Besides the restoration of public credit, he thought the act had in view the encouragement of a particular description of people, which might lead them into enterprises of a peculiar nature, for the protection of which the public faith seemed to be pledged. But would gentlemen infer from hence, that no alteration ought to take place if the manufactures were well established? The subject appeared to him in a twofold point of view; first, to provide for the exigencies of Government, and second, for the establishment of public credit; but he thought both these objects could be obtained without making the bill perpetual. If the Government showed a proper attention to the punctual performance of its engagements, it would obtain the latter; the other would be secured by making provision as the occasion demanded. If the bill was to be made perpetual, it would be continued after the purpose for which it was adopted had ceased; the error would in this case be irremediable; whereas, if its limitation was determined, it would always be in the power of the Government to make it commensurate with what the public debts and contingencies required.
The constitution, as had already been observed, places the power in the House of originating money bills. The principal reason why the constitution had made this distinction was, because they were chosen by the people, and supposed to be best acquainted with their interests and ability. In order to make them more particularly acquainted with these objects, the democratic branch of the Legislature consisted of a greater number, and were chosen for a shorter period, so that they might revert more frequently to the mass of the people. Now, if a revenue law was made perpetual, however unequal its operation might be, it would be out of the power of this House to effect an alteration; for if the President chose to object to the measure, it would require two-thirds of both Houses to carry it. Even if the House of Representatives were unanimous in their opinion that the law ought to be repealed, they would not be able to carry it, unless a great majority appeared in the Senate also.
Mr. Boudinot said, the time mentioned by the former Congress, and to which they requested the concurrence of the several States, was, that the impost duties might be continued for twenty-five years. This request was made on full consideration, and they did not think it was more than sufficient to discharge the principal and interest of the national debt. He concluded, therefore, that it was better to let the law remain without limitation; because when they found the purposes for which it was intended were accomplished, it would be in the power of Congress to repeal the law.
Mr. Lawrence thought the present was a subject of great importance, and he lamented it was not brought forward at an earlier period, because he feared the time would not allow that full discussion or deliberation which ought to take place. He wished also that the House was acquainted with the necessities of the United States, that so they might make provision accordingly; but these two points were mere matter of speculation as to their precise amount; yet he believed it was agreed on all hands, that the ways and means provided in this bill for the support of Government, the payment of interest and instalments of the foreign and domestic debt, were, so far as agreed to, inadequate to the object. If this be the case, the public debt must accumulate; and as we do not know when the time may come for its extinguishment, the provision cannot be limited; for every gentleman will agree, that if the demand for revenue be increased, the fund ought to be commensurate to the object. Is there any time when the civil list will cease its demand? If there is not, there will be a perpetual call for revenue. He thought it absolutely impossible to provide for the payment of the debts, if the bill was limited to two, three, or four years; such a precarious provision would never tend to the re-establishment of public credit. If the bill was not limited, it would always be in the power of the Legislature to lower the duties, or make such other alteration as might, upon experience, be thought beneficial to the community; whereas if the bill were limited, it would be thought improper to make any amendments during the term for which it is enacted, although those amendments appeared indispensably necessary. But why is this degree of caution necessary? Will not the administration of public affairs be conducted in future by representatives as good as ourselves? Will they have less wisdom or virtue, to discover and pursue the good of their fellow-citizens than we have?
Mr. Bland.—Our public credit consists of two branches: first, as it respects the evidences of our debt, in the hands of those from whom we have had money or services; and secondly, as it respects our ability to borrow in future. Now, the first branch of public credit depends upon the punctuality with which the interest is paid; but this in foreign nations, does not depend upon the limitation of the act. Do gentlemen suppose our laws, like those of the Medes and Persians, unchangeable? Can any person, who has read our constitution, believe that it is in our power to pass a law without limitation? No, it is impossible. Every person knows that a future Congress may repeal this and every other law we pass, whenever they think proper. The constitution had particularly intrusted the House of Representatives with the power of raising money; great care was necessary to preserve this privilege inviolate; it was one of the greatest securities the people had for their liberties under this Government. Moreover, the importance of the House itself depended upon holding the purse-strings; if they once part with this power, they would become insignificant, and the other branch of the Legislature might become altogether independent of them. For these reasons, he was in favor of the motion of his honorable colleague, and hoped it would obtain.
