CHANG YEN HOON.
Envoy sent by China to Japan to negotiate terms of peace before the despatch of
Li Hung Chang.—See pages [623] and [655].
FROM PORT ARTHUR TO WEI-HAI-WEI.
China Makes Another Attempt towards Peace—The Envoy Rejected Because of lack of Credentials and Rank—President Cleveland Offers to Help Create Peace—Chinese and Manchoos at War—Japanese Victories Immediately after the Taking of Port Arthur—More Corean Politics—The Third Japanese Army—Preparing for a Descent on the Chinese Mainland—Wei-hai-wei and Its Capture.
Even before Port Arthur had fallen, China was making another attempt to secure peace through the intervention of foreign nations. As this seemed slow in coming, however, it was decided that an informal effort to stop hostilities would be made, one indeed of such a sort that it might be disavowed if criticism seemed to demand. Consequently, Mr. Gustav Detring, the Chinese Commissioner of Customs under Sir Robert Hart, was sent to Japan to feel the way in preliminary negotiations. In its perplexity and distress, the Chinese government took the step which only extremity could have driven it to take. It swallowed the pill which was of all things most bitter. The emperor, on the advice of his council and at the instigation of Prince Kung and Li Hung Chang, appointed a foreigner as envoy to Japan. The office was not one which timid Chinamen would envy, because none of them were ambitious to hand down their names to posterity in connection with the humiliation of their country. The wisest man in office was Prince Kung, but he was not the dictator which he was supposed to be. He was thwarted by other influences, among them the Grand Council, of which he was not but ought to have been a member.
In this confusion, the grand imperial effort towards centralization of authority had partially at least failed, and the failure had the effect of rehabilitating for the moment the Viceroy Li Hung Chang, who once more stood out as the only possible practical man. This aged statesman had many faults, which those who were nearest to him saw most clearly, but if we compare even his faults with the wisdom of his compeers, he was still the one-eyed man among the blind, the only man at the time in the empire who was capable of anything, and whose removal from the scene would have been regarded with grave apprehension by all who were interested in the maintenance of order against chaos.
Mr. Detring, with his suite, left Tien-tsin November 22 by rail to Tung-ku, embarked there on a steamer, under the German flag, called the Li-yu, and steamed down the Gulf of Pechili past Chefoo and Wei-hai-wei. Not until the vessel reached Japan did they know of the fall of Port Arthur. The vessel proceeded to Kobe, where no one was permitted to land at first. The envoy at once sought communication with Count Ito, and applied to the local authorities to inform His Excellency thereof. The result was not an invitation to Mr. Detring to visit Hiroshima, but the dispatch of the Secretary-General of the cabinet, Mr. Ito Moiji, to confer with him at Kobe. From this point there is a difference of statement as to what occurred. The Chinese declare that before the arrival of the secretary, Mr. Detring had been recalled by his government, and having taken leave of the governor he left at daylight on the 29th without waiting to see Mr. Ito, who had arrived the previous night. The Japanese, on the contrary, assert that they refused to entertain any proposals from Mr. Detring, as he was not properly accredited and had no authority whatever to make peace negotiations. However that may be, it is certain that he returned to China without having an audience with any Japanese officials, and that the peace negotiations were never even begun.
The next surprise was that whereas the United States had declined to entertain England’s proposal for a coalition of powers to restore peace to the orient, President Cleveland subsequently tendered to Japan his good offices as mediator. He hoped that by his aid peace might be restored, and restored in such a manner as to secure to Japan the just fruits of her victories. A reply declining his proposal, couched in duly grateful terms, was conveyed to the president by Japan, and he having learned in the interval that the European powers would not agree to intervene conjointly, ceased his own activity. It was still hoped however that Minister Denby at Peking and Minister Dun at Tokio would be able to use their good offices in advancing peace. Japan was holding out the insistence that China must speak for herself if she wanted peace. Japan however did go so far as to say that if China had any propositions of peace to make, they might be transmitted in the beginning through the United States ministers in Japan and China. It was still evident however, that China would hold off as long as possible, in the hope that something would turn up to relieve her of the necessity of suing for peace.
The Manchoo princes feared and mistrusted the Chinese, who seemed to be indifferent to the issue of the war, and intent only on obtaining individual advantage. It was reiterated again and again, that the Chinese secret societies desired Japanese success in order that the Manchoo dynasty be overthrown and the Chinese restored to power. Captain Von Hannecken, at the request of the Tsung-li Yamen, submitted a comprehensive scheme of military reorganization. This was approved by the emperor and the Manchoo statesmen, but was frustrated by the strategem of certain wealthy taotais, on the alleged ground of economy. The question was then referred from Peking to Tien-tsin. Thus the central and provincial governments reduced each other to impotence. Genuine reform in China appeared to be hopeless, owing to the invincible ignorance of the rulers. There was much popular discontent at the imbecility of the government.