When we consider the warlike disposition of the Indians in general, and the alacrity with which the victors are ever sure to be joined by numerous allies, we have every reason to expect a much more formidable opposition in the next campaign. It is well known that the savages place all their glory in deeds of war; and that, among them, a young man cannot make his appearance in company till he has signalized his valor by some martial achievement. When, to this powerful incentive, a new stimulus is added by the trophies obtained in the late action, it is presumable that numbers will crowd to their standard; and it strongly behooves us to prepare in time for a much more vigorous effort than any we have yet made against them.
The objections drawn from the increased expense, must entirely vanish from before the eyes of any man who looks forward to the consequences of one more unsuccessful campaign. Such a disaster would eventually involve the nation in much greater expense than that which is now made the ground of opposition. Better, therefore, at once to make a vigorous and effectual exertion to bring the matter to a final issue, than to continue gradually draining the Treasury, by dragging on the war, and renewing hostilities from year to year.
If we wish to bring the war to a speedy and a happy conclusion, and to secure a permanent peace to the inhabitants on the frontier, we must employ such troops and adopt such measures as appear best calculated to ensure success. If we delay our determination until the force of the enemy be ascertained, we can make no provision at all; for the nature and circumstances of the case preclude us from the very possibility of obtaining a knowledge of their strength and numbers. And are we, meanwhile, to remain inactive and irresolute, and make no efforts to repel their intended attacks? No! Whatever their numbers may be, prudence calls aloud for provision of some kind. And if experience is to have any weight with us, the example of the French and of the British points out the true mode of securing our frontier, and rendering it invulnerable to an Indian foe. Let us occupy posts in the vicinity of the enemy, let them be properly garrisoned and well provided, and the business is done.
These will afford an opportunity of trading with the friendly tribes, and will prevent all intercourse between the whites and the Indians, except under proper regulations. Should hostilities be meditated by any tribes who are not in amity with us, early intelligence of their movements can be obtained; their marauding parties may either be beaten off on their approach, or intercepted on their return; opportunities may be taken of separately attacking the hostile tribes; their old men, their squaws, their children, will be exposed a great part of the year, whilst the others are out hunting. In short, if fear, hope, interest, can be supposed to have any influence on the Indians, this mode of defence must be allowed to be preferable to any other, as giving the fullest scope to the operation of all those motives.
A different mode has long been pursued in Virginia, and adopted by the inhabitants of Kentucky, but its success has not been such as to offer any inducement to the General Government to follow the same plan. Rangers have there been employed for a number of years to scour the frontiers; and those rangers, too, were expert woodsmen, perfectly inured to the Indian mode of warfare; yet, notwithstanding their utmost vigilance, these savages still found means to commit all the murders and depredations already enumerated. It is true, however, that a frontier militia man, trained up in the woods, may be, in many respects, preferable to a regular soldier, who has not the same knowledge of the country, and of the mode of fighting; but with equal experience, (and proper men possessed of that experience, may be enlisted on the establishment,) regular troops will be found infinitely superior to any militia upon earth.
Every man who has ever seen militia in the field, cannot but know that a very trifling disaster, or a slight cause of discontent, is sufficient to make them disband, and forget all subordination, so far as even to neglect the means of self-defence; whereas regular troops, under proper discipline, and acting with greater steadiness and concert, are much more to be depended on, especially when the object of attack is distant, and great fatigue is to be undergone. The militia, in whatever mode they may be called out, will hardly furnish men of the proper description; if large pay be offered, the temptation will equally prevail upon those who are unfit for the service as it will upon good, effective men; besides, some of the States have no militia laws; and, even in those States which have such laws, they are gone into disuse; no dependence can therefore be placed on militia under any laws now existing. There is, indeed, a general militia law now before the House: but if it ever passes, it certainly cannot be passed in due season to answer the purpose of providing for the immediate defence of the frontier. Regular troops must be raised, or nothing effectual can be done; and if to avoid the expense we refuse the only aid that may prove of any real service, we render ourselves responsible for the consequences of this parsimonious policy, which may be attended with the ruin and destruction of our fellow-citizens in the Western country.
The Cornplanter's speech was again mentioned and called for; but, as it had been confidentially communicated by the President, an objection was made to having it read, without clearing the galleries. Whereupon,
An honorable member rose, and mentioned his having read it in one of the public newspapers in the State of New Jersey.
To this it was answered, that if any gentleman had the newspaper to produce, the speech might be publicly read from that; otherwise, although it might be very proper that the speech itself should be read, yet, as it had been confidentially received from the Executive, there would be a manifest trespass on propriety and decorum in having it read with open galleries; it was therefore wished that the galleries might be cleared.
The Parliamentary etiquette requiring that this should be done by the House, and not by a committee, the committee rose for the purpose; and,