In regard to the sincerity of his intentions to afford effectual protection to the frontiers, Mr. S. said that he had been sufficiently explicit; that a feeling for the sufferers had dictated this motion; that he was sorry that it had been whispered in the ears of some of the members that it was intended to withhold the necessary appropriations, and divert them to other purposes.
If two regiments were insufficient to garrison all the posts necessary for defence, he would even, under certain restrictions, consent to continue the three sub-legions, thereby enabling the President to establish double the number of posts now erected, if he should deem it advisable. Regular troops being incapable of active expeditions against Indians in the wilderness, his wish was to abandon that system and confine them entirely to the garrison.
The next objection to the motion is the incompetency of the militia; and to support this opinion the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Wadsworth) has made this expression, "that as to the expedition under General St. Clair, the regulars were few, and not to be named when compared with the number of the militia." The truth is, there was not a man engaged that day as a militia man, except the advance guard commanded by Colonel Oldham, which consisted of about three hundred, perhaps a few more. The field return of the day preceding the action being in the War Office, this can be ascertained with precision. The balance of the army on that unfortunate day, had been enlisted as regulars, were fought as regulars, even clothed as regulars, and, poor fellows, died like regulars. They suffered the fate which awaits every regular army destined for similar expeditions. Even the handful of militia employed that day, did not deserve that name; they were chiefly substitutes for drafted men from the ceded territory. This draft became unavoidable, from a misfortune to General Sevier, which Mr. Steele related.
The attack on Major Adair has also been mentioned as a proof of the incompetency of militia, and Mr. S. insisted that the only inference which could be drawn from thence was, that one hundred militia were able to repel, but not destroy, near two hundred Indians. This event he conceived was in favor of and not against his motion.
He next adverted to the arguments of Mr. Wadsworth, in regard to the war of 1762; of the establishment of posts in Pennsylvania and Virginia, and of the success of Colonel Boquet's expedition. If two worn-out regiments at that time were sufficient to defend the frontiers, and, with the aid of the militia, to terminate the war, two new regiments, with all the vigor which the gentleman described them to possess, with the aid of established posts, and a much more effective militia, can certainly be equal to the same end. After examining Mr. W.'s arguments for some time, Mr. S. said, that when analyzed, it would be found that they proved more than they were intended to prove; but the merits of this motion did not require that he should take advantage of these indiscretions.
He showed from the history of 1762, that though posts were established, with a handful of regular troops in each, they never answered the purpose of effectual protection; but the frontier people were always obliged, in a great degree, to defend themselves; that they were best calculated for that service, and that they would perform it now with alacrity and success, if well rewarded.
Mr. S. then refuted the objection against the militia on account of their waste and expense which Mr. W. had alluded to. The law allows a mounted volunteer, furnishing himself with a good horse, good arms, provisions, and every other necessary, except ammunition, at his own risk and expense, one dollar per day. The exact expense of such an expedition can be calculated. Whether successful or not, the charge to the public cannot be increased. The contractors, quartermasters, and hospital departments, are all avoided, with the abuses, expenses, and frauds, attending such establishments. Mr. S. enlarged upon this point, and said that these were always found to be the most expensive departments in any army, and that the Federal Treasury had felt their effects already. In favor of the militia, it may be asked, who fought the battle of Bunker's Hill? Who fought the battles of New Jersey? Who have fought the Indians so often with success, under Generals Wilkinson, Scott, Sevier, and others? Who marched in 1776 under General Rutherford, through the Cherokee nation, laid waste their country, and forced them to peace? Who fought the battles of Georgia, under Clark and Twiggs? Who fought the battles of South Carolina, under the command of an honorable member now present? Delicacy forbids me to enlarge upon his successes in his presence.
Who fought the ever-memorable battles of Cowpens, King's Mountain, Hanging Rock, Blackstocks, the pivots on which the Revolution turned in the Southern States? In short, who fought all the battles of the Southern States, while we had a mere handful of regular troops, scarcely the shadow, much less the reality of an army?
They were all fought by freemen, the substantial freeholders of the country—the men attached to the Revolution from principle, men who were sensible of their rights and fought for them.
Such men will not enlist in regular armies, nor will any one who has the disposition or the constitution of a freeman. It would give me pain to describe the trash which composes all regular armies: they enlist for three dollars a month; which, in a country like the United States, is a sufficient description of their bodies as well as their minds. Such men are not fit to combat the most active enemy in the world. Here Mr. S. read Major Gaither's and Major Trueman's depositions, respecting the defeat of the 4th November, 1791, stating that they could not see the Indians, because they were behind trees, &c.; that the regular troops tried, but could not fight that way; that they seemed to be stupid, and incapable of resistance; and that if any General in the world had commanded such men that day, he must have been defeated as they were.