Political parties and leaders:
pro-market democrats: Our Home Is Russia, Viktor CHERNOMYRDIN;
Yabloko Bloc, Grigoriy YAVLINSKIY; Russia's Democratic Choice Party,
Yegor GAYDAR; Forward, Russia!, Boris FEDOROV
centrists/special interest parties: Congress of Russian Communities,
Yuriy SKOKOV; Women of Russia, Alevtina FEDULOVA and Yekaterina
LAKHOVA
anti-market and/or ultranationalist parties: Communist Party of the
Russian Federation, Gennadiy ZYUGANOV; Liberal Democratic Party of
Russia, Vladimir ZHIRINOVSKIY; Agrarian Party, Mikhail LAPSHIN;
Power To the People, Nikolay RYZHKOV and Sergey BABURIN; Russian
Communist Workers' Party, Viktor ANPILOV and Viktor TYULKIN
note: some 269 political parties, blocs, and associations tried to
gather enough signatures to run slates of candidates in the 17
December 1995 Duma elections; 43 succeeded
Other political or pressure groups: NA
International organization participation: BSEC, CBSS, CCC, CE,
CERN (observer), CIS, EBRD, ECE, ESCAP, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICRM, IDA,
IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, Inmarset, Intelsat, Interpol, IOC, IOM
(observer), ISO, ITU, MINURSO, MTCR, NACC, NSG, OAS (observer),
OSCE, PCA, PFP, UN, UN Security Council, UNAMIR, UNAVEM III, UNCRO,
UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNIKOM, UNITAR, UNMIH, UNOMIG,
UNPREDEP, UNPROFOR, UNTSO, UPU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WToO, WTrO
(applicant), ZC
Diplomatic representation in US: chief of mission: Ambassador Yuliy Mikhaylovich VORONTSOV chancery: 2650 Wisconsin Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20007 telephone: [1] (202) 298-5700 through 5704 FAX: [1] (202) 298-5735 consulate(s) general: New York, San Francisco, and Seattle
US diplomatic representation: chief of mission: Ambassador Thomas R. PICKERING embassy: Novinskiy Bul'var 19/23, Moscow mailing address: APO AE 09721 telephone: [7] (095) 252-24-51 through 59 FAX: [7] (095) 956-42-61 consulate(s) general: St. Petersburg, Vladivostok, Yekaterinburg
Flag: three equal horizontal bands of white (top), blue, and red
Economy ———-
Economic overview: Russia, a vast country with a wealth of natural resources, a well-educated population, and a diverse industrial base, continues to experience formidable difficulties in moving from its old centrally planned economy to a modern-market economy. The break-up of the USSR into 15 successor states in late 1991 destroyed major economic links that have been only partially replaced. As a result of these dislocations and the failure of the government to implement a rigorous and consistent reform program, output in Russia has dropped by one-third since 1990 (instead of the one-half previously estimated). On the one hand, President YEL'TSIN's government has made substantial strides in converting to a market economy since launching its economic reform program in January 1992 by freeing nearly all prices, slashing defense spending, eliminating the old centralized distribution system, completing an ambitious voucher privatization program in 1994, establishing private financial institutions, and decentralizing foreign trade. On the other hand, Russia has made little progress in a number of key areas that are needed to provide a solid foundation for the transition to a market economy; and the strong showing of the communists and nationalists in the Duma elections in December 1995 casts a shadow over prospects for further reforms. In 1995, the new cash privatization program went slower than planned. The state claims that the nonstate sector produced approximately 70% of GDP in 1995, up from 62% in 1994, although these figures apparently include many enterprises that have only nominally moved out of state control. Moscow has been slow to develop the legal framework necessary to fully support a market economy and to encourage foreign investment. Stockholder rights remain ill-defined and the Duma has yet to adopt a land code that would allow development of land markets as sources of needed capital. Russia's securities market remains largely unregulated and suffers from the lack of a comprehensive securities law. In addition, Moscow has yet to develop a social safety net that would allow faster restructuring by relieving enterprises of the burden of providing social benefits for their workers. Most rank-and-file Russians perceive they are worse off because of growing crime and health problems, the drop in real wages, the great rise in wage arrears, and the widespread threat of unemployment. The number of Russians living below the official poverty level rose by 10% to 36.6 million people, or 25% of the population. The decline in output slowed during 1995, and some sectors showed signs of a turnaround; analysts forecast the resumption of growth in 1996 - at a low rate. Russian official data, which fail to capture a considerable portion of private sector output and employment, show that GDP declined by 4% in 1995, as compared with a 15% decline in 1994. Despite continued declines in agricultural and industrial production, unemployment climbed only slowly to about 8% of the work force by yearend because government policies aimed at softening the impact of reforms have created incentives for enterprises to keep workers on the rolls even as production slowed to a crawl. Moscow renewed tightened financial policies in early 1995 and succeeded in reducing monthly consumer price inflation from 18% in January to about 3% in December, the lowest monthly rate since the beginning of reform. According to official trade statistics, Russia ran a $19.9 billion trade surplus for 1995, up from $15.9 billion in 1994. It continued to shift its trade away from the other former Soviet republics toward the West, with the CIS countries' share of Russian trade falling to 22% in 1995. Russia made good progress with official and commercial creditors in 1995 in resolving the issue of its $105 billion in Soviet-era debts. When completed, these Paris Club and London Club rescheduling agreements will reduce Russia's repayment liabilities from $20 billion to less than $5 billion annually through the end of the decade. Capital flight reportedly continued to be a problem in 1995, with billions of additional dollars in assets being moved abroad, primarily to bank accounts in Europe.
GDP: purchasing power parity - $796 billion (1995 estimate as extrapolated from World Bank estimate for 1994)
GDP real growth rate: -4% (1995 est.)