Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, Vol. 1 (of 16)

by United States. Congress

To elucidate this position, Mr. S. recited the expenses, charges, and increase of the War Department from its first establishment under the present Government, to its present enormous demands, which for the year 1793, are no less, agreeably to the estimate furnished by the Secretary of the Treasury, than $1,171,719;[45] more than double the sum necessary for the support of all the other branches of the National Government. The better to illustrate this subject of the Indian war, he entered into comparative statements of the years 1790, '91, '92, and '93; and, animadverting on the different items of calculation, he asserted, in strong terms, that they exceeded every thing that the history of the Indian wars afforded for twenty years back; he wished any gentleman to enter into an investigation and comparison of the alarming increase of the expenses of the department, and to take a retrospect of the subject for twenty years back; and he was certain neither the Secretary of War nor any other person could account rationally for the occasion of such an establishment. There was no precedent to be found in any of the States; not one of them has a War Department; neither was it contemplated in the Constitution of the United States. Yet it has, in the short space of three or four years, been imposing on the country burdens which the people have at length expressed their abhorrence of; it has been increased from $137,000 in 1789, to the extravagant demand now required, of $1,171,719 and $50,000 contingencies for the support of 1793. This is so alarming an increase, that it calls loudly for reformation, or the entire abolition of the department, and that another system shall be adopted for the protection of the frontiers. Armies of regulars will never afford protection; they have never answered any good purpose against the Indians from the time of Braddock's defeat down to that of Major General St. Clair, although this last-mentioned unfortunate expedition cost the United States an immense sum of money, and the lives of a great number of valuable officers and citizens. History and the experience of ages have proved this fact, that unwieldy armies will never be able to fight the savages in the wilderness; indeed, the Secretary of War confesses the fact in one of his reports, which Mr. S. read, wherein the Secretary accounts for the ill success of the plans, by observing, "that it was owing to the extreme activity of the enemy and our ignorance of the wilderness through which our troops had to march." But the Secretary might have also added, our entire ignorance of the mode of carrying on the war.

Here Mr. S. took occasion to observe, that this alarmingly expensive and useless department had crept upon the country entirely from our fondness for taking up money on loans; for had it not been that the money was thus obtained with a sort of facility that was not directly felt by the people, they never would have consented to be directly taxed to support the parade of so unnecessary an establishment. This is my reason for being an enemy to loans; they deceive citizens, and lull them for a time, in order to levy double contributions afterwards.

But it may be demanded, how are the frontiers to be protected, if the army was disbanded? In reply to this Mr. S. said he wished that the former two regiments might be retained to garrison the forts, and that a militia near the scene of action should be raised, who would be able to make five expeditions against the savages in a year, if necessary, instead of one solitary fruitless attempt, which, upon an average, is as much as a regular army can do; and sometimes not so much, for it does not appear that any expedition took place during the last twelve months: moreover, it is not so easy for the Indians to discover the plans and approaches of militia, as they do the slow motions of an unwieldy army, dragging their heavy artillery through the woods. The fact is, that the Indians have the best intelligence and know every motion of the army, and they can even calculate the time and place to meet them, and the numbers of their tribes that will be necessary to receive such a force; they will always be prepared when a regular army are to march against them. But if the business be left to a militia of the frontier inhabitants, who know the country, and have their property at stake, it would not cost the Government one-fourth part of the expense to give a complete protection, and to repel all the depredations of the savages, if that be our intention. If it be the protection and happiness of our brethren on the frontiers—if we are serious to check the progress of expense, the motion which I have brought forward will be the most effectual means, and to establish a proper Militia System. On this motion, therefore, will depend the question, whether we are to continue a fruitless warfare in the present mode for seven or ten years, or shall we adopt a better system, which will not cost one-fourth of the expense, and which would completely check the Indians; nay, it would entirely exterminate them, if that was thought to be necessary.

In order to bring the matter to a point, Mr. S. suggested, that it would be proper to disband all the troops except the two former regiments of two thousand one hundred and twenty-eight men, which would be more than sufficient to garrison all the fourteen posts on the frontier. These, with a militia, under proper regulations, and the officers appointed by the President, would be found a more certain protection. The garrisons are at Fayette, Hamilton, Steuben, Knox, Tammany, Telfair, Harmar, Franklin, Jefferson, St. Clair, Marietta, Massachusetts, Matthews, and Knoxville. Most of these are commanded by captains, except two that are commanded by majors: now, reducing the establishment to two thousand one hundred and eighteen non-commissioned and privates, and average them amongst the garrisons, it will give one hundred and fifty-two men for each; the sum saved by this reduction would be six hundred and twenty-four thousand six hundred and seven dollars—the difference between the appropriations for 1792 and those required for 1793.

