Executive branch: chief of state: Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Ali Hoseini-KHAMENEI (since 4 June 1989) head of government: President (Ali) Mohammad KHATAMI-Ardakani (since 3 August 1997); First Vice President Hasan Ebrahim HABIBI (since NA August 1989) cabinet: Council of Ministers selected by the president with legislative approval elections: leader of the Islamic Revolution appointed for life by the Assembly of Experts; president elected by popular vote for a four-year term; election last held 23 May 1997 (next to be held NA May 2001) election results: (Ali) Mohammad KHATAMI-Ardakani elected president; percent of vote - (Ali) Mohammad KHATAMI-Ardakani 69%
Legislative branch: unicameral Islamic Consultative Assembly or Majles-e-Shura-ye-Eslami (290 seats, note - changed from 270 seats with the 18 February 2000 election; members elected by popular vote to serve four-year terms) elections: last held 18 February-NA April 2000 (next to be held NA 2004) election results: percent of vote - NA; seats - NA; note - reformers received 70% of the vote (170 seats), the conservatives received 30% (45 seats), and independents (10 seats); 65 seats were up for runoff election in April 2000
Judicial branch: Supreme Court
Political parties and leaders: since President KHATAMI's election in May 1997, several political parties have been licensed; Executives of Construction; Followers of the Imam's Line and the Leader (conservative); Islamic Coalition Association [Habibollah ASQAR-OLADI]; Islamic Iran Solidarity Party; Islamic Partnership Front; Militant Clerics Association ; Second Khordad Front (pro-reform); Tehran Militant Clergy Association Political pressure groups and leaders: active student groups include the pro-reform "Organization for Strengthening Unity" and "the Union of Islamic Student Societies'; groups that generally support the Islamic Republic include Ansar-e Hizballah, Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution, Muslim Students Following the Line of the Imam, and the Islamic Coalition Association; opposition groups include the Liberation Movement of Iran and the Nation of Iran party; armed political groups that have been almost completely repressed by the government include Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK), People's Fedayeen, Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan; the Society for the Defense of Freedom
International organization participation: CCC, CP, ECO, ESCAP, FAO,
G-19, G-24, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC, ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC,
IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, Inmarsat, Intelsat, Interpol, IOC, IOM
(observer), ISO, ITU, NAM, OIC, OPCW, OPEC, PCA, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO,
UNHCR, UNIDO, UPU, WCL, WFTU, WHO, WMO, WToO
Diplomatic representation in the US: none; note - Iran has an Interests Section in the Pakistani Embassy, headed by Faramarz FATH-NEJAD; address: Iranian Interests Section, Pakistani Embassy, 2209 Wisconsin Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20007; telephone: (202) 965-4990
Diplomatic representation from the US: none; note - protecting power in Iran is Switzerland
Flag description: three equal horizontal bands of green (top), white, and red; the national emblem (a stylized representation of the word Allah) in red is centered in the white band; ALLAH AKBAR (God is Great) in white Arabic script is repeated 11 times along the bottom edge of the green band and 11 times along the top edge of the red band
@Iran:Economy
Economy - overview: Iran's economy is a mixture of central planning, state ownership of oil and other large enterprises, village agriculture, and small-scale private trading and service ventures. President KHATAMI has continued to follow the market reform plans of former President RAFSANJANI and has indicated that he will pursue diversification of Iran's oil-reliant economy although he has made little progress toward that goal. The strong oil market in 1996 helped ease financial pressures on Iran and allowed for Tehran's timely debt service payments. Iran's financial situation tightened in 1997 and deteriorated further in 1998 because of lower oil prices. The subsequent zoom in oil prices in 1999 afforded Iran fiscal breathing room but does not solve Iran's structural economic problems.