It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the Soviet Union in the last several years has demonstrated a great skill in coordinating its progress in missilery, its success in space missions, and its foreign policy and world image. Shots seem to have been timed to maximize the effects of visits of Soviet leaders and to punctuate Soviet statements and positions in international negotiations. This is not to equate their space activities with hollow propaganda. Empty claims do not have a positive effect for long. Nor is there any firm evidence that it has been possible for political policymakers to call their shots at times inconsistent with good scientific and technical needs. The conclusion is rather that the many elements of scientific, technical, military, political, and psychological policy are all weighed, and tests which make a full contribution to such a combined strategy are carried out and supported with appropriate publicity.[23]
There is also evidence that scientific endeavor by the Russians for prestige purposes is having repercussions on internal policy. Great emphasis is currently being placed on the demonstrable usefulness of scientific effort—to the extent that Soviet colleges, research institutions, examining boards, and academies of science have been directed to be more exacting in conferring scientific degrees and titles. Newness and usefulness are requisite, but, at the same time, degrees may now be awarded for other than dissertations; inventions and textbooks of major importance may also earn a degree for their authors.[24]
Within the prestige context, it is true that the United States must labor under certain handicaps because of the nature of its democratic system.
No effort is made in the American space program to hide the failures which result from its highly complex character. Our burnups, misfires, explosions, fizzles, and lost or wayward vehicles are well publicized. Those of the Soviet Union rarely are. Even though most nations are well aware that the Russians must be having their troubles, too, the appearance of uniform success fostered by the U.S.S.R. inevitably contributes to an image of scientific superiority. In addition, the Soviets have developed a habit of striving for spectacular "firsts," most of which undoubtedly are undertaken almost as much for prestige reasons as for scientific ones.
Figure 4.—Symbolic of the American effort in space is this Thor-Able rocket, shown here launching the Tiros weather satellite into a near-perfect orbit. This same vehicle, which launched the record-breaking 23 million-mile communication probe—Pioneer V—has contributed enormously to U.S. prestige abroad.
Still, the United States has not done badly from the prestige angle. So far as the world's scientific fraternity is concerned, it may even be well in the lead.
In the first 30 or so months following the opening of the space age, as signaled by the launching of Sputnik I in October 1957, the United States put 21 satellites into orbit out of 42 attempts. Two out of five deep-space probes were successful. The degree of success for all major launchings ran better than 50 percent. The American effort has been based on a broad scope of inquiry and includes long-range communications, weather reporting, navigation and surveillance vehicles, as well as information-gathering satellites.
During the same period the Soviets launched four Earth satellites, one deep-space probe, one lunar-impact probe and one satellite into a much elongated Earth orbit which circled and photographed the Moon. Most of their vehicles have been substantially heavier than those launched by the United States, although complete information on their scientific purposes and the result obtained has never been disclosed.