It has been said, that the preliminaries were no more than a suspension of arms—that the state of war still continues, until a definitive treaty. To this it is answered, that preliminaries bind the national faith; if violated, the perjured faithless nation would kindle a new war. By the law of nations there is not such a distinction as that which is alleged, between preliminary and definitive treaties. Let the authorities for such a distinction be produced by those who make it. But they do not exist—a truce does not put an end to a war—a truce is, however, a suspension of war for a specified term. At the end of this term, the war begins again, of course, without any fresh declaration. But a suspension of hostilities for an indefinite period, is not a truce, but a peace; especially if it is added, that it is agreed upon by the belligerent nations in consequence of a settlement of their disputes, and if it happens in fact that the war is not revived. Those who make so much of a definitive treaty, and so light of preliminaries, should consider that, on their own system, the former is a kind of defeasance which annuls the latter. But when the definitive treaty is signed, the preliminaries, which before were liable to be annulled, now become of force, and the treaty, now become indefeasible, takes its date from the preliminaries. Though this mode of reasoning has not much weight on my mind, it ought to have some with those who have set up the distinction which it is adduced to overthrow.
These are the reasons on which I have formed my opinion that the war ended in fact in April, 1783, when hostilities ceased by mutual agreement of the powers at war. My opinion is supported by authority much more reputable than any I can give to it. The law courts in this country have decided it judicially; cases of captured vessels, and the question of interest on British debts, have produced decisions in every State of the Union, unless I am misinformed, that the war ended in March or April, 1783. The courts in England, and in every country where the war spread, on trials of property, have made similar decisions. Major Torrey died in September, 1783; shall this body decide against the settled rule of all the law courts?
It remains to remove some objections:
It is alleged, that Congress have by various resolves fixed the period of the war, and have declared that the 3d November, 1783, is the term. If they had declared that it should be computed from the end of the world, it would not alter the truth of the fact. After declarations ought not to be received to change their own promises. But a declaration, or a dozen of them, made for another purpose, and not to declare the meaning of the contract, cannot on any principle be received to interpret it. It is not necessary, however, to contend against those resolves of Congress. They are irreconcilable with the former engagement to Major Torrey. In undertaking to reconcile them, I feel that I impose a task on myself, which is made heavy by the prepossessions of many of my friends; I believe the minds of gentlemen are perfectly fair, and well-disposed to doing the petitioner justice. But I hope I shall not be thought to intend any offence, when I remark that certain ideas, such as that this claim is cut off by resolves of Congress, and that on allowing it, confusion would take place in the business of the public offices, were started with the discussion, and they have remained so woven into the texture of the debate, that I think it hard to unravel them. It was soon manifested that there was a general disposition to vote against the petition. This opportunity for debate seems to have been accorded as of grace, rather than as a means of removing any existing doubts of their own. Having adopted these opinions, this is rather a form of refusal than a mode of inquiring; and it seems to have been chosen with every circumstance of decency, and with all possible steadfastness of purpose. Yet I will proceed to state, that the point whether the war was at an end when hostilities ended in April, 1783, being already considered fully, we are to look for other reasons than such as relate to the commutation, to explain the resolves of Congress which continued the service of the officers beyond the end of the war, and as late as November, 1783. A mistake seems to have crept in here. It seems to be supposed that the officers were engaged to serve to the end of the war, just long enough to secure their commutation. But the commutation depended on one thing—the term of their service on another. The former was their right at the end of the war; but they were to remain in service till dismissed, unless they should think fit sooner to resign. They held their commissions during the pleasure of Congress. Though when the war ended they had a right to the commutation, they had no right to say their service was at an end. They did not choose to resign: Congress, for wise reasons, did not choose to dismiss them. A foreign army was still in New York. They were sent home on furlough, but drawing pay, and liable to be called into the field. Congress, in their resolves, did not say that it was not peace, but in effect that it was unsafe to disarm. Gentlemen are not well agreed among themselves as to the end of the war. Some fix it at the definitive treaty of September 3, 1783; others at November 3. Their conclusions agree as illy with their principles; for if the definitive treaty put an end to the war, how can the same gentlemen say that the war was kept alive, on the journals of Congress, till November, 1783? Here, then, were Peace and War subsisting quietly together during two months.
The fears of making confusion by opening a door to many applications, seem to be groundless. A man must have died between the end of hostilities and November, 1783, to place a claim on the like footing. The living have had their commutations; they cannot come: and no other officer died in that period, as far as I can learn. I have inquired, and cannot find at the office of the Secretary of War any precedent which militates with this claim, or any reason to suppose that any similar one will be offered. The case is a new one; it stands alone, and probably ever will, and it must be decided on its own merits. Believing the fact to be indisputable that Major Torrey served to the end of the war, confiding in the principles of the law of nations, and the settled decisions of the Judicial Courts, I have endeavored to explain my ideas with perspicuity, and to impress them with force. I have said more than questions touching an individual will often be found to merit; but when public principles are construed to the prejudice of private rights, the debate cannot be treated too seriously.
Mr. Boudinot said, he differed in opinion from the gentleman in his construction of the business. He did not coincide in the idea that the decision of the present question should be on a strictly judicial principle. The petition is founded on certain resolutions and laws of Congress; and as there are certain established rules which have been observed in settling with every other officer similarly circumstanced, Congress cannot now with propriety break through those rules; to these they ought to adhere, till by the decision of some judicial court it shall appear that they are contrary to the rules of justice. [Here Mr. Ames requested Mr. Boudinot to point out the rules to which he referred.] Mr. B. referred to the report now under consideration, which was founded on a resolution of Congress, that the time for which the army was engaged should expire in November, 1783. This has been made a rule in all the settlements with the officers of the army.
The terms of the contract, between the officers and the United States, depended, he said, on the decision of the sovereign power; that was authorized alone to determine when the war should cease. That power was vested in the then existing Congress, who, although they entered into provisional articles in November, 1783, did not, however, think proper immediately to disband their armies or put an end to the war, as it was yet uncertain whether those provisional articles would be ratified by Great Britain, or a treaty of peace concluded between Great Britain and France; a circumstance which was necessary before those articles could be definitively binding. It was only when the definitive treaty was made, that Congress determined the period of the war. The army, when finally disbanded and paid up to that day, acknowledged, by accepting their pay, that it was then only the war ended; and, as far as was in their power, assented to the principle which he maintained, that the provisional articles had not before put an end to the war. Suppose that, on the arrival of the definitive treaty, Congress had not agreed to the terms, would the war have then been considered as at an end? Would not Congress have been in the same situation as before the signing of the provisional articles? It was necessary that Congress should, by a definitive act, determine when the war ceased. Congress had passed such an act; and the House at present cannot with propriety enter into a resolution to alter the period. The argument of inconvenience ought also to have some weight with the House; for if any alteration were now to be made in the law, it must have a retrospect to all the widows and children of deceased officers, who have received half pay for years past. Besides, many officers who have not hitherto considered themselves as entitled to half pay, would, in consequence of such an alteration, have a right to apply for it.
Mr. Laurance said, he doubted not the gentleman who supported the petition was fully satisfied as to the justice of the claim which he advocated with so much ardor; he begged leave to state his opinion, however, on the subject, in which he should differ from that gentleman.
The contract with the officers of the late army was, that those should be entitled to certain benefits who served to the end of the war. But Major Torrey was not thus circumstanced, as he died previous to the period when the war ceased, and left neither widow nor orphan to receive the benefit of the provisions allowed by law; his case is not contemplated by any existing resolution of Congress.