Political pressure groups and leaders: no meaningful political opposition groups exist
International organization participation: AfDB, APEC, AsDB, BIS
(pending member), CCC, ESCAP, FAO, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC, ICFTU, ICRM,
IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, Inmarsat, Intelsat,
Interpol, IOC, ISO, ITU, LAIA (observer), MINURSO, NAM (observer),
PCA, UN, UN Security Council, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNIKOM,
UNITAR, UNTSO, UNU, UPU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WToO, WTrO (applicant)
Diplomatic representation in the US: chief of mission: Ambassador LI Zhaoxing chancery: 2300 Connecticut Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20008 telephone: [1] (202) 328-2500 through 2502 consulate(s) general: Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, New York, and San Francisco
Diplomatic representation from the US: chief of mission: Ambassador James R. SASSER embassy: Xiu Shui Bei Jie 3, 100600 Beijing mailing address: PSC 461, Box 50, FPO AP 96521-0002 telephone: [86] (10) 6532-3831 FAX: [86] (10) 6532-6422 consulate(s) general: Chengdu, Guangzhou, Shanghai, Shenyang
Flag description: red with a large yellow five-pointed star and four smaller yellow five-pointed stars (arranged in a vertical arc toward the middle of the flag) in the upper hoist-side corner
@China:Economy
Economy-overview: Beginning in late 1978 the Chinese leadership has been trying to move the economy from a sluggish Soviet-style centrally planned economy to a more market-oriented economy but still within a rigid political framework of Communist Party control. To this end the authorities switched to a system of household responsibility in agriculture in place of the old collectivization, increased the authority of local officials and plant managers in industry, permitted a wide variety of small-scale enterprise in services and light manufacturing, and opened the economy to increased foreign trade and investment. The result has been a quadrupling of GDP since 1978. Agricultural output doubled in the 1980s, and industry also posted major gains, especially in coastal areas near Hong Kong and opposite Taiwan, where foreign investment helped spur output of both domestic and export goods. On the darker side, the leadership has often experienced in its hybrid system the worst results of socialism (bureaucracy, lassitude, corruption) and of capitalism (windfall gains and stepped-up inflation). Beijing thus has periodically backtracked, retightening central controls at intervals. In 1992-97 annual growth of GDP accelerated, particularly in the coastal areas-averaging about 10% annually according to official figures. In late 1993 China's leadership approved additional long-term reforms aimed at giving still more play to market-oriented institutions and at strengthening the center's control over the financial system; state enterprises would continue to dominate many key industries in what was now termed "a socialist market economy." In 1995-97 inflation dropped sharply, reflecting tighter monetary policies and stronger measures to control food prices. At the same time, the government struggled to (a) collect revenues due from provinces, businesses, and individuals; (b) reduce corruption and other economic crimes; and (c) keep afloat the large state-owned enterprises, most of which had not participated in the vigorous expansion of the economy and many of which have been losing the ability to pay full wages and pensions. From 60 to 100 million surplus rural workers are adrift between the villages and the cities, many subsisting through part-time low-paying jobs. Popular resistance, changes in central policy, and loss of authority by rural cadres have weakened China's population control program, which is essential to maintaining growth in living standards. Another long-term threat to continued rapid economic growth is the deterioration in the environment, notably air pollution, soil erosion, and the steady fall of the water table especially in the north. China continues to lose arable land because of erosion and economic development; furthermore, the regime gives insufficient priority to agricultural research. The next few years may witness increasing tensions between a highly centralized political system and an increasingly decentralized economic system. Rapid economic growth likely will continue but at a declining rate. Hong Kong's reversion on 1 July 1997 to Chinese administration will strengthen the already close ties between the two economies.
GDP: purchasing power parity-$4.25 trillion (1997 estimate as
extrapolated from World Bank estimate for 1995 with use of official
Chinese growth figures for 1996-97; the result may overstate China's
GDP by as much as 25%)
GDP-real growth rate: 8.8% (1997 est.)
GDP-per capita: purchasing power parity-$3,460 (1997 est.)