3. Resolved, That the Secretary of the Treasury has violated the law passed the 4th of August, 1790, making appropriations of certain moneys authorized to be borrowed by the same law, in the following particulars, viz: First, By applying a certain portion of the principal borrowed to the payment of interest falling due upon that principal, which was not authorized by that or any other law. Secondly, By drawing part of the same moneys into the United States, without the instructions of the President of the United States.
4. Resolved, That the Secretary of the Treasury has deviated from the instructions given by the President of the United States, in exceeding the authorities for making loans under the acts of the 4th and 12th of August, 1790.
5. Resolved, That the Secretary of the Treasury has omitted to discharge an essential duty of his office, in failing to give Congress official information in due time, of the moneys drawn by him from Europe into the United States; which drawing commenced December, 1790, and continued till January, 1793; and of the causes of making such drafts.
6. Resolved, That the Secretary of the Treasury has without the instructions of the President of the United States, drawn more moneys borrowed in Holland into the United States than the President of the United States was authorized to draw, under the act of the 12th of August, 1790: which act appropriated two millions of dollars only, when borrowed, to the purchase of the Public Debt: And that he has omitted to discharge an essential duty of his office, in failing to give official information to the Commissioners for purchasing the Public Debt, of the various sums drawn from time to time, suggested by him to have been intended for the purchase of the Public Debt.
7. Resolved, That the Secretary of the Treasury did not consult the public interest in negotiating a loan with the Bank of the United States, and drawing therefrom four hundred thousand dollars, at five per cent. per annum, when a greater sum of public money was deposited in various banks at the respective periods of making the respective drafts.
8. Resolved, That the Secretary of the Treasury has been guilty of an indecorum to this House, in undertaking to judge of its motives in calling for information which was demandable of him, from the constitution of his office; and in failing to give all the necessary information within his knowledge, relatively to the subjects of the reference made to him of the 19th January, 1792, and of the 22d November, 1792, during the present session.
9. Resolved, That a copy of the foregoing resolutions be transmitted to the President of the United States.
Mr. Giles then moved that they should be referred to a Committee of the whole House.
Mr. W. Smith was decidedly opposed to referring those resolutions to the consideration of the Committee of the whole House, because he neither viewed a discussion of them as necessary on the present occasion nor warranted by the nature of the inquiry into the Secretary's conduct. It was trifling with the precious time of the House to lavish it on abstract propositions, when the object of the inquiry ought to be into the facts. He was satisfied that should the House once involve itself in an investigation of theoretic principles of government, the short residue of the session would be exhausted, and no opportunity remain for examining the charges themselves. Those charges being made, it became the House, from a sense of duty to the public and justice to the accused, to proceed immediately to consider them. If the mover intended to apply the principles of the two first resolutions to the facts contained in the subsequent ones, it was unquestionably proper first to substantiate the facts, and then establish the principles which were applicable to them; but it was surely a reversal of order to spend much time in establishing principles, when it might happen that the charges themselves would be totally unsupported. He did not like this mode of proceeding, because it might tend to mislead the House; it was sometimes a parliamentary practice to endeavor to lead the mind to vague and uncertain results, by first laying down theorems from which no one could dissent, and then proceeding by imperceptible shades to move unsettled positions, in order ultimately to entrap the House in a vote which in the first instance it would have rejected. This mode of conducting public business, he considered as inconsistent with fair inquiry. The question was, had the Secretary violated a law? If so, let it be shown; every member was competent to decide so plain a question. He could examine the proofs, read the law, and pronounce him guilty or innocent without the aid of these preliminary metaphysical discussions.
If it were urged that the propositions are so plain and obvious that no time would be lost in considering them, he then begged leave to observe that all antecedent discussions of constitutional questions had never failed to occupy a large portion of their time, and that however self-evident the resolutions might at the first glance appear, a more critical attention would satisfy a mind not much given to doubt that they were by no means so conclusive as to be free from objections.