On the doctrine of construction, as applied to the constitution, he observed, that on some occasions the constitution is like the sensitive plant, which shrinks from the smallest touch; on others it is like the sturdy oak, which braves the force of thunder. He referred to the act containing the power of removability; in which the utmost latitude of construing the constitution was contended for and adopted; and, said he, the funding system cannot be defended on any other principle than of implication.
He then inquired, of what right does this incorporation deprive a single citizen? And can an act possibly meet the disapprobation of a single person which does not infringe his rights, and which puts money into his pocket? I think not. He insisted that the power of Congress alone was equal to establishing a bank competent to creating a currency which shall pervade all parts of the Union; the paper of the State banks cannot circulate beyond the bounds of the particular States.
From the restrictions to the Government contended for by the opposers of the bill, he compared the constitution to a horse finely proportioned in every respect to the eye, and elegantly caparisoned, but deficient in one, and the most essential requisite, that of ability to carry the owner to his journey's end; he had rather, he said, mount the old Confederation, and drag on in the old way, than be amused with the appearance of a Government so essentially defective.
Mr. Madison observed, that the present is a question which ought to be conducted with moderation and candor; and, therefore, there is no occasion to have recourse to those tragic representations which have been adduced. Warmth and passion should be excluded from the discussion of a subject which ought to depend on the cool dictates of reason for its decision.
Adverting to the observation of Mr. Smith, (of South Carolina,) "that it would be a deplorable thing for the Senate of the United States to have fallen on a decision which violates the constitution," he inquired, What does the reasoning of the gentleman tend to show but this, that from respect to the Senate this House ought to sanction their decisions? And from hence it will follow, that the President of the United States ought, out of respect to both, to sanction their joint proceedings; but he could remind the gentleman of his holding different sentiments on another occasion.
Mr. M. then enlarged on the exact balance or equipoise contemplated by the constitution, to be observed and maintained between the several branches of Government; and showed, that except this idea was preserved, the advantages of different independent branches would be lost, and their separate deliberations and determinations be entirely useless.
In describing a corporation, he observed, that the powers proposed to be given are such as do not exist antecedent to the existence of the corporation; these powers are very extensive in their nature, and to which a principle of perpetuity may be annexed.
He waived a reply to Mr. Vining's observations on the common law, [in which that gentleman had been lengthy and minute, in order to invalidate Mr. Madison's objections to the power proposed to be given to the Bank, to make rules and regulations, not contrary to law.] Mr. M. said the question would involve a very lengthy discussion; and other objects more intimately connected with the subject remained to be considered.
The power of granting charters, he observed, is a great and important power, and ought not to be exercised unless we find ourselves expressly authorized to grant them. Here he dilated on the great and extensive influence that incorporated societies had on public affairs in Europe. They are powerful machines, which have always been found competent to effect objects on principles in a great measure independent of the people.
He argued against the influence of the precedent to be established by the bill; for though it has been said, that the charter is to be granted only for a term of years, yet he contended, that granting the powers on any principle is granting them in perpetuum; and assuming this right on the part of the Government involves the assumption of every power whatever.