a powerful and well directed fire. Stupendous losses, unimaginable destruction, have been confidently predicted as a necessary result of a naval battle fought with modern weapons. This did not prove to be the case, and the damage inflicted in the five or six hours’ fighting at the mouth of the Yalu might have occurred in the days of the '74s. Allowance must be made for the probable defects in the Chinese gunnery practice, but their seamen fought like heroes, and greater endurance than was shown on either side can never be expected. The accuracy of naval fire is always over-estimated in time of peace. The disablement of the heavy guns of the Chen-Yuen and her continued fighting with her light armament are a useful object lesson. This vessel like many others was built solely with a view to carry her four thirty-seven ton guns. The remaining armament was doubtless distributed promiscuously as space offered. Both barbettes were quickly disabled, and machinery gave place to man power. On board ship, as on land, it is the man who ultimately counts, even though in time of peace he is often forgotten.

From this survey of the characteristics of the two fleets, it may be perceived that each fairly represented a different principle. The principle represented by the Chinese was that advocated by the school which puts matter above mind, for their fleet contained the biggest ships, the less numerous but heaviest guns, and the most extensive torpedo armament. The principle of which the Japanese may be taken as the representative is that of a school which appeals to history and experience, and not to theories evolved out of the inner consciousness of people without practical knowledge of the sea, and which maintains that the human factor is both the most important and the unchanging factor in war, which must in its broader features remain much what it has always been.

Whatever the claims of victory made by the opposing forces, the fact remains that Admiral Ito stayed at sea with the Japanese fleet and that the damages were repaired as fast as possible on board the ships; while the Chinese went into port, where their repairs could be made in safety and at leisure. Japan unquestionably had command of the sea. The menace which operated successfully in the early stages of the war was changed for the prestige of a great[great] moral and material victory.