He took a view of the prominent features of the arguments of the members up before him. It had been said that, if the power of the President and Senate, as to Treaties, was complete, then the House had no right to claim a participation; this could not be denied; but the question was, whether the Executive had that right unqualifiedly, in all cases. In the present case, he contended, the House had a voice. To elucidate: Suppose that, in the constitution of the United States, which has been so guarded about the expenditure of money, a clause had been inserted, positively declaring that the House have a control over the money matters stipulated in a Treaty; would not this constitute a qualification of the powers of the President and Senate with respect to Treaties? The constitution, on this head, he contended, though less explicit than his supposed case would make it, was not the less positive, if tested by all the fair rules of construction; and if compared with the practice of the government from which we had borrowed, with many other matters, this part of our constitution. In England, the country alluded to, their House of Parliament had exercised a control over the moneyed articles of Treaties; and he contended, the House of Representatives had an equal authority here, as chief guardians of the purse-strings. It was unnecessary, at this time, he said, to touch on the other parts of the Treaty which clashed with the constitutional powers of the House.
He again adverted to the power of control that the House of Commons have over Treaties; and contended, that that provision of the British constitution had been accurately copied in our own with this deviation only, that the Senate have the power of making amendments to money bills here, which the House of Lords there have not. He could show, from the best authority, the acknowledgment of the British Crown officers themselves, that the Parliament has a right to discuss and decide on Treaties which involved moneyed stipulations.
The same power, he argued, resided in the House here; for shall it be said, that we have borrowed only the form from Great Britain, and not touched the substance? Shall it be said, that the House have a discretion as to appropriations, and yet they must make them as directed by a Treaty? If the House have no discretion to use in the business, they are the most unfit body to regulate money-matters; for complete regularity in so large a body must be one of the least of their valuable properties. But, with the power of appropriating money, the House have certainly the right to judge of the propriety of the appropriation. The constitution explains itself fully on this head. He instanced the specific power in the constitution, with respect to appropriations for the army, to explain from that instrument its meaning in other parts.
The constitution says, that no appropriations for the support of armies shall be for more than two years; this is, no doubt, that the House may periodically have before them the question of the propriety of supporting an armed force, with all its consequences, and that they may, by refusing or granting an appropriation, determine on its existence. The power thus cautiously lodged must have been for some purpose, and that he had suggested could alone explain this clause of the constitution. This will show what was expected of this House in appropriating money; that they should judge of the usefulness of the expenditure. In the case of the army, the constitution does not say that we may disband an army by withholding money; but for the purpose of investing us with the same power, only requires that the appropriation should recur every two years; taking it for granted, that in this as well as in every other Legislative act, we will duly weigh every consequence.
Having thus explained from the constitution itself the true meaning of this power of appropriation, he proceeded to elucidate it by a reference to the practice of the Government. He found an instance in the permanent appropriations made for the payment of the public debt. If the House in this and analogous cases, could exercise no discretion as to appropriations, why this permanent provision, in preference to an annual appropriation? The permanency of the provision took its rise from the idea, that the House possessed a discretionary power as to appropriations. Thus, he had shown that the practice of the Government, the provisions of the constitution, and the example of the British, from whom we had exactly copied the control over money transactions, all proved a discretion in the House as to appropriations. This must be considered as a sufficient answer to the gentleman from South Carolina, when he said, that the President and Senate possessed the Treaty-making power; for they possessed it with qualification, in matters of money; and unless the House chose to grant that money, it was so far no Treaty.
It was said, that if the Treaty was not the law of the land, the President should be impeached for declaring it as such. Parts of the Treaty the President and Senate had, no doubt, a right to make without any control of the House—those parts he might be considered as proclaiming; he proclaims it, limited as his authority, and under the qualifications provided by the constitution. It was said, that no instance of such a call as that now contemplated could be produced. No; nor of such a Treaty, he answered.
Mr. Swanwick expressed his sense of the importance of the subject before the House, and the pleasure which he experienced at observing the calmness and temper with which the discussion had been carried on. He had not conceived, however, that the decision of the present question involved the sense of the House as to the merits of the Treaty; the object of the resolution was only to obtain that knowledge necessary for an enlightened decision; it had been observed, that the Treaty had been censured by assemblages of people with precipitancy, and without proper information. They did this on the best information that could by them be obtained. But if the House should go into a Committee of the Whole, to take into consideration the Treaty, without obtaining all the information in their power, they would be justly to blame.
He adverted to the constitution; according to that instrument, the Legislative power is completely vested in Congress. By the 8th section of the 1st article, not only a certain specification of powers are granted to Congress, to lay and collect taxes, regulate commerce, &c., but the very extensive further power, not only to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, but, also, all other powers vested by this constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof. If, then, Congress have the power to pass laws to carry into execution all powers vested by the constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof, how is it possible that there can be any authority out of the purview of this general and extensive Legislative control? Is the Treaty-making power not a power vested by the constitution in the Government of the United States, or in a department or officer thereof? If it is, is the conclusion not obvious, that Congress have power to pass laws for carrying these powers into effect? But in the power to pass laws, discretion is necessarily implied; of course, this House must judge when it is to act; whether it will, or will not, carry into effect the object in question. It is a power, it is true, of great delicacy and responsibility, but it is not less a power constitutionally given.
The member from South Carolina construed this part of the constitution in a different way, and insisted that, as the President and Senate had the power of making Treaties, the House were divested of the right of exercising their judgment upon the subject. If this doctrine prevails, to what a situation would the Representatives of a free people be reduced? The constitution especially gives them the power of originating money bills; but to what purpose would this power be granted, if another authority may make a contract, compelling the House to raise money? Suppose that authority were in this way to grant millions upon millions, must the House, at all events, be compelled to provide for their payment? In this case the House become mere automatons, mere mandarine members, like those who nod on a chimney-piece, as directed by a power foreign to themselves.