Mr. Sylvester said, that he had always been in the habit of respecting the Society called Quakers; he respected them for their exertions in the cause of humanity; but he thought the present was not a time to enter into a consideration of the subject, especially as he conceived it to be a business within the province of the State Legislatures.

Mr. Lawrence observed, that the subject would undoubtedly come under the consideration of the House; and he thought, as it was now before them, that the present time was as proper as any; he was therefore for committing the memorial, and when the prayer of it had been properly examined, they could see how far Congress may, constitutionally, interfere: as they knew the limits of their power on this, as well as every other occasion, there was no just apprehension to be entertained that they would go beyond it.

Mr. Smith (of South Carolina) insisted that it was not in the power of the House to grant the prayer of the petition, which went to the total abolishment of the slave trade, and it was therefore unnecessary to commit it. He observed, that in the Southern States difficulties had arisen on adopting the constitution, inasmuch as it was apprehended that Congress might take measures under it for abolishing the slave trade.

Perhaps the petitioners, when they applied to this House, did not think their object unconstitutional, but now they are told that it is, they will be satisfied with the answer, and press it no further. If their object had been for Congress to lay a duty of ten dollars per head on the importation of slaves, they would have said so, but that does not appear to have been the case. The commitment of the petition, on that ground, cannot be contended. If they will not be content with that, shall it be committed to investigate facts? The petition speaks of none. For what purpose, then, shall it be committed? If gentlemen can assign no good reason for the measure, they will not support it when they are told that it will create jealousies and alarm in the Southern States; for I can assure them that there is no point on which they are more jealous and suspicious, than on a business with which they think the Government has nothing to do.

When we entered into this confederacy, we did it from political, not from moral motives, and I do not think my constituents want to learn morals from the petitioners; I do not believe they want improvements in their moral system; if they do, they can get it at home.

The gentleman from Georgia has justly stated the jealousy of the Southern States. On entering into this Government, they apprehend that the other States, not knowing the necessity the citizens of the Southern States were under to hold this species of property, would, from motives of humanity and benevolence, be led to vote for a general emancipation; and had they not seen that the constitution provided against the effect of such a disposition, I may be bold to say they never would have adopted it. And, notwithstanding all the calmness with which some gentlemen have viewed the subject, they will find that this discussion alone will create great alarm. We have been told, that if this would be the case, we ought to have avoided it, by saying nothing; but it was not for that purpose that we were sent here. We look upon this measure as an attack upon the palladium of the property of our country; it is therefore our duty to oppose it by every means in our power. Gentlemen should consider, that when we entered into a political connection with the other States, that this property was there; it was acquired under a former Government, conformably to the laws and constitution, therefore any thing that will tend to deprive them of that property, must be an ex post facto law, and, as such, is forbidden by our political compact.

I said the States would never have entered into the Confederation, unless their property had been guarantied to them, for such is the state of agriculture in that country, that without slaves it must be abandoned. Why will these people, then, make use of arguments to induce the slave to turn his hand against his master? We labor under difficulties enough from the ravages of the late war. A gentleman can hardly come from that country with a servant or two, either to this place or Philadelphia, but there are persons trying to seduce his servants to leave him; and, when they have done this, the poor wretches are obliged to rob their master, in order to obtain a subsistence; all those, therefore, who are concerned in this seduction, are accessories to the robbery.

The reproaches which they cast upon the owners of negro property, is charging them with the want of humanity. I believe the proprietors have as much humanity as persons in any part of the continent, and are as conspicuous for their good morals as their neighbors. It was said yesterday that the Quakers are a society known to the laws and the constitution, but they are no more so than other religious societies; they stand exactly in the same situation; their memorial, therefore, relates to a matter in which they are no more interested than any other sect, and can only be considered as a piece of advice, which it is not customary to refer to a committee; but if it is supposed to pray for what they think a moral purpose, is that sufficient to induce us to commit it? What may appear a moral virtue in their eyes, may not be so in reality. I have heard of a sect of Shaking Quakers, who, I presume, suppose their tenets of a moral tendency. I am informed one of them forbids to intermarry, yet you may see them with a numerous offspring about them. Now, if these people were to petition Congress to pass a law prohibiting matrimony, would gentlemen agree to refer such a petition? I think if they would reject one of that nature, as improper, they ought also to reject this.

Mr. Page was in favor of the commitment. He hoped that the designs of the respectable memoralists would not be stopped at the threshold, in order to preclude a fair discussion of the prayer of the memorial. He observed, that gentlemen had founded their arguments upon a misrepresentation; for the object of the memorial is not declared to be the total abolition of the slave trade, but that Congress will consider whether it be not in reality within their power to exercise justice and mercy, which, if adhered to, they cannot doubt must produce the abolition of the slave trade. If, then, the prayer contained nothing unconstitutional, he trusted the meritorious effort of the petitioners would not be frustrated.

With respect to the alarm that was apprehended, he conjectured there was none; but there might be just cause if the memorial was not taken into consideration. He placed himself in the case of a slave, and said, that, on hearing that Congress had refused to listen to the decent suggestions of a respectable part of the community, he should infer that the General Government (from which was expected great good would result to every class of citizens) had shut their ears against the voice of humanity, and he should despair of any alleviation of the miseries he and his posterity had in prospect; if any thing could induce him to rebel, it must be a stroke like this, impressing on his mind all the horrors of despair. But if he was told that application was made in his behalf, and that Congress was willing to hear what could be urged in favor of discouraging the practice of importing his fellow-wretches, he would trust in their justice and humanity, and wait the decision patiently. He presumed that these unfortunate people would reason in the same way, and he, therefore, conceived the most likely way to prevent danger was to commit the petition. He lived in a State which had the misfortune of having in her bosom a great number of slaves; he held many of them himself, and was as much interested in the business, as any gentleman in South Carolina or Georgia, yet if he was determined to hold them in eternal bondage, he should feel no uneasiness or alarm on account of the present measure, because he should rely upon the virtue of Congress that they would not exercise any unconstitutional authority.