Mr. King (from New York) and some other gentleman of the Senate, said a few more words on the motion; it was agreed that the sitting member should begin.
Mr. Gallatin accordingly rose and recapitulated the facts stated in the written paper which he had presented to the President, commenting on each of them as he proceeded. He proved that he had been an inhabitant of the United States for thirteen years, and was one before the peace of 1783, and before the Confederation. He quoted the laws previous thereto respecting aliens, and also the British statutes, and he maintained that they were all done away by the Revolution. He conceived himself a citizen in common with the other citizens of the United States, from the time of his first qualifying after his arrival and attachment to the country. He concluded by saying, he would reserve the remainder of his defence until after he should hear the counsel on behalf of the petitioners.
Mr. Lewis commenced his speech by observing, that he appeared there on behalf of Conrad Laub, and other respectable men, who complained of the unconstitutionality of admitting Mr. Gallatin to a seat in the Senate. He was glad to find, by the gentleman's expressions, that the ground of debate had been narrowed into so small a compass, and he would therefore take him up from the argument where he had left off speaking, that of his being a citizen in common of the United States, from the time of his qualifying in Massachusetts or Virginia. But in Virginia two oaths are required, and they must be taken in a court, not before a magistrate, to entitle a man to citizenship. He must also be possessed of a certain quantity of property and be a resident for two years. It appears Mr. G. did not remain in Virginia more than two months. (Here Mr. Lewis read the law of Virginia of the 20th October, 1783.) On this law Mr. L. argued that Mr. G. had not gone through the necessary qualifications to entitle him to citizenship there; and he observed, that he admired the gentleman's candor in not insisting on it here. In this State he had certainly not qualified himself agreeably to the law. Under these circumstances, Mr. L. for his part could never admit of the gentleman's right to citizenship so far back as to entitle him to the suffrage of a vote for a seat in the Senate, &c.
The mischievous consequences of permitting such innovations, he represented in strong terms; and he called to the recollection of the Senate, the conduct of ancient and modern governments on this question. One of the ancient republics made it death for an alien to intermeddle in their politics. The sentiments of antiquity, and those of men in modern days, proved the justice of these conclusions.
With regard to the arguments of the gentleman respecting his being entitled to be a citizen of the Union, or any individual State of it, because he had qualified himself to be citizen of one of them, Mr. L. said, was a mere bubble, for surely the gentleman was not one of the mass of citizens at the accomplishment of independence.
The doctrine of the old law, which the gentleman says was done away by the Revolution, in respect to aliens, may have been so with regard to the British King; it was still, however, virtually in force against the gentleman. But supposing it to be done away, how do the constitutions of the different States stand on this head? Is it not implied by all of them, that certain oaths, residence, and property, make the requisites to form citizenship? In Massachusetts a foreigner is not a citizen, without he complies with those terms. [Here he quoted p. 70 of the small volume of the Laws of Massachusetts. He also cited the act in favor of John Jarvis and others; also, p. 104 of the same book, and p. 191 and 192.] From these he maintained, that no such wild idea was ever contemplated by either the law of Massachusetts or Virginia, as to admit foreigners or persons from other States to citizenship, immediately on their entrance within their limits.
The situation of the sitting member, with respect to the constitution and laws of Pennsylvania, he had little doubt was similar to what he had mentioned in regard to the other States, although he would not assert it as a fact. [He read the 42d section, and also in p. 43 of the Law of Pennsylvania, 13th March, 1789, a proviso which contains some precautions requiring records to be kept by the master of the rolls of the persons admitted to citizenship.] The same principle pervades all the States as well as it does the Constitution of the United States. The absurdity of applying it in any other sense, was severely pictured by Mr. L., and to admit the idea advanced by the sitting member, was as inadmissible as it was novel. In support of what he wished to impress on the minds of the Senate, Mr. L. quoted the 1st vol. of the Journals of Congress in 1774 and 1775, pp. 28 and 29. He then recurred to Blackstone, vol. I, pp. 63, 64, and 69; also 73 and 79.
It was not his intention to quote the Parliamentary Laws of England in support of any thing, but such parts of their Common Law as could be got over—that Common Law of England which was imported by our ancestors, and handed down to them by the people, not the Parliament. The people had made the Common Law, from time to time. The Saxons, Normans, &c., were all concerned in making and improving it, until it had finally reached that degree of perfection in which it was given to us by our ancestors, and it was founded in wisdom and justice.
Mr. L. next quoted, first Blackstone, 402, which was one of the British laws that had never been admitted in this country, and which, he hoped, never would, viz: that wherein the distinction is drawn between the Commoner and the Peer, an oath being required of the Commoner, upon all occasions, and no more than "upon my honor" from a Peer, except in giving evidence in civil or criminal trials.
Mr. L. concluded, by saying that the difficulties which stood between Mr. Gallatin and his seat, were insurmountable and could not be removed without showing a law of Massachusetts, Virginia, &c., repealing those laws in regard to the qualification of citizens, which he had mentioned, but which repeal he was certain did not exist. He therefore stated, that to insist upon the gentleman's right to a seat, was both novel and absurd. These were his opinions, which he had given in a perfectly extempore way, not having been allowed time nor expecting to meet the subject on the new ground which it had this day taken in the Senate.