Here Mr. Gerry read a statement, to show the diminution of the revenue in consequence of the failure of the fisheries; and added,
To support the fisheries, is to support the revenue: by that staple, the citizens of Massachusetts are enabled to pay the revenue that is expected from them; and, by an attempt to save ten thousand dollars, Government will probably sacrifice a hundred thousand; and besides, lose the confidence of the citizens of that State.
The only question now is, whether this be a direct bounty, or simply a commutation of the allowance already granted by Congress? If the latter be the case, I can see no reason why we should refuse our assent to a proposition, which is only calculated to do justice to the people concerned, and to give encouragement to a very important branch in the United States; especially as the proposition will even have a tendency to increase the revenue.
Mr. Williamson.—It has been urged with great propriety, in favor of the bill now submitted to our consideration, that the operation of our laws should in all cases tend to encourage useful industry; that while we are giving back the duties on all other foreign goods which are exported, it would be unjust and cruel to refuse a full drawback of the duties on salt which may be exported, especially when the circumstances of its exportation are attended with an increase of riches and strength to the nation. Impressed as I am with the force of these arguments, and desirous as I am to protect and encourage the native seamen of America, by all prudent, practicable, and constitutional means, I shall nevertheless find it my duty to vote for striking out the first section of the bill, because it proposes to give a bounty for the encouragement of the vessels employed in the fisheries.
We have been told that the name is improper; that it is simply a drawback of the duty upon salt; and gentlemen have produced a very ingenious calculation, by which they attempt to prove, that in some years it may happen that the whole duty on the salt will not be repaid; but they admit that in some years the drawback or bounty will exceed the duty. It is certainly their opinion—and in this we are perfectly agreed—that the money to be paid will be more than that received, else there had been no use for so large an appropriation. We shall not trouble the committee with calculations on this subject. It is conceded, that the encouragement to be given, probably will exceed the full drawback of the duty on salt. In other words, a douceur or a proper bounty is to be given: let us call it one thousand dollars per annum. Is it within the powers of this Congress to grant bounties? I think not; and on this single position I would rest the argument.
In the constitution of this Government there are two or three remarkable provisions, which seem to be in point. It is provided, that direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers. It is also provided, that all duties, imposts, and excises, shall be uniform throughout the United States; and it is provided, that no preference shall be given, by any regulation of commerce or revenue, to the ports of one State over those of another. The clear and obvious intention of the articles mentioned was, that Congress might not have the power of imposing unequal burdens; that it might not be in their power to gratify one part of the Union by oppressing another. It appeared possible, and not very improbable, that the time might come, when, by greater cohesion, by more unanimity, by more address, the Representatives of one part of the Union might attempt to impose unequal taxes, or to relieve their constituents at the expense of other people. To prevent the possibility of such a combination, the articles that I have mentioned were inserted in the constitution. Suppose a poll-tax should be attempted; suppose it should be enacted that every poll in the Eastern States shall pay a tax of half a dollar, and every poll in the Southern States should pay a tax of one dollar. Do you think we should pay the tax? No certainly. We should plead the constitution, and tell you that the law was impotent and void.
But we have been told, that Congress may give bounties for useful purposes; that is to say, they may give bounties for all imaginable purposes; because the same majority that votes the bounty will not fail to call the purpose a good one. Establish the doctrine of bounties, and let us see what may follow. Uniform taxes are laid to raise money, and that money is distributed—not uniformly; the whole of it may be given to the people in one end of the Union. Could we say, in such a case, that the tax had been uniform? I think not. There is certainly a majority in this House who think that the nation would be stronger and more independent, if all our labor was performed by free men. This object might be promoted by a bounty. Let a poll-tax be laid, according to the constitution, of one dollar per poll: in this case, sixty cents must be paid for each slave; and the number of slaves being 680,186, their tax would amount to $334,911. To encourage the labor of citizens, let Congress then give an annual bounty of one dollar to every free man who is a mechanic, or who labors in the field. We might be told that the bounty was small, and the object was good; but the measure would be most oppressive, for it would be a clear tax of rather more than three hundred thousand dollars on the Southern States.
Perhaps the case I have put is too strong—Congress can never do a thing that is so palpably unjust—but this, sir, is the very mark at which the theory of bounties seems to point. The certain operation of that measure is the oppression of the Southern States, by superior numbers in the Northern interest. This was to be feared at the formation of this Government, and you find many articles in the constitution, besides those I have quoted, which were certainly intended to guard us against the dangerous bias of interest, and the power of numbers. Wherefore was it provided that no duty should be laid on exports? Was it not to defend the great staples of the Southern States—tobacco, rice, and indigo—from the operation of unequal regulations of commerce, or unequal indirect taxes, as another article had defended us from unequal direct taxes?
I do not hazard much in saying, that the present constitution had never been adopted without those preliminary guards in it. Establish the general doctrine of bounties, and all the provisions I have mentioned become useless. They vanish into air, and like the baseless fabric of a vision, leave not a trace behind. The common defence and general welfare, in the hands of a good politician, may supersede every part of our constitution, and leave us in the hands of time and chance. Manufactures, in general, are useful to the nation; they promote the public good and general welfare. How many of them are springing up in the Northern States? Let them be properly supported by bounties, and you will find no occasion for unequal taxes. The tax may be equal in the beginning—it will be sufficiently unequal in the end.