With the move towards the investment of Port Arthur, and the crossing of the Yalu, the war entered upon a new phase. In selecting Port Arthur as an objective point, the Japanese were well advised. By such an attack a dockyard of the first importance was threatened, and full advantage of naval superiority could be taken. The Kwang Tung peninsula, or “Regent’s Sword,” was peculiarly inaccessible by land, while a power in command of the sea could land men at pleasure at several points within a short distance of Port Arthur, and with a small force only could isolate it from the mainland.
Two days after the landing of troops on the peninsula, the collection of a third army at Hiroshima commenced. This force was to number twenty-four thousand, and be under the command of Lieutenant-General Viscount Takashima. At the same time another revolt of some little magnitude arose in the south of Corea, and two thousand rebels attacked the quarters of the Japanese commissary at Anpo. The malcontents were afterwards dispersed by a military force though not without difficulty.
We have now reached the end of October. The first Japanese army is safely installed on the north bank of the Yalu River in Manchoorian territory, threatening the road to Mukden, Niuchwang and the intervening cities. The second army is safe on shore on the Kwang Tung peninsula, threatening China’s proudest naval station. The next month will see the fall of Port Arthur and the practical destruction of all Chinese hopes of ultimate success.
REVIEW OF THE PROGRESS OF THE WAR TO THE
FIRST OF NOVEMBER.
Characteristics of the two Nations in War—China’s Ignorance of the Coasts of Corea—Japan’s Knowledge of Chinese Topography and Climate—Patriotism in the Two Countries—Bad Judgment of China in Methods of Conducting the War—The Governmental Weather-Vane and its Revolutions—No Commander-in-Chief for the Chinese Army—Official Corruption in Civil as Well as Military Officials—The Battles of Ping-Yang and the Yalu River—Handling the Forces of the Enemies.
At this period in the war, occurs a lull which makes it possible and wise to take a glance at the whole course of affairs during the hostilities, since the declaration three months earlier. The war has advanced far enough to prove the mettle of both combatants, and to furnish data for judging of the probable issue of the struggle, at least from a purely military point of view. At the beginning of November, prophets were quite well equipped with material for predictions that were surely not to be disappointed, and it is from the aspect at this date that the present chapter takes its view. On the one side there is little but praise to be offered. The Japanese have proved themselves assiduous students of all modern armaments, and have in many points bettered their European instruction. They have made good their claim to be the rising power of the Orient.
Of the Chinese a diametrically opposite account must be given. From a military standpoint nothing favorable can be said of them, and the only palliation of their failure is that they were wholly unprepared for an unexpected aggression. The course of the war has brought out in strong relief what has not always been clearly recognized, the essential differences between the two belligerent nations. A stronger contrast is scarcely imaginable than that between China and Japan, though they are so near and have been nursed on a common literature. With passionate effort the Japanese have ransacked the western world for its treasures of knowledge, and have vigorously applied what they have learned. The Chinese, on the other hand, have set their faces against the science of other nations, and with an unhappy mixture of apathy and contempt have rejected the teaching which has pressed upon them. In the same spirit they have spurned the knowledge of their own country and of their own forces, while the Japanese have been for years making a minute study of both, and possess maps and details which the Chinese themselves have not and do not care for. The Chinese have carried on a large trade with the Yalu river, but the government knew nothing of the coast. Captain Calder of Port Arthur made a holiday expedition to the Manchoo-Corean coast, found the country beautiful, and recommended the naval authorities to let the cadets go and improve themselves by surveying it. Nothing was done, the sole reason being that the incidental expenses of the ships would be increased by being at sea, and the captains would not save so much of their monthly allowance. Now the only survey the Chinese admiral possesses even of the scene of the late naval battle, is the outline made by Captain Calder himself. The Japanese navy has complete charts both of the Corean and the Chinese coasts. In the summer of 1893 a small expedition of Japanese disguised as Chinese, in a native boat surveyed the islands and coasts of the Gulf of Pechili, spending eight days in the immediate neighborhood of Port Arthur. The topography and physiography of North China have been their study for years.
A Japanese physician even devoted a whole year to the climate and pathology. With his headquarters in Tien-tsin, where he plied the foreign doctors incessantly with queries, this Japanese investigator thoroughly explored the province of Chihli, and probably knows more of the climatic conditions of North China than any other living man. He pretended he had the intention of practicing among the Chinese, as possibly he may in the not distant future. The Chinese have started exotic medical schools, but they have not overcome the elementary difficulty about dissection, and the enterprise is but half hearted. As for employing competent men to gather knowledge, the whole idea is foreign to the Chinese official mind, and they only accept ungraciously as a gift the results of the explorations of enthusiasts for science. It is not, therefore, the accident of being a little earlier in the field, or quicker in movement to seize the benefit of an opportunity, that gives the Japanese such crushing advantages over the Chinese, but rather a deep-seated, congenital love of improvement on one side and hatred of it on the other.
Another essential difference between the people is their exhibition of patriotism. The Japanese are saturated with it, while the Chinese have none. The instinct of loyalty is there, and it can be called out by any man, native or foreign, who is worthy of it, but in the sense of nationality the Chinese have no capacity for enthusiasm, and the people as a whole are indifferent as to who rules them, so long as they are left to cultivate their gardens. For want of a patriotic focus, what would elsewhere be treachery is in China a commonplace of official practices; every man to the limit of his small ability selling his country for his private benefit, and no one able to cast a stone at his neighbor. In Japan it would be impossible to get a man to betray his fatherland; in China where is the man who would not? From the same root springs the incredible difference between the peoples in their treatment of soldiers and sailors. In the one country they are made heroes of, the people at home send delicacies to the troops abroad, honor the dead, and nurse the wounded. In the other the men are treated worse than dogs, robbed of their small pay, deserted, discarded, or grossly neglected by their leaders whenever they can be dispensed with and their monthly pay saved. Attachment between men and officers in China is a rare, though not an unknown thing, for the Chinese are, after all, human at heart, if one can but penetrate the pile of hereditary corruption which has covered up the divine spark.