The War in the East: Japan, China, and Corea

by Trumbull White

Chinese officers are however by no means all abandoned to money making. Some are liberal with their funds, just as some are brave and loyal, and are backed by equally brave and loyal soldiers. The efficiency[efficiency] of a force depends altogether on the personality of the general, and as in feudal times in Europe, it is to their chief rather than to any government or country that the troops feel the ties of allegiance. As the leader is, therefore, so are the men. General Tso-pao-kwei for example, who bore to his grave the honors of the fight at Ping-Yang, was a man well known to many foreigners of different classes, missionary and others, and the unanimity of good opinion of him is quite remarkable. He was not only brave, but a courteous and kindly gentleman who gained the affections of all around. A Mohammedan himself, all his soldiers were of the same faith, and[and] they stood shoulder to shoulder like heroes in the face of overpowering odds.

During the month of August, while the Japanese forces were advancing upon Ping-Yang in three columns, there were outpost skirmishes in which the Japanese were frequently worsted. These affairs were naturally enough reported by the Chinese commanders concerned, according to their lights, as victories, and when it is remembered how the view of each is bounded by the horizon of his own camp, it is easy to see how they could deceive themselves as to the significance of such apparent success. The truth seems to be that the Chinese commanders in and about Ping-Yang did not realize that they were surrounded, each perhaps thinking it was the other’s business. They had sent out no scouts, nor posted videttes to watch the mountain passes to the north of them. These elementary military precautions had been pressed on Li Hung Chang, who sent repeated orders to the front to have them seen to; but nothing was done, for according to the vicious tradition of the Chinese service, the word is taken for the deed, and orders which are either impracticable or inconvenient are simply ignored or forgotten, without the delinquent being ever called to account. Spacious but wholly fictitious excuses would in any case serve the turn in a system whose fetich is universal sham. Perhaps, as there was no commander-in-chief, but a number of independent commands, duties which concerned the army at large fell within the sphere of no one in particular. But in whatever manner it came about, the result was that the Chinese remained in comatose ignorance of the intentions of the enemy, until the only thing left was precipitate retreat.

The affair of Ping-Yang was observed by one military expert, a Russian, who speaks in high terms of the precision and completeness of the Japanese equipment and organization, but the opposition had been so contemptible throughout the war that the military qualities of the Japanese have not been seriously put to the proof. They remain a theoretical quantity. So far as the campaign had gone, to November 1, the chief obstacles encountered had been bad roads, standing crops, and sickness.

The second day after the flight from Ping-Yang, September 17, the naval battle off the Yalu River was fought. The collision of the fleets seems to have been somewhat unpremeditated. The Chinese were engaged in disembarking troops for the re-enforcement of the army at Ping-Yang, and it is a characteristically haphazard proceeding that they should have been landing troops one hundred and twenty miles from the front, to strengthen a position already abandoned. The battle which ensued, and which raged for five hours, has been described with as much fullness as the limits of this volume permit, but the ultimate truth about it will perhaps never be fully known except of course to the Japanese government. From the Chinese side it will be impossible to obtain a consistent account, not because of intentional concealment, but because of the simple reason that no one in the Chinese fleet was able to observe accurately what was going on, except near his own vessel. Nevertheless the salient points of the battle stand out clear enough. The sea fight was but a repetition of the land fight, with two important differences. The first of these was that as the nature of the cause rendered it impossible to sail modern ships of war at all by two-thousand-year-old tactics, the mere possession of a fleet required a European organization. But the organization was imperfect, and would have been unable to sustain itself in action, but for the presence of another element in which the Chinese land forces were entirely lacking, competent foreign direction. This factor also was most imperfect. The foreign officers had been extemporized hastily, the leader of them being not even a seaman. They were of various nationalities and were enlisted about the middle of August. Three engineers, two German, one English; two gunnery officers, one English, one German; had been for some years in the fleet, and volunteered for war service. One American engaged for many years in the Chinese naval college also volunteered for active service during the war. Captain Von Hannecken, bearing now the rank of Chinese general, commissioned as Inspector General of Fortifications, was entrusted with the anomalous office of adviser of the admiral, thus giving him the real command of the fleet. An English civilian with naval training also joined.

