Mr. Giles said this subject had struck him in two points of view: whether Congress are not precluded from exercising any discretion on the subject? and whether, if they are not, it is expedient for them to exercise this discretion at this time? The ratio of representation is a constitutional, and not a Legislative act. He referred to the constitution, in which it is said that there shall be one Representative to every State; and, secondly, that until the enumeration, the number should be as therein appointed to each State. After the enumeration, the number is mentioned below which it shall not be placed; but there is a negative power to increase the ratio, and from this negative power, a positive discretionary power is inferred. But, he observed that Congress had precluded itself from a right to exercise this discretionary power, by sending out to the several State Legislatures an amendment on this very subject. This amendment he considered in a serious point of view; and had this idea been attended to at the commencement of the discussion, he conceived that it would have prevented the opinion from being brought forward whether it was expedient that any change in the ratio of the representation should take place. The idea of one to thirty thousand, he considered as fully settled in the minds of the people; and a change on the part of the Government would indicate a changeable disposition, and a mutability of counsels, which is but another name for weakness.

Mr. G. then took a view of the objects of legislation to the State Assemblies, and of those of the General Government. In the former, above one thousand persons are employed, though their attention is confined to their internal police. Those of the General Government, on the other hand, are on the great objects of the whole finance of the Union, a sum of more than eighty millions of dollars, &c., &c.

It is said that we shall want abilities, but I should be sorry if a representation of ten times the present number of this House should comprise the abilities of a single State.

He assigned different causes than numbers, for the corruption in the British House of Commons; among these were the frequent mortgages of the funds, and the immense appropriations at the disposal of the Executive, the mode of their elections, &c. A large number is not so easily corrupted as a small body.

An inequality of circumstances, he then observed, produces revolutions in Government, from Democracy to Aristocracy and Monarchy. Great wealth produces a desire of distinctions, rank, and titles. The revolutions in property in this country have created a prodigious inequality of circumstances. Government has contributed to this inequality; the Bank of the United States is a most important machine in promoting the objects of this moneyed interest. This bank will be the most powerful engine to corrupt this House. Some of the members are directors of this institution; and it will only be by increasing the representation that an adequate barrier can be opposed to this moneyed interest. He next adverted to certain ideas which he said had been disseminated through the United States; and here he took occasion to observe, that the Legislature ought to express some public disapprobation of these opinions. The strong Executive of this Government ought to be balanced by a full representation in this House. He hoped the motion to strike out thirty thousand would not obtain.

Mr. Boudinot closed the debate of this day by a few remarks, reinforcing his former observations in favor of an increased ratio.

Tuesday, November 15.

Ratio of Representation.

The House again resolved itself into a committee of the whole House on the Schedule of the Enumeration of the Inhabitants of the United States.