Mr. Madison was of opinion that a discrimination was necessary; he observed, that it had been evidently contemplated by the constitution, to distinguish in favor of the Senate, that men of abilities and firm principles, whom the love and custom of a retired life might render averse to the fatigues of a public one, may be induced to devote the experience of years, and the acquisitions of study, to the service of their country. And unless something of this kind is adopted, it may be difficult to obtain proper characters to fill the Senate, as men of enterprise and genius will naturally prefer a seat in the House, considering it to be a more conspicuous situation.
Mr. Moore did not see the propriety of the discrimination proposed; the business of each House is equal, or if there is a difference in their legislative concerns, it is in favor of the House. He had no idea of giving the public money for such an idle purpose as the support of a fanciful dignity and superiority. His idea of the business was, each member ought to be compensated for his services, and nothing further.
Mr. Vining.—The arguments brought forward by my honorable friend from Virginia, (Mr. Lee,) have not proved satisfactory to my mind, that his favorite opinion with respect to discrimination is right. He has told us that the sages of America will be selected, and placed in this distinguished situation. True, sir, I expect venerable and respectable characters will find their way into every branch of the Government; but when I consider the mode in which the Senate is elected, I apprehend we may have there men whose wealth has created them the influence necessary to get in. If any thing is to be expected by this refined choice, it is that men of rank and opulence will draw the regard of the small and select circle of a State Legislature; while the Representatives in this House, being the choice of their fellow-citizens, among whom rank and dignity are rather unpopular, will consist of men in middling circumstances. Now if any thing is to be drawn from arguments like these, it is in favor of this House. But the whole of this is a subject on which we are better able to decide from our feelings, than from our discussions.
I am against the motion for another reason, sir; it goes to reduce the compensation, which I think is already set too low, to furnish good security for the happy administration of the Government. In considering this subject, there are two important objects necessary to engage the attention of the Legislature. First, that the compensation be not made an object for indigence to pursue; and second, that it be not so low as to throw the business of legislation into the hands of rich and aspiring nabobs, but such as to compensate a man in the middle grade of life. These are generally men of business, who are fittest to conduct the concerns of their fellow-citizens. Now, in compensating this class of men, (for I would have the compensation proportioned to this class,) I do not take into consideration the sacrifices they make, by dedicating their time and abilities to the service of their country; but I confine myself merely to a compensation for their time and services. If the compensation is made an object for indigence, we shall have the sessions protracted to an extreme length, and the expense will be increased; if we make the reward barely commensurate with the services, you will have men of abilities, who will despatch the public business, and return to their private pursuits. If the business is done without pay, it may be productive of the most enormous evils. Were every member of the British House of Commons allowed a thousand guineas a year, they would be less venal; we should not find them purchasing their seats, and selling their votes, for places and pensions. The very money given in this way would furnish a handsome compensation for every member, and add something considerable, annually, to their sinking fund.
I apprehend, in establishing a compensation, we shall put it in the power of gentlemen, while here, to live as independent as they can at home. Perhaps I hazard a conjecture, when I say there is not a gentleman on this floor, I am certain there are not many, but have found, from experience, that six dollars per day is adequate to that object; certainly it cannot be the wish of any man to make the public service unpleasant, by rendering the situation of the members of Congress less eligible than a solitary retirement from patriotic pursuits would be. Any man who lives decently, will find six dollars a day not more than sufficient to defray the expense of a casual residence in a splendid city.
The experiment has been made. If a gentleman keeps a servant and his horses, and means to reciprocate the civilities he receives, I again assert the compensation is inadequate. It is true, we may live for two dollars a day; but how? There is a dignity attached to the situation of a Representative, with respect to his country; and the compensation might be seven or eight dollars per day, without granting the members more than a bare compensation. From all these considerations, I am induced to hope that gentlemen will indulge a little, and rather support an increase, than a diminution of pay.
As to the discrimination, it has been once decided against by a considerable majority; I have no doubt but it will now meet a similar fate; but be the decision of the House what it may, with respect to the quantum, or manner of compensation, I shall never fear to deliver my sentiments. On the present occasion, I wish them known to my constituents, and I am much mistaken if they are not coincident with their own.
Mr. Seney.—I am sorry, sir, that the question of discrimination has been brought before the House. Can any reason be assigned for making this distinction? Are the services of the Senate of more importance than those of the Representatives? I think not. Gentlemen have brought forward the constitution upon this occasion, but I conceive it to be opposite to the very principle they mean to advocate. This will destroy the independence of the several branches, which is to be strictly observed. If a discrimination should be established in favor of the Senate, will it not naturally tend to create a sense of inferiority in the minds of the Representatives? And the time may come when they may find it their interest to become subservient to the views of the Senate. I feel so sensibly, sir, the impropriety and unconstitutionality of this measure, that had I the most distant idea it would comport with the sentiments of a majority of the members of this House, I should call for the yeas and nays on a division of the House upon the question. But as I do not conceive that to be the case, I shall waive the proposition for the present.
Mr. Sedgwick said, that whenever he had a motion to make before the House, he endeavored to satisfy himself of the reasonableness and propriety of it. If he thought it proper, he did not consider the mode of decision that might be adopted of any material consequence; but in determining the present question, he hoped the yeas and nays would not be called. There is a principle in mankind which revolts at the idea of inferiority; a proposition, for example, shall be made, that has for its object the establishment of a superiority (howsoever necessary;) that principle is alarmed and excited to opposition; to discuss such a question as the present, we ought to be divested of every partiality and prejudice, that might bias our judgment in deciding an affair that will not bear the test of reason and experience. I conceive the precedence of the Senate has been clearly pointed out by the Constitution. There are grades in society which are necessary to their very existence. This is a self-evident proposition; it is recognized by every civilized nation, and by the House in the report before us. For what reason have we made a difference between the President and Vice President? Is it not on account of his superior station and his dignity? And between the Vice President and the Senate? This distinction is likewise established by the constitution in the difference of the terms for which the members of the Senate and those of the House of Representatives are chosen. The time for which the Senate is chosen, demonstrates the propriety of a difference being made in the pay they ought to receive; the duties of their office require they should renounce every other avocation; their attention will be wholly taken up in the discharge of public business; therefore they should have an adequate and an independent allowance. The generality of the members being so far advanced in years, will drop every idea of engaging any more in their several professions, after having once engaged in the service of their country. Their age, wisdom, and experience, all warrant this discrimination. He concluded by saying, that the real dignity of the House was, he thought, so far from being diminished by adopting the proposition, that he conceived it was essentially connected with it.
Mr. Stone thought the House ought not to assist in elevating one branch of the Government more above the other than the constitution had done. This had given influence to the Senate by a negative in the cases of treaties and appointments. It had given importance to the House, by vesting them with the sole power of originating money bills. But both these powers could be exercised without a discrimination being made in the pay of the members; therefore he inferred that it was not contemplated by the constitution to make any such distinction.