Other political or pressure groups: Socialist Alliance of Working People
of Yugoslavia (SAWPY), the major mass front organization; Confederation of
Trade Unions of Yugoslavia (CTUY), League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia,
Federation of Veterans' Associations of Yugoslavia (SUBNOR)
Member of: ASSIMER, CCC, CEMA (observer but participates in certain
commissions), FAO, G-77, GATT, IAEA, IBA, IBRD, ICAC, ICAO, IDA,
IDB—Inter-American Development Bank, IFAD, IFC, IHO, ILO, ILZSG, IMF, IMO,
INTELSAT, INTERPOL, IPU, ITC, ITU, NAM, OECD (participant in some activities),
UN, UNESCO, UPU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO
Diplomatic representation: Ambassador Dzevad MUJEZINOVIC; Chancery at 2410 California Street NW, Washington DC 20008; telephone (202) 462-6566; there are Yugoslav Consulates General in Chicago, Cleveland, New York, Pittsburgh, and San Francisco; US—Ambassador Warren ZIMMERMAN; Embassy at Kneza Milosa 50, Belgrade; telephone [38] (11) 645-655; there is a US Consulate General in Zagreb
Flag: three equal horizontal bands of blue (top), white, and red with a large red five-pointed star edged in yellow superimposed in the center over all three bands
- Economy Overview: Tito's reform programs 20 years ago changed the Stalinist command economy to a decentralized semimarket system but a system that the rigid, ethnically divided political structure ultimately could not accommodate. A prominent feature of the reforms was the establishment of workers' self-management councils in all large plants, which were to select managers, stimulate production, and divide the proceeds. The general result of these reforms has been rampant wage-price inflation, substantial rundown of capital plant, consumer shortages, and a still larger income gap between the poorer southern regions and the relatively affluent northern provinces of Hrvatska and Slovenija. In 1988-89 the beleaguered central government has been reforming the reforms, trying to create an open market economy with still considerable state ownership of major industrial plants. These reforms have been moving forward with the advice and support of the International Monetary Fund through a series of tough negotiations. Self-management supposedly is to be replaced by the discipline of the market and by fiscal austerity, ultimately leading to a stable dinar. However, strikes in major plants, hyperinflation, and interregional political jousting have held back progress. According to US economic advisers, only a highly unlikely combination of genuine privatization, massive Western economic investment and aid, and political moderation can salvage this economy.
GNP: $129.5 billion, per capita $5,464; real growth rate - 1.0% (1989 est.)
Inflation rate (consumer prices): 2,700% (1989 est.)
Unemployment rate: 15% (1989)
Budget: revenues $6.4 billion; expenditures $6.4 billion, including capital expenditures of $NA (1990)
Exports: $13.1 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities—raw materials and semimanufactures 50%, consumer goods 31%, capital goods and equipment 19%; partners—EC 30%, CEMA 45%, less developed countries 14%, US 5%, other 6%