Mr. Madison did not concur with the gentleman in his interpretation of the constitution. What, said he, would be the consequence of such construction? It would in effect establish every officer of the Government on the firm tenure of good behavior; not the heads of departments only, but all the inferior officers of those departments, would hold their offices during good behavior, and that to be judged of by one branch of the Legislature only on the impeachment of the other. If the constitution means this by its declarations to be the case, we must submit; but I should lament it as a fatal error interwoven in the system, and one that would ultimately prove its destruction. I think the inference would not arise from a fair construction of the words of that instrument.
It is very possible that an officer who may not incur the displeasure of the President, may be guilty of actions that ought to forfeit his place. The power of this House may reach him by the means of an impeachment, and he may be removed even against the will of the President; so that the declaration in the constitution was intended as a supplemental security for the good behavior of the public officers. It is possible the case I have stated may happen. Indeed, it may, perhaps, on some occasion, be found necessary to impeach the President himself; surely, therefore, it may happen to a subordinate officer, whose bad actions may be connived at or overlooked by the President. Hence the people have an additional security in this constitutional provision.
I think it absolutely necessary that the President should have the power of removing from office; it will make him, in a peculiar manner, responsible for their conduct, and subject him to impeachment himself, if he suffers them to perpetrate with impunity high crimes or misdemeanors against the United States, or neglects to superintend their conduct, so as to check their excesses. On the constitutionality of the declaration I have no manner of doubt.
Mr. Benson.—If we refer to the constitution for light on this subject, it will appear evident that the objection is not well founded. The objection is this, that an officer ought not to be removed but by impeachment; then every officer is appointed during good behavior. Now, the constitution expressly declares, that the Judges, both of the Supreme and Inferior Courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior. If it is declared, that they are to hold their offices by this particular tenure, it follows that the other officers of the Government should hold them only at pleasure. He thought this an important question, and one in which they were obliged to take the constitution by construction. For although it detailed the mode of appointing to office, it was not explicit as to the supersedure; this clause, therefore, would be a mere declaration of the legislative construction on this point. He thought the importance and necessity of making the declaration, that the Chief Magistrate might supersede any civil officer was evident, and he should therefore vote in favor of the clause as it stood.
Mr. Vining said, there were no negative words in the constitution to preclude the President from the exercise of this power; but there was a strong presumption that he was invested with it: because it was declared, that all executive power should be vested in him, except in cases where it is otherwise qualified; as, for example, he could not fully exercise his executive power in making treaties, unless with the advice and consent of the Senate—the same in appointing to office.
He viewed the power of removal, by impeachment, as a supplementary security to the people against the continuance of improper persons in office; but it did not consist with the nature of things, that this should be the only mode of removal; it was attended with circumstances that would render it insufficient to secure the public safety, which was a primary object in every Government. Witness a transatlantic instance of its incompetency—he meant the famous case of Mr. Hastings. With what difficulty was that prosecution carried on! What a length of time did it take to determine! What is to be done while the impeachment is depending? For, according to the ideas of the gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. Smith,) he cannot be removed but on conviction. If he cannot be removed, I should suppose he cannot be suspended; and what security have the people against the machinations of a bad man in office? He had no doubt but the constitution gave this power to the President; but if doubts were entertained, he thought it prudent to make a legislative declaration of the sentiments of Congress on this point. He was therefore in favor of the clause.
Mr. Bland thought the power given by the constitution to the Senate, respecting the appointment to office, would be rendered almost nugatory if the President had the power of removal. If the first nomination of the President should be disapproved by the Senate, and the second agreed to, he had nothing to do but wait the adjournment of Congress, and then fill the vacancy with his favorite; who, by thus getting into the possession of the office, would have a considerable chance of permanency in it. He thought it consistent with the nature of things, that the power which appointed should remove; and would not object to a declaration in the resolution, if the words were added, that the President shall remove from office, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. He agreed that the removal by impeachment was a supplementary aid favorable to the people; but he was clearly of opinion, that the same power that appointed had, or ought to have, the power of removal.
Mr. Jackson wished the motion had been referred to a sub-committee to digest: it seemed to him they were building the house before the plan was drawn. He wished to see the system reduced to writing, that he might leisurely judge of the necessity and propriety of each office and its particular duties.
With respect to the question before the House he was of opinion that if the House had the power of removal by the constitution, they could not give it out of their hands; because every power recognized by the constitution must remain where it was placed by that instrument. But the words in the constitution declare, in positive terms, that all civil officers shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, high crimes and misdemeanors; and however long it may take to decide, in this way it must be done. He did not think the case of Mr. Hastings ought to be brought forward as a precedent for conducting such business in the United States. He believed, whenever an impeachment was brought before the Senate, they would proceed with all imaginable speed to its termination. He should, in case of impeachment, be willing to go so far as to give the power of suspension to the President, and he thought this all the security which the public safety required; it would prevent the party from doing further mischief. He agreed with the gentleman in the general principle, that the body who appointed ought to have the power of removal, as the body which enacts laws can repeal them; but if the power is deposited in any particular department by the constitution, it is out of the power of the House to alter it.
Mr. Madison did not conceive it was a proper construction of the constitution to say, that there was no other mode of removing from office than that by impeachment; he believed this, as applied to the Judges, might be the case, but he could never imagine it extended in the manner which gentlemen contended for. He believed they would not assert, that any part of the constitution declared, that the only way to remove should be by impeachment; the contrary might be inferred, because Congress may establish offices by law; therefore, most certainly, it is in the discretion of the Legislature to say upon what terms the office shall be held, either during good behavior or during pleasure. Under this construction, the principles of the constitution would be reconcilable in every part; but under that of the gentleman from South Carolina, it would be incongruous and faulty. He wondered how the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Jackson) would reconcile his principles so far as to permit the President to suspend the officer. He begged his colleague (Mr. Bland) to consider the inconvenience his doctrine would occasion, by keeping the Senate constantly sitting, in order to give their assent to the removal of an officer; they might see there would be a constant probability of the Senate being called upon to exercise this power, consequently they could not be a moment absent. Now, he did not believe the constitution imposed any such duty upon them; why, then, said he, shall we enjoin it, especially at such an expense of the public treasure?