Mr. Gerry.—There seems to be a great variety of opinions entertained by gentlemen on this question. But he thought they would all agree on these two points: first, that there were very great demands upon the federal treasury; and, secondly, that they had no kind of documents to show what they were, or what the revenue bill would produce. Under these circumstances, gentlemen must agree, that there is danger of passing a law that would operate oppressively, and without reason. There was also danger of erring in the mode of collecting, for want of experience to guide them. From these considerations, there was no doubt but the act would require the reconsideration of the Legislature in a short time; there may be applications from the people of all quarters to repeal a part of it. But what are their immediate representatives to do, in case the bill be made perpetual? They may be convinced that a repeal would be just and necessary; but it may not be in their power to remedy the grievances of their constituents, however desirous they may be of doing so; for, although this House may originate and carry a bill unanimously through for the repeal, yet it will be in the power of the President, and the minority of the other branch of Congress, to prevent a repeal.
Mr. Huntingdon thought it easy to see the danger of making this bill perpetual: besides parting with the power which the constitution gave to the House of Representatives, in authorizing them solely to originate money bills, there would be another inconvenience, which was, extending the revenue beyond what the nature of the public debt required. The foreign debt was payable by instalments; it was saying nothing to allege that the debt would accumulate, because the United States must make provision for the annual extinguishment of a part. If the revenue, arising from the impost, be insufficient for this purpose, recourse must be had to some other fund, which will enable us to perform the engagements of the late Congress. It is true the debt is large, and will take time to pay it off, but he had no doubt but it would be done according to contract, and with honor to the Union. How, then, can gentlemen suppose the revenue ought to be perpetual, in order to be commensurate with the object? If they contemplated the contraction of more debts in future, the supposition might be true; but he saw no reason why gentlemen should extend their views so far. He thought if a future war, or some other untoward circumstance, should increase the national debt, it ought to be provided for by the Government who were acquainted with the necessity. He thought the House ought to consider seriously before they parted with their powers; it was easy for them to pass a bill to give power, but it was difficult to recall it. He had seen many instances of this kind; one in particular in the State from which he came, where the Legislature had given the appointment of sheriffs, and some other little matters, out of their hands, and had been a long time endeavoring to get it back; but they had not been able to obtain it. He had no suspicions of any character in the Senate, but the constitution had made that body in some degree perpetual, to obtain a permanency in the laws; if, therefore, this revenue bill had once their approbation, they might be inclined to continue it, even against the sentiments of the people and of the House. Though he was not against trusting the gentlemen who now composed the Senate, he was against trusting their successors.
Mr. Smith, of South Carolina, was also in favor of the clause; he conceived the only reason of weight urged against it, related to the restoration of public credit; but he thought every person possessed of the stock or debt of the United States would have the same feelings and reasoning as the House; they would know that their demands depended upon a higher source than Congress, and might be sure that we would do our duty in making particular provision. If Congress neglected this, one part of the creditors would compel them. If it was found that the United States were not disposed to pay their debts, foreigners would find the means to make them. Taking it therefore for granted, that Congress would always provide for these objects, he would proceed to consider what effect might arise from a permanent or temporary provision. If the latter were made, the creditors would honor us for our exertions, and confide in our continuing to provide for them in the manner we should find upon experience most convenient to the community. If the system was declared to be a perpetual provision for the payment of their interest, it would give no hope, in the first place, for the redemption of the capital; and in the second, if Congress were to alter it, and which, in all probability they shortly must, the security would be impaired, and an essential injury done to the public credit, which we are so desirous to revive.
Mr. Ames considered this as a very important question; and in order that his own mind might be fully enlightened, he had listened with the most unwearied attention to the arguments urged on both sides; but he was far from being satisfied that the motion was necessary or proper for the House to adopt.
Gentlemen tell us they are willing to make the revenue commensurate with the debt. If they do this, all the inconveniences resulting from the imperfection of the system will be entailed upon us for a number of years. Other gentlemen mention a year or two for its limitation. Can the House listen seriously to such a proposition? If we were to tell our creditors that we are making provision for them for one year, would it tend to inspire them with confidence in our wisdom or justice? Would our foreign creditors believe we were scrupulously fulfilling our engagements with them? No: nothing less than a fixed, permanent system, can beget confidence or give security. An illusory system of one or two years' duration would engender distrust; its very visage would make the public suspect deception. If we do not mean to deceive, why not make the provision commensurate to the occasion? His idea of a temporary act was pro hac vice, by way of experiment: but he thought the House could not make the experiment with this bill, because the public credit would not admit of it. If this act be made for one year, will it not be a considerable expense to the public by going over all the ground again, which had taken the House such a length of time to discuss?