With regard to the expense that would be incurred from militia expeditions, none of them would cost above thirty thousand dollars; and four or five of those, if made in a year, would have ten times the success and effect that could be expected from the present system. Had the militia plan been adopted, we should not at this day hear such murmurs from our constituents, nor would the people be saddled with heavy taxes and imposts; but, on the contrary, the money that has been actually wasted would have sunk a considerable part of our National Debt. But by the system of warfare lately adopted of dragging heavy cannon and camps into a wilderness, of which we have confessed our ignorance, if it be allowed any longer, our Treasury will be exhausted, and the public revenues which the Secretary of the Treasury reported as affording a prospect of income beyond the permanent wants of Government, will not all together be sufficient for our War Establishment; we must fly to loans, and pursue a system of ruin and distress to the country. Under these impressions, said Mr. S., I have introduced the proposition now before the House; and I entreat gentlemen to think seriously of it, for thereon, in a high degree, will depend the real protection of our frontier, the safety of our garrisons, and the ultimate ease, happiness, and tranquillity of the continent.

Mr. Hartley, although he did not wish to advocate the continuance of a standing army, yet he was averse to disbanding the troops at present, while it is known that a negotiation for a peace is going forward, and may not perhaps be brought to a decision before the spring. It is a well-known maxim in politics, that a peace can always be easiest obtained by a nation which is prepared for war. He noticed the great prudence and economy of the President in forming the army into a legion; and he differed in opinion with Mr. Steele respecting the insufficiency of regular troops. No instance could be quoted where regulars had engaged the Indians without beating them.

Mr. Parker said he had always abhorred the idea of keeping up standing armies in this country; and he believed he could from experience demonstrate that it was an unwise measure at the commencement of the present Government; for it answered no better purpose than throwing out a hint to the British and Spanish Governments, on our Northern and Southern frontiers, to increase their forces, and even to administer countenance and support to the Indians, which they never would have thought of doing, but for our vain attempt at military parade. He mentioned a letter which had been written by Lord Dorchester to the Indians, informing them "that Prince Edward had arrived with a number of chosen warriors to protect them," meaning against the United States.

Thus, said Mr. P., we have been warring with our finances for the last three years, by keeping up an army in imitation of European plans, which are formed in countries altogether unanalogous to America in every possible view. The consequences have been unsuccessful, and produced military disgraces, by sending into the field a collection of beings, collected from stews and brothels and from the most unprincipled of their species, to fight against Indians well supported on both sides, and fighting, as they do, for their property, their hunting ground, their wives, and children, instead of calling forth the militia, the natural strength of the country. But the present plan has involved us in such difficulties that we are not now able to provide for the payment of our debts, without the medium of loans; nay, we are now called on for a small sum of two hundred thousand dollars at the bank, which would have been easily paid out of the surplus in the Treasury, were it not that our finances have been exhausted by those ill-judged expeditions under General Harmer and General St. Clair. He mentioned the naked, starved appearance of the men who were sent out—with shoes that would not last three days, clothes that did not half cover their miserable bodies from the inclemency of the weather, and food sometimes not fit for dogs. He could mention the particulars, if required, of some other very abominable abuses, but refrained from it at present. He concluded by expressing the same opinion of militia that Mr. S. had done; and, with regard to the starved soldiery who had appeared in the woods, they were despised so much by the Indians, that they called them Coatmen, and shot them down like wild turkeys.

Mr. Fitzsimons was apprehensive that it would be a dangerous experiment, so suddenly to alter the system of defence already adopted. He remarked, that when Mr. Steele had stated the War Department to have cost the United States three million five hundred and forty thousand dollars, he had committed a great mistake, for there was one million one hundred and seventy-one thousand dollars of that sum not yet granted. [Mr. Steele explained, that he had gone by the estimates for the appropriations proposed, &c.] Mr. Fitzsimons did not wish to advocate a standing army; and if any better mode of defence for the frontiers could be digested, he would be amongst the foremost who would agree to it.