Mr. Dennett. The most damaging effect to the Communist Party was that it shook the faith of many of those who were members of the district bureau at that time. I must admit that I tried to present the appearance myself of not losing faith in the integrity of the Soviet foreign policy. However, I must also admit that there was a little bit of deception in that for the reason that I could not completely justify it, no matter how hard I tried, and I found that Mr. Costigan became very bitter about it. I found also that Mr. Ebey had a few misgivings. He didn’t express them at that time too sharply because he is a very mild-mannered sort of person. But those of us who were in the rough and tough political battles put on a case-hardened outward appearance which was intended to inspire the ranks to hold the line.
Mr. Tavenner. What was the final result?
Mr. Dennett. The final result was that various organizations affiliated to the Washington Commonwealth Federation found their political conviction to be inconsistent with the official policy expressed by disguised Communist leaders in the Washington Commonwealth Federation. So that many of them began to disaffiliate and leave the organization, so that it did not embrace the commanding minority which it had previously had.
Mr. Tavenner. In other words, your position of control in that organization was weakened, if not virtually destroyed, by this disaffection that had arisen within the Communist Party ranks largely as a result of international problems.
Mr. Dennett. That is very true.
Those of us who presented what might be referred to as a case-hardened outward appearance did so largely in the hope and faith that our loyalty to the Soviet Union under those circumstances would be rewarded by the Soviet Union remaining loyal and true to the socialist ideals which all of us held.
However, at a later date, after the Second World War, just to make the comment without going into detail at this moment, many began to find out through their experience in the Army and military efforts, and through persons who traveled abroad and came into contact directly with the Russian military effort—many became convinced that there was a considerable difference between the democracy that had been preached about in the Soviet Union and the actual practice which they found.
Also there was a serious disillusionment when large numbers of soldiers learned, to their dismay, that even during the war period the Soviet Union had in labor camps very large numbers of persons who were held in those camps as political prisoners, a policy which we had been led to believe, through all the official propaganda, that the Communist Party in the Soviet Union wouldn’t possibly indulge in such a practice, that only the capitalist countries would practice such a heinous crime.
But it was a terrible shock and disillusionment when large numbers of people found, out of their own direct knowledge, that these huge forced labor camps did in fact exist and that people who were committed to them were committed to them for terms ranging from 25 years to life instead of the official propaganda which has been preached, to the effect that no sentence was over 10 years in length in the Soviet Union. And we found there was a great deal of difference between fact and fancy.
(At this point Representative Harold H. Velde left the hearing room.)