On entering on their duties, these officers found the fleet honeycombed with abuses requiring patient reform, but they set themselves to make the best of things as they were, and to get the ships as quickly as possible into action, as the thing most needful in order to brace up officers and men. Von Hannecken urged unceasingly an offensive policy. He would seek out the Japanese and attack them wherever found, fall on their convoys, and generally assert the supremacy of China in Corean waters, from the Yalu eastward. In particular he urged the occupation of Ping-Yang inlet, so important for the support of the army which held the city of that name, and, if necessary, to fight to the death for the possession of a harbor at once so valuable and so easily defended. His prescience was indicated in the sequel, but to all such suggestions Admiral Ting replied with the imperial edict which forbade him to move out of Chinese waters. The convoying service for which the fleet was eventually told off in the middle of September was a sort of compromise, which, without transgressing too flagrantly the imperial restrictions, yet committed the fleet to an engagement on conditions not of its own choosing.

The handling of the respective fleets showed the great superiority of the Japanese professional training, and critics have commented on the weakness of the Chinese manœuvring, but the first consideration was to get the Chinese to fight at all. The government had satisfied itself that without foreigners to lead them, the Chinese commanders would rather lose their ships in trying to escape than stand up to the enemy. The man, the only man available, who possessed the requisite qualities, personal and professional, including a competent knowledge of Chinese, happened to be a soldier, but he at least made the fleet fight, not as a trained admiral would have done with a trained fleet, but in a manner to inspire the Chinese with some confidence in themselves, in which till then they were greatly lacking. That is perhaps the most important result of the baptism of fire of the Chinese navy.

As regards the technical bearings of the action off the Yalu, the Chinese admiral and captains adopted the formation which they said had been taught them by Captain Lang as the most advantageous for attack. But obviously a plan communicated four years ago by an officer whom these same men had intrigued out of their navy, when he had taken it through only half its course of training, could not be considered an infallible weapon with which to meet the thoroughly efficient navy of Japan.

The fight brought out several of the weak points of the Chinese naval organization, and taught the officers many lessons. Most conspicuously was the fatuous economy of ammunition exposed. The most formidable ships for offense and defense were of course the two iron clads Ting-Yuen and Chen-Yuen, with their twelve and one-half inch guns. These guns throw a shell three and one-half calibres long, charged with forty pounds of powder. It is a projectile of low initial velocity, but a most destructive explosive, as the Japanese have testified. There were but four of these shells in the fleet, all being on board the Chen-Yuen. Of a smaller, and of course cheaper shell for the same guns two and one-half calibres long, used for target practice, there were in all fourteen in the two iron clads, and they were fired off in the first hour and a half of the engagement, after which only steel shot was left with which to continue the fight. From the condition of the flag ship and her consort, may be inferred that of the other vessels in the fleet. They were at once however, after the battle, well supplied with shell except of the larger size.

The Chinese fleet was at a disadvantage in manœuvring from inferior speed, but a greater difficulty even than that was the perversity of the personnel. Even on board the flag ship orders were not carried out, but varied or suppressed at the discretion of the officers. In telegraphing from the conning tower to the engine room, the plans of the admiral were frustrated, by the officer who moved the telegraph signalling a low speed when the admiral was ordering a high speed, in order to close with the enemy. This trick was only discovered after the battle, by comparing notes with the German engineer who was below. How many other ways of cheating the commanding officer were resorted to during those critical hours, no one can tell. As for the other ships of the fleet, it is acknowledged that after the first round they kept no formation, each ship fighting her own battle, except the two ironclads with the foreign officers on board, which kept moving in concert till the close. The flagship lost all her signal halyards and a number of signal men in the beginning of the action, and thereby lost touch with the rest of the squadron.