Mukden is only one hundred and fifty miles from Wi-ju, with which place the Manchoo city was connected by a road, comparatively good for China, as it had been the main route to Peking, and even the Chinese recognized its strategic importance by running telegraph wires along it. It is easy to see why the Chinese began to increase the fortifications of the sacred city, and why they made a stand at Wi-ju in the hope of interrupting the Japanese advance.
PRINCIPAL STREET OF MUKDEN.
The levies of troops concentrating upon Wi-ju, Mukden, and the intervening territory were hardy men from the north, of excellent material to be worked into soldiers, but they were badly armed. Only about four thousand had good rifles, but further supplies were being hurried up from the southern arsenals. The Chinese force intrenched upon the Yalu River was about thirty-eight thousand, including the troops that had escaped from the Ping-Yang defeat to fall back upon Wi-ju. Many of the forces which they found there were also raw levies, badly armed. The loss of field guns, rifles, and ammunition at Ping-Yang greatly embarrassed the Chinese war department. It was recognized that a battle must be fought at the river, and it was earnestly desired to retrieve the disaster of Ping-Yang.
It was immediately after the series of defeats in Corea that the effort began to be made by the enemies of Li Hung Chang to find a means for his degradation. Even two weeks before the battle of Ping-Yang, the government at Peking appointed two officers to act as censors of his proceedings, and especially of his conduct of the war. One of these officials was a notorious enemy of the viceroy. The censors at first contented themselves with taking note of Li Hung Chang’s actions and movements. Immediately after the news of the disaster at Ping-Yang reached Peking, the emperor was persuaded that the defeat of his army was due to the mismanagement of the viceroy. The intrigue was completely successful, and on the morning of September 18, an imperial edict was issued depriving Li Hung Chang of his three-eyed peacock feather, the reason assigned for the disgrace being incapacity and negligence in making preparations for the war. Much sympathy was expressed for the viceroy, who was thus made the scapegoat for the disasters. The real responsibility rested with the Tsung-li Yamen, which had been making war with an inadequate force inefficiently organized and hampered by tradition. Li was not a member of the Grand Council, but it was sought to make him responsible for its blunders.
CHINESE TROOPS FLYING TO SAVE THEIR ARTILLERY.
Within a few days after the Corean engagements, another Japanese army was mobilized at Hiroshima for service in the field. The destination of this fresh expeditionary force of thirty thousand men was kept a secret, nothing being known except that another effective blow was contemplated by General Kawakami, the Von Moltke of Japan. The sea-going fleet of China was practically paralyzed for the time, and the Japanese were free to transport a force in any direction. The island of Hai-yung-tao, in Corea Bay, had been made a coaling station for the Japanese fleet, thus enabling the Japanese torpedo boats to keep a constant watch at the mouth of the Gulf of Pechili and secure advance warning of offensive or defensive operations. It was believed that Count Yamagata favored an attack upon Niuchwang from the sea. This city in the possession of the Japanese would form a base for a movement upon Mukden or upon Peking itself, and the forces landed there could co-operate with the army advancing from Corea. A second possible destination for the new force was Peking itself. It was believed that an army of that size could reach the capital by disembarking at a point on the coast about half way between Taku, the city at the mouth of the Peiho River, on which Peking is situated, and Niu-chwang.
TRANSPORTING CHINESE TROOPS.