Mr. Fitzsimons.—If we were to debate for a week upon it, I am sure that there cannot be one new idea started. The whole argument lies in so narrow a compass that every member may decide on a first hearing. The question is, whether, on account of the particular state of the country at this time, it is proper to intrust the President with a discretionary power of raising an army of ten thousand men? For my own part, I am as ready to decide just now as I ever can be.
Mr. Ames.—If we are to go to war, will it not be a prodigious saving of expense to have all matters ready beforehand? By being prepared two months before the war breaks out, the advantages in economy would be immense, as the price of enlisting men would rise fourfold when it was once known that war was certain. He knew many weak parts in the Union that might be attacked and in danger before a body of militia could be ready for effectual service. He was not qualified for details of this sort; but he knew that Rhode Island, for example, might be taken, and, in a short time, so strongly fortified, that it would be difficult or impossible to retake it. Why were we afraid to intrust the President with the power of raising ten thousand men? Can any body of men to be raised in this country tread down the substantial yeomanry? This is quite a Utopian dread. It is infinitely cheaper to raise and embody an army at leisure, when the storm is seen to be approaching, than all at once, when twenty things must be done at the same time. There is, besides, a material distinction between this bill and the former. The force may be discontinued whenever the Legislature thinks proper; nor is it to be raised at all unless the President sees or thinks it necessary. The principle of the bill is, therefore, much less exceptionable than that of the other. To reject a bill on the first reading is a bad practice. Mr. A. hoped that the House would guard against it, unless where any thing was grossly improper, and depended on a single principle. But he trusted that the House would, in every common case, set their faces against it.
Mr. Smilie controverted every thing said by Mr. Ames. He thought that the measure would involve this country in a very useless expense. Did we intend to rival the military establishments in Europe? The British might be expected to increase their forces in Canada in proportion to those of the United States.
Mr. Dayton followed Mr. Smilie, and said, that the arguments of the member who spoke last, although intended to make a different impression, had convinced him of the impropriety of rejecting this bill upon its first reading. That gentleman had thought proper to enter into the intrinsic merits at this stage of it, when those who favored its principles could have no opportunity of defending or amending the particular parts of it. He had heard the objects of it grossly misrepresented. It had been asserted that the bill contemplated the increase of our military peace establishment to sixteen thousand men.
[Mr. Smilie interrupted Mr. Dayton by declaring that he had never said or meant any such thing. But the defence of the Western Territory was to require six thousand men; and these, with the ten thousand to be raised by this bill, would amount, in the whole, to sixteen thousand men.]
No such thing (said Mr. D.) was to be found in it, and he called upon gentlemen to show upon what such an assertion was founded. He, for one, was of opinion that the interests and safety of the United States might be materially promoted by our vesting the President with the power to raise these men, if war should break out in the recess of Congress. Who did not believe that such an event was not only possible, but in some degree probable? Who would say that, if war should be forced upon us, this would not be considered as a most valuable provision, because we might have this respectable body of troops engaged, equipped, and prepared to act the moment that hostilities should be declared by the constituted authority? He would address himself to the feelings and interests of the member who spoke last, and those similarly circumstanced. They resided in the interior parts of the country, and hence it was that they did not seem to experience such lively sensations at the approach of danger on the eastern frontiers—the sea. What (he asked) was their situation, and what had they to fear in case of an open rupture with Great Britain? It was easy to foresee that they would be vigorously pressed, not only by those Indians which are at present hostile, and by the regular troops in that quarter, but by all the neighboring nations of savages over whom British threats or bribes could have influence. A part of the Six Nations, too, would probably join the confederacy, and the frontier settlers of Virginia, Pennsylvania, and New York, would certainly be driven in. With such a corps as the one proposed, an early check might be given to their irruptions, and the war be carried to their towns.
On the other hand, what would be the consequence, if, after the President perceives a war inevitable, he is not permitted to make the smallest preparation until he can convene Congress? Two months must be lost in convening them, owing to the extreme distances of their residence, all which time would be employed by our enemies in increasing their forces, in strengthening their posts, and establishing new ones, and in invading our country. Let this discretionary power be given to the President, (with whom much greater had repeatedly been lodged, and had never in any instance been improperly exercised,) and the men might be engaged while the members were collecting, and a small army in readiness to act as Congress should by law direct and authorize. No danger could arise from it, because the enlistments of those who might be engaged would be void, unless the Legislature, immediately upon their meeting, should confirm them. It had been said, that our reliance should be upon the militia. He had, Mr. D. said, as high an opinion of militia as any member in that House, for he had witnessed their exertions and importance in the late war; but could it be said that it would be very convenient or agreeable to them, to be drawn a distance from their own homes, to be employed in taking and garrisoning posts, if it should be deemed advisable to direct operations of that kind? He concluded, with wishing that the bill might be allowed to have a second reading, as constructions had been imputed to it which it certainly would not bear.
Mr. Madison did not accede to the principle of the bill. He did not see any such immediate prospect of a war, as could induce the House to violate the constitution. He thought that it was a wise principle in the constitution, to make one branch of Government raise an army, and another conduct it. If the Legislature had the power to conduct an army, they might embody it for that end. On the other hand, if the President was empowered to raise an army, as he is to direct its motions when raised, he might wish to assemble it for the sake of the influence to be acquired by the command. The constitution had wisely guarded against that danger on either side. He could not, in the present case, consent to the breaking down of this barrier of public safety. He saw no necessity for it; nor any violent probability, that this country will be speedily invaded by any force, to which the present military establishment cannot make an adequate resistance. Let us hear from the Minister whom we have just sent to Britain, before we take such abrupt and expensive measures. We shall certainly hear from him, at least, before we are invaded. Now, if we enter into a calculation of the time requisite for his arrival in Britain, for commencing his business, and for sending back an account of what kind of reception he has met with, we shall find that by this period, Congress will have met again; or at least, the interval will be so small as to make it not worth while to embrace any measure of this kind.
Upon the whole, he could not venture to give his consent for violating so salutary a principle of the constitution as that upon which this bill encroached.
Mr. Sedgwick differed from Mr. Madison. He did not think that, in certain contingencies, war was so distant a prospect. Simcoe is going to erect a fort in our territories, and the President has declared that he will repel the attempt. We all know the waste of time and property in the last war, at its commencement, by trying to do the business with militia. The proposal met his approbation, as did the resolution of the President to repel force by force.