Answer. Ever since the battle of Shiloh. I have commanded at Bolivar and Jackson, Tennessee, until about the 20th of November, 1862, when I was ordered to Memphis.
Question. Now, with regard to this raid of Forrest, was that raid made in your department?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Please give us, in your own way, a brief account of that raid.
Answer. Forrest first crossed the Memphis and Charleston railroad last December. I organized a force in Columbus, and moved it down and drove him out. General Sherman then ordered all the available troops in my command to be got together—leaving very small garrisons at the important points—for the Meridian expedition. I marched and crossed there, and marched back again. Two divisions of my command were then detailed to go up Red river, under General Banks. As an auxiliary to the infantry movement to Meridian, General W. S. Smith came to Memphis and took command of all my cavalry and another brigade which he brought over, all amounting to about seven thousand effective men, to move across the country, drive the enemy's force out, cut his way across to Columbus and Aberdeen, and to go down to the Mobile and Ohio railroad, and join us at Meridian. He failed to make that junction; was met by Forrest about West Point, and for some reason or other (I do not know what) retreated and fell back to Memphis. The effect of a retreat, at the rate at which they retreated, and the loss they met with, and the retreating before an inferior force, demoralized the cavalry very seriously. I returned to Memphis about the Three Points, marched, and found that Forrest was organizing a very considerable force, so far as I could find out, with the intention of moving up to West Tennessee. I had orders from the War Department to send home all the veteran regiments (cavalry especially) as rapidly as possible. I took an inventory of my force, and found that I had about six thousand cavalry to two thousand two hundred horses, which limited the efficiency of the cavalry. I furloughed and sent home the 3d Michigan, 2d Iowa, 3d, 6th, 7th, and 9th Illinois, and distributed their horses among the men that were left, so as to keep men enough always, and more, to mount with horses. Forrest moved up, and crossed the line of the Charleston and Memphis railroad, towards Jackson, Tennessee, and occupied it. General Grierson was directed by me to go out with his cavalry, feel him, attack him, and cripple him as much as possible. He went out, and reported that he was "a little too strong for him, and he could not touch him." My effective force at Memphis consisted of 2,200 cavalry, 2,100 white infantry, and 2,400 colored infantry. I had the choice to move out a force sufficiently strong to attack Forrest and leave Memphis open, with its immense amount of government stores, ordnance, hospitals, and everything of that nature. I became satisfied that if I moved out 4,000 men, (which was the lowest I considered safe to send out,) and they should move out 50 or 60 miles into the country, the enemy, being all mounted, would turn that force and come in and occupy Memphis, which I considered would be a greater disaster than to allow Forrest to range in West Tennessee. I therefore did not send them out, but I kept the cavalry out as far as we could go, or dared go. It was not possible to divine precisely what Forrest's intentions were. My own opinion was, that it was his intention to organize a force, cross the Tennessee river, and operate upon General Sherman's line of communication. I was at Cairo at the time Union City was attacked. Four regiments and a battery of one of my divisions, which were ordered up the Tennessee river, were here also. I directed General Brayman to take them and throw them up to Columbus in rear of Forrest when he was at Paducah, but they were peremptorily ordered up the Tennessee river.
Question. Ordered up by General Sherman?
Answer. Yes, sir. The result was, that there was not force enough, in my opinion, in the command on the Mississippi river, from Paducah to Memphis, to operate upon Forrest with any prospect of success.
Question. What was the estimated strength of Forrest's forces?
Answer. Forrest's entire force, according to the best of my information, was between 8,000 and 9,000 men altogether. That includes this division of Buford's that operated up here. I have somewhere among my papers a list of all his brigades. I know nearly all of them. I have run against nearly all of them. He had five of the oldest regiments in the confederate service detailed expressly for this purpose as a nucleus of his organization. These were troops that had seen a great deal of service along the line below Memphis—Chalmers's brigade, Ely's brigade, Bell's brigade, and McCullough's. I cannot estimate Forrest's force at less than between 8,000 and 9,000 men. The cause of his raid, unquestionably, was the fact that so large an amount of troops which had been holding this region of country had been removed—a portion of them up the Tennessee river to Decatur, and a portion up the Red river—also the fact that he knew perfectly well, from his spies at Memphis, the condition of our cavalry. Memphis, from the nature of the ground there, is a place that requires not less than five thousand men to garrison the outer line. It is the worst place to cover that I ever saw. We have a fort there that was built that would take seven thousand men as a reasonable amount to line the parapets. We have immense stores there, for from Memphis not only the 16th and 17th army corps are supplied, but General Steele's army at Little Rock are supplied from there also. We have large hospitals there, scattered all over the city. We have an unsteady and unreliable population; and the daily interior guard duty, for the city proper, requires over 300 men. I considered then, and I consider now, that the removal of any force competent to make any serious impression upon Forrest would have imperilled Memphis; and I believe that was what General Forrest wanted done.
Question. How large a force did you retain there for the safety of that place?