In the first place, the right of exercising that authority by the Government is at least problematical, it is nowhere granted in express terms; the Legislature, therefore, can have no competent security against a judicial decision but a dependent or a corrupt court. I presume that a law to punish with death those who counterfeit the paper emitted by the Bank will be consequent upon the existence of this act. Hence a judicial decision will probably be had of the most serious and awful nature; the life of an individual at stake on the one hand, an improvident act of the Government on the other. A distrust arising from this cause will for ever keep the Bank in jeopardy, and the very first trial of this nature will probably subject the Bank to a run which it will be unable to withstand; for all stockholders will require the greatest possible security for their money, and a distrust of such an institution will be its destruction. This observation seems to me to have peculiar force, from the great proportion of paper to that of gold and silver, upon which the Bank is proposed to be founded. The peculiar relation between the General and State Governments, will naturally produce a contest for governmental rights, until long experience shall settle the precise boundaries between them. The present measure appears to me to be an unprovoked advance in this scramble for authority, and a mere experiment how far we may proceed without involving the opposition of the State Governments. It should be remarked that this Government is in its childhood; it is therefore unfitted for such bold and manly enterprises, and policy would dictate that it should wait at least until it may have become more matured or invigorated. Two modes of administering this Government present themselves; the one with mildness and moderation, by keeping within the known boundaries of the constitution, the other, by the creation and operation of fiscal mechanism; the first will ensure us the affections of the people, the only natural and substantial basis of Republican Governments; the other will arise and exist in oppression and injustice, will increase the previously existing jealousies of the people, and must be ultimately discarded, or bring about a radical change in the nature of our Government. Having suggested these observations upon the measure in general, I shall now proceed to point out a few objections to the details of the bill. I think the authority given to the Bank to purchase and hold lands objectionable; in the first place I doubt the constitutional right of Congress to invest such an authority; the lands within the United States are holden of the individual States, and not of the United States; and that tenure appears to me to be the true ground upon which the right to exercise that authority grows. I believe it is admitted, that although Congress may naturalize a foreigner, they cannot authorize him to purchase lands; and I think the case at least as strong, when they first create an artificial person, and then invest the authority; besides, if we have any reference to the experience of other countries, we shall find it dangerous to allow incorporated bodies to hold lands at all. The exercise of that right produced great oppression in England, and nothing but the masterly activity of an absolute prince could apply a competent remedy. A gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Sedgwick) has denied that the Bank is invested with this right. It is true it is confined to the mode of purchasing by mortgage, but that is the most effectual mode of purchasing, and the most ruinous to the landholder.
I will merely mention one other objection without a comment—the authority given to make laws not contrary to law or its own constitution; but the most objectionable clause is that which limits its duration, and pledges the faith of the United States that no other bank shall be established in the mean time, however dangerous and offensive the present measure might prove in its operation, and whatever may be the utility and advantage in any other scheme of banking which experience may suggest. Such a stipulation cannot be justified but from the most pointed necessity, and from the maturest deliberation. When I search for the necessity of this measure, it escapes me; it is not pretended in the bill itself; the chief stimulus which I can discover to the existence of this measure, is to give artificial impulse to the value of stock. This is not a sufficient justification; the subject has not been sufficiently considered, and I therefore hope it may be postponed to some future session of Congress; many evils may be avoided by such a conduct, none can result from it.
Mr. Gerry said, he should principally confine himself to the objections of the gentleman first up from Virginia, (Mr. Madison,) not from a disrespect to the observations of other gentlemen in the opposition, but because he considered their arguments as grafts on the original stock of those urged by the gentleman alluded to, and if the trunk fell, its appendages must fall also.
The objects of the bill were to render the fiscal administration successful, and to give facility to loans on sudden emergencies, and to benefit trade and industry in general; and that these were objects of high importance had not been denied, neither had it been asserted that they ought not, if possible, to be attained.
It is objected, however, that the mode proposed by the bill is unconstitutional, and the bill itself defective.
The mode proposed is a National Bank; to establish which he thought Congress were as competent as either House were to adjourn from day to day.
It is said that Congress have no power relating to this subject, except what is contained in the clauses for laying and collecting taxes, imposts, excises, &c.; for borrowing money, and for making all laws necessary and proper for carrying these powers into effect; and that these do not authorize the establishment of a National Bank.
To ascertain this, the gentleman from Virginia proposes a candid interpretation of the constitution, which we shall agree to, and he offers to assist us with his rules of interpretation, for his good intentions in doing which we give him full credit; but as he acknowledges that he has been long decided against the authority of Congress to establish a bank, and is therefore prejudiced against the measure; as his rules, being made for the occasion, are the result of his interpretation, and not his interpretation of the rules; as they are not sanctioned by law exposition, or approved by experienced judges of the law, they cannot be considered as a criterion for regulating the judgment of the House, but may, if admitted, prove an ignis fatuus that may lead to destruction.
We wish not, however, by establishing our own rules of interpretation, to enjoy the privilege which is denied to the gentleman, but will meet him on fair ground, by applying rules which have the sanction mentioned; and as the learned Judge Blackstone has laid down such, it is presumed the gentleman from Virginia will not contend for a preference, or refuse to be tried by this standard.