Peace, it was said, may be obtained from the Indian tribes at a much less expense than would be necessary for the support of the war. To persevere in hostilities would be wasting the public money to a very bad purpose indeed; for, supposing our arms crowned with victory, what are the advantages we may expect to reap from our success? We can only gain possession of their lands—a possession that must long continue unproductive of the smallest benefit, as we already possess land sufficient—more, in fact, than we will be able to cultivate for a century to come.
Instead of being ambitious to extend our boundaries, it would answer a much better national purpose to check the roving disposition of the frontier settlers, and prevent them from too suddenly extending themselves to the Western waters. If kept closer together, and more nearly connected with the old settlements, they would be more useful to the community at large, and would not so frequently involve us in unnecessary and expensive wars with the Indians; but if permitted to rove at pleasure, they will keep the nation embroiled in perpetual warfare as long as the Indians have a single acre of ground to rest upon.
If the citizens of the United States were recalled within their proper boundaries, there they might, for years to come, cultivate the soil in peace, neither invaded nor invading. As the country progresses in population, and our limits are found too narrow, it will then be soon enough to contemplate a gradual extension of our frontier; but, in the mean time, it is an idle profusion of blood and treasure to carry war beyond our present line of forts. It is only exposing our arms to disgrace, betraying our own weakness, and lessening the public confidence in the General Government, to send forth armies to be butchered in the forests, while we suffer the British to keep possession of the posts within our territory.
As long as Britain is suffered to retain these posts, we can never hope to succeed against the Indians; nor ought we to trace our late misfortune to any other source than her still holding them in her possession. Were they in our hands, the Indians could not carry on their operations against us with the same degree of vigor as they now do; for it is from those forts that they obtain their supplies of arms and ammunition, with which they can be at all times plentifully furnished, as long as things continue on their present footing.
Until those posts are in our possession, it will be in vain to send our armies into the wilderness. A body of five thousand men, sent out against the Indians, under the present circumstances, would be as effectually defeated as the smaller ones have already been. In those wilds, our troops have no friend at hand to furnish them with supplies, or to give them intelligence of the approach and operations of the enemy; whereas, the Indians, receiving both aid and information from their friendly neighbors, can preconcert their plans, and choose, according to their own convenience, the place and the hour of attack, as they did before.
It was here observed, by an honorable gentleman on the other side of the question, that we ought undoubtedly to get possession of those posts; and that we might have long since obtained it, if we had only laid a seasonable embargo on all the British shipping in our ports; though he doubted whether it would at present be worth while to take such a step, as the English have lost so great a portion of our carrying trade, in consequence of the additional tonnage laid on their vessels.
In favor of the motion, it was further urged, that, supposing even the war to have been originally undertaken with justice on our side—supposing, also, that the national honor and interest called for a continuance of hostilities—yet, as it was by no means either necessary or prudent to invade the Indian territory, as this had been attempted in two successive campaigns, and the event had, in both instances, been such as to afford no very flattering prospect from a third expedition of the same kind, it was thought much more advisable to content ourselves with defending the frontier; and this might be done without making so great an augmentation in the military establishment.
The only use of regular troops on the frontier is to garrison the forts, and to have a standing force in the neighborhood to form a station, to which the militia may resort either for protection or supplies; but as to active service, the frontier militia and rangers were pronounced to be by far preferable to the regular troops, as being more expert woodsmen, and better habituated to the Indian mode of fighting. To defend the forts, a small number of regulars would be sufficient. The present establishment of two regiments would, if completed, be amply adequate to the purpose, and, when assisted by such forces as might at all times be collected on the frontier, would be able to repel every inroad of the enemy.
Experience has proved that the sudden and desultory attacks of the frontier militia and rangers are ever attended with better success than the methodical operations of a regular force. The former are better calculated for expedition and surprise, making unexpected sallies, scouring the country in small bodies, harassing the Indians, and intercepting their straggling parties, by whom their motions are unobserved; whereas, when a body of regulars take the field, encumbered with baggage and heavy artillery, the unavoidable slowness of their movements affords the enemy an opportunity of watching all their operations, collecting their whole force, and skulking in the woods around them till they can seize the favorable moment to strike a sudden blow, which they generally do with success, but which they could never attempt if exposed every hour to the unforeseen attacks of our woodsmen, who would keep their attention constantly engaged in all quarters, and thus prevent them from uniting in large bodies.
It was further observed by some gentlemen, who even admitted the propriety of invading the Indian territory, that, to effect this with success, it was by no means necessary to make such an increase in the military establishment as that contemplated in the bill. The miscarriage of the former expeditions could not (they said) be alleged as a sufficient reason; for it is well known that the former establishment was far from being complete. The regulars intended for the service of the last campaign were to have been above two thousand two hundred; the President was, besides, empowered to raise two thousand five hundred levies, in addition to the regulars; and these would, together, have constituted an army of about four thousand seven hundred men. Had such a body been employed, we might reasonably have expected much better success against the Indians, whose numbers were so far inferior; the whole force of the Wabash tribes not amounting to above eleven or twelve hundred warriors, who never could keep the field for any length of time, but must be soon obliged to disperse, without venturing an attack upon an army of such superior strength.