Mr. Clark said, he did not rise to trouble the House with a lengthy discourse, for he had always believed that long speeches answer no valuable purpose. He meant only to offer a few remarks on what had been said in opposition to his former observations, and he hoped that, although the gentlemen contend for the ratio of 30,000 as the only basis whereon to found the liberties of the people, he should not be stigmatized with the name of an aristocrat for voting in favor of a large ratio. Hitherto he had not borne that character, and he could not suppose himself yet infected, unless he had caught the disorder since he became a member of the present House. Much has been said about the influence of the bank, and that bank directors are members of the House of Representatives. The bank (said he) is public property, and therefore he could not see the force of the gentleman's arguments respecting the dangerous influence of that institution, unless it was that he was displeased at the distribution of the shares, so much of the stock being held at New York and to the eastward, and so little at Conococheague. In the same predicament he viewed the other objections respecting the influence of speculators; for he did not know that any members of the House were speculators, neither could he see any danger from bribery.
In reply to Mr. Findlay's observation, that more wisdom would be brought into the House by increasing the ratio, he asked whether this would not also bring in more folly? For the probability is, that the ratio of both wisdom and folly will increase with the increase of numbers, and likewise of honesty and dishonesty; and with respect to the smallness of the district, or that it was safer for a small number to send a member than a greater, he was of a different opinion, as he believed that if ever the practice of bribery should come into play in America, it would be easier for a Representative to purchase a small district than a large one. If ever the liberties of the people are endangered, it will not be by the smallness of the representation, but by the corruption of electors and elections. This is the door which Congress should guard in the strictest manner, and that will secure the people against corruption in the House.
A gentleman from Georgia has observed, that the disposition of a great many millions of dollars has been in the hands of a quorum of this House, of whom it requires only seventeen to form a majority. On this Mr. C. observed, that the old Congress, which was composed of a much smaller number, were intrusted with the disposal of larger sums, although there were sometimes only two members from the largest State, Virginia, and no complaints were heard of their conduct.
But there is an argument which ought to have weight in the present question. The Senate, although a much smaller body than this House, are fully competent to judge of our proceedings, and of the safety of the country. Indeed, (said Mr. C.,) it appears very evident to me that we are not in want of a larger number in the House of Representatives to debate any question, if it be considered how much has already been said on the subject now before us.
Mr. Vining expressed much surprise that the subject, which to him appeared perfectly definable, should have occasioned the debate to travel so widely from the line marked out by the constitution. The pendulum seems to vibrate between the numbers 81, 96, and 113; and should that pendulum rest on any one of them in preference to the others, he could not suppose that it would affect the liberties of America. Why, therefore, all this extraneous argument about a point of so easy decision? We are sent here to administer the Government, the first principles of which are already fixed, so that neither branch can encroach on the other. The Senate, the House of Representatives, the President, have each defined powers; and whilst those remain, I shall always believe the liberties of America are invulnerable.
Under this impression, Mr. Chairman, I shall vote for striking out 30,000, in order to accommodate the question to a medium. But I shall do this on different principles from some other gentlemen; notwithstanding, I at the same time confess that the ratification of the first amendment to the constitution ought to govern us in deciding this question. The spirit of the amendment appears to me clearly to imply that we should not suffer the number of Representatives to exceed one for 30,000. I am here, not as a person who shall exercise discretionary opinions, but judge by the letter of the constitution. And in this case we may increase the number, but we cannot make it less after the enumeration. In the mean time, until that enumeration is complete, the representation remains as it has been hitherto, which I believe may be about one member to every 40,000 or 41,000.
If we go upon theory only, I would enlarge the representation to its greatest extent, and hand down the principle to futurity, in letters of gold, that a very great representation—that Democracy is the very best Government that can possibly be devised, provided it were practicable to give it stability. Next to a government as free as theory could extend, we have the freest in the world—a Government of representation, which will increase with the population of the country, and the ten new States will always preserve an equilibrium; but if you increase it to an extreme, you may render it tumultuous, although it may be safe.
I cannot, however, see the propriety of comparing this to the Government of Great Britain, although that is called a Government of Representation, consisting of two Houses of Parliament, one of which is elective, the Lords are hereditary, and the King can do no wrong; and it has hitherto been, I believe, the next best Government, after our own, in the world. And yet we know with how much reluctance Ireland obtained a participation of the trade and commerce of Great Britain; although a Flood bellowed forth with the voice of liberty like a Demosthenes, still nothing could induce the British Ministry to give way, until the volunteers effected it. And have we not the volunteers, sir, in this country to protect our rights? Yes, sir, the American volunteers are perfectly competent to this service.
I am under no apprehensions from the stockholders of the bank, or the speculators in the funds; for it is their interest to have a wise and good representation. The people who are employed in the more simple path of agriculture, removed at a great distance, are not more interested in the security of the Government than the more informed stockholder. As an example of the discernment of the great commercial people of London and Bristol, I need only mention their choice of a Fox and a Burke, for until a late day Mr. Burke was the champion of the people and the friend of liberty.
If our Senate should take any unwarrantable stride towards aristocracy, have we not the power to check them? No President can very well attempt it at any time hereafter; and we are perfectly secure in the present time from all suspicion of corruption.