He argued that the power was not contained in express words, but that it was necessarily deduced by the strongest and most decisive implication, because he contended that it was a necessary means to attain a necessary end. Necessary implication had led Congress under the power to lay and collect impost and taxes, to establish officers for the collection, to inflict penalties against those who should defraud the revenue, to oblige vessels to enter at one port and deliver in another; subjected them to various ceremonies in their proceedings, for which the owners were made to pay; and he conceived that it was not so great an exertion of power by implication to incorporate a company for the purpose of a bank. He also deduced the right from the power of paying debts, raising armies, providing for the general welfare and common defence, for which they were to borrow money. All these necessarily include the right of using every proper and necessary means to accomplish these necessary ends. It is certain, he said, that money must be raised from the people. This could not be done in sums sufficient for the exigencies of Government in a country where the precious metals were as scarce as in this. The people in general are poor when compared with European nations; they have a wilderness to subdue and cultivate; taxes must be laid with prudence, and collected with discretion; the anticipation of the revenues, therefore, by borrowing money, becomes absolutely necessary. If so, then as the constitution had not specified the manner of borrowing, or from whom the loan was to be obtained, the supreme Legislature of the Union were at liberty, it was their duty, to fix on the best mode of effecting the purposes of their appointment. For it was a sound principle, that when a general power is granted, and the means are not specified, they are left to the discretion of those in whom the trust is reposed, provided they do not adopt means expressly forbidden. The public defence, or general welfare, resting on the annual supplies from uncertain revenues, would expose the very existence of the community. It is the duty of those to whom the people have committed this power to prepare in time of peace for the necessary defence in a time of war. The United States are now happily in a state of peace; but it was impossible for any one to say how long it would continue. By prudent management it might be long preserved; but this prudence consisted in being always found in a state of preparation to defend our country.

The constitution contemplates this very duty by authorizing Congress to provide for the common defence by borrowing money. Why borrow money? Are not the annual revenues sufficient? It might be so, if nothing was to be attended to but internal wants; but the common defence and general welfare loudly call for that provision which will produce a constant guard on external enemies and internal insurrections. To this necessary end it becomes Congress to provide that the necessary means may be always at hand, by being able to arm their citizens and provide their support while engaged in the defence of their common country. This can be done only by borrowing money, which is usually of citizens or foreigners; if of the first, it must be from individuals or from private banks: will it be prudent to trust to either? Loans from individuals were attempted during the war, when patriotism produced a will in some lenders, and others were glad to get rid of a depreciating paper currency almost on any terms whatever.

But even these loans, arising from this paper medium with which the market was glutted, were altogether insufficient; and by one change of circumstances every hope was precluded of being any way successful in procuring money from that source. The circumstances of individuals, too, in this country are such, when compared with the wants of a nation, as to render the source too vague and uncertain to rely upon; and it would be a most improvident execution of the powers granted for the express purpose of the common defence and general welfare. Private banks are almost as inadequate to the object, and for reasons already given, were neither to be depended on for will or capital as to the supply for the principal wants of Government. They are generally established for commercial purposes, and on capitals not always sufficient for them. If they should be prevailed upon at any time to attempt to supply the demands of a nation at war, it must be from a general combination of their whole stocks, to the destruction of the original designs of their several institutions. This ought not to be expected; for as far as it goes to the depression of the mercantile interests, so far it is injurious to the Government; besides, a dependence upon such a combination would be impolitic, both from its slowness and uncertainty. The votes of a few individuals affected by local, selfish, or adverse politics, might endanger the whole people. Such a dependence ought not to be attributed to the wise framers of the constitution, neither does the language warrant it. But foreign loans have been mentioned, as a proper source for this purpose. The imprudence of placing the common defence of a nation on the will of those who have no interest in its welfare is a good answer to this observation. Would it be prudent to trust a foreigner, perhaps a rival, if not an enemy, with your supply of what has emphatically been called the sinews of war? Would it not expose us to exorbitant demands, and often a refusal? Many adventitious circumstances of a war, increasing demands from all quarters, scarcity of coin, and difficulty of communication, as well as the intrigues of courts, all loudly oppose the measure, as contrary to the spirit and meaning of a provision for the common defence and general welfare. The only resort then, he conceived, was by a timely provision to secure institutions at home from which loans might be obtained at all times on moderate terms, and to such amount as the necessity of the State might require. But gentlemen say that the constitution does not expressly warrant the establishment of such a corporation. If by expressly, express words are meant, it is agreed that there are no express words; and this is the case with most of the powers exercised by Congress; for if the doctrine of necessary implication is rejected, he did not see what the supreme Legislature of the Union could do in that character. If this power is not clearly given in the constitution by necessary implication, then is a necessary end proposed and directed, while the common and usual necessary means to attain that end are refused, or at least not granted.

Mr. B. was firmly of opinion that a National Bank was the necessary means, without which the end could not be obtained. Theory proved it so in his opinion, and the experience of the Union in a day of distress had fully confirmed the theory. The struggles of the friends of freedom during the late contest had nearly been rendered abortive for want of this aid. That danger which was then so hardly avoided became a solemn memento to this House to provide against a similar case of necessity. This was the time to do it with advantage, being in such profound peace. He had not heard any argument by which it was proved that individuals, private banks, or foreigners, could with safety and propriety be depended on as the efficient and necessary means for so important a purpose. Although money was at present plentiful in Europe, and might be borrowed on easy terms, it might not be so to-morrow, in case a war should break out, and our necessities become pressing. He again enumerated the harmless qualities with which it was proposed to vest the bank corporation, by the bill on the table, for the important purposes of the common defence and general welfare. Gentlemen had not yet pointed out any danger arising to the community, neither did he think it possible that any could ever be mentioned equal to those of suffering the Government to depend on individuals or private banks for loans in a day of distress.

But it was said that this bill gave the corporation a right to hold real property in a State, which Congress had no power to do. The terms of the bill are misapprehended; this is a right which has been already shown, attaches to the citizens individually, or in their associated capacity; the bill, therefore, does no more than to vest a number with an artificial single capacity under a fictitious name, and by that name to hold lands, make by-laws, &c.; all which they might have done before as citizens in a collective capacity. So far from giving a new power, their original individual rights are limited for the public safety as to the amount of their stock and the duration of their existence.

Mr. B. then proceeded to cite numerous instances of powers exercised by Congress during the last two years, deduced under the constitution by necessary implication, to show the utter impossibility of carrying any one provision of that authority into execution for the benefit of the people without this reasonable latitude of construction. He also adverted to some instances of the like conduct under the former Confederation. It had been urged that the new Congress had no rights or powers but what had been vested in and given to them by the individual States, and therefore they could not accept a cession from Great Britain by the treaty of peace of the lands extending to the Lake of the Woods, because not before included in any individual State. Every member was soon convinced of the absurdity of the argument, and by a necessary implication established the power of the Confederated Legislature. During the war the Commander-in-chief gave a passport to a British officer to transmit clothing to the British prisoners at Lancaster. He accordingly conveyed a very large quantity of British goods into Pennsylvania for that purpose; which being directly against an express law of that State, they were seized and condemned by the proper magistrate. On a complaint to the Legislature of the State, they referred the same to their Judicial officers, upon whose report (that Congress being vested with the power of declaring war, the right of giving safe passports to an enemy was necessarily implied, which, therefore, was duly exercised by their Commander-in-chief, though no express power was given to him for that purpose) the Legislature declared their law directing the condemnation of the goods void ab initio, and the judgment of condemnation had no effect.

This was also the rule that governed this House with regard to the removability of officers by the President, and the authority given to a Council to legislate for the Western Territory. In fine, he concluded, that it was universally understood that whenever a general power was given, especially to a supreme Legislature, every necessary means to carry it into execution were necessarily included. This was the common sense of mankind, without which it would require a multitude of volumes to contain the original powers of an increasing Government that must necessarily be changing its relative situation every year or two.

If power was given to raise an army, the making provision for all the necessary supplies and incidental charges was included. If a navy was to be formed, the manning and supplying the warlike stores are necessarily included. If a power is given to borrow money, a right to mortgage or pledge the public property to secure the repayment is understood to be vested in the borrower. Take up the present statute book, and every page will afford evidence of this doctrine. Examine the law with regard to crimes and punishments; under the power of establishing courts, we have implied the power of punishing the stealing and falsifying the records, and ascertained the punishment of perjury, bribery, and extortion. Under the power of regulating trade, we have accepted cessions of real estate, and built light-houses, piers, &c. All this is under the doctrine of necessary implication for the public good; and in cases not so strong as the present, and on the exercise of which no gentleman thought proper to start this objection.

This construction appears so natural and necessary, that the good sense of every gentleman on the floor has hitherto led him to proceed on this principle ever since we began to legislate; what principle of the constitution does it destroy? It gives nothing that can affect the rights of any State or citizen. Indeed, it has been said that it is exercising a high act of power; he thought it had been shown to be rather of the inferior kind; but allow the position, and who so proper as the Legislature of the whole Union to exercise such a power for the general welfare? It has also been said that this power is a mere conveniency for the purpose of fiscal transactions, but not necessary to attain the ends proposed in the constitution. This is denied, and at best is mere matter of opinion, and must be left to the discretion of the Legislature to determine.

Mr. B. said, he should now conclude what he had to say, had not an honorable gentleman (Mr. Jackson) brought forward the observations of the author of the Federalist, vol. 2, p. 72, 73, 74, to show a different contemporaneous exposition of the constitution, and charged the author, who he alleged was said to be also the author of the present plan before the House, with a change of sentiment. As this gentleman is not here to speak for himself, he ought to have the next best chance by having what he then wrote candidly attended to, especially as gentlemen allow him to be a good authority. Mr. B. read only part of the 73d page referred to by Mr. Jackson, in these words: "Had the Convention attempted a positive enumeration of the powers necessary and proper for carrying their other powers into effect, the attempt would have involved a complete digest of laws on every subject to which the constitution relates; accommodated, too, not only to the existing state of things, but to all the possible changes which futurity may produce; for in every new application of a general power, the particular powers which are the means of attaining the general power must always necessarily vary with that object, and be often properly varied whilst the object remains the same." How these sentiments can be said to be a different contemporaneous exposition must be left to the House to determine.