Mr. Holland said: It is with great diffidence I rise on this important subject, to submit some considerations to this committee. As it has now become a constitutional question, not with respect to the merits of the Treaty, but with respect to the constitutional right of this House to request the Executive to furnish us with papers that related to the Treaty antecedent to its ratification.
To this it is objected that this House has no discretionary power over the Treaty, and, on that account, has nothing to do with the papers.
The question is not whether the Treaty is a good or bad Treaty, but it is whether we have a right to exercise our judgments upon it. Then, without any regard to the Treaty, we must be governed by the rational construction of the fundamental principles of government.
To illustrate which, it may be necessary to examine what has been incident to the different kinds of government, according to the histories of those nations governed by despotism, monarchs, or republics; and from the Constitution of the United States as the fundamental maxims of the Republic, draw that construction that is most rational and natural.
It will also be proper to examine which of those governments preserves the most power in the people.
First, then, of monarchy. Where has that power been placed? According to the theory of the English Government it has been lodged in the Sovereign, for it is there expressly said (nor has it been denied on this floor) that the King is the source of all power; and it is also expressly declared that the King of Great Britain has sovereign and exclusive right to make Treaties. That, when they are made, they cannot be impeded or annulled by any existing power in the kingdom. This is the theory of that Government. But what has been the practice? I answer, the contrary; for it ever has been that, when a Treaty was made, the same has been submitted to the Parliament for concurrence; and Parliament, if they thought proper, admitted and sometimes annulled them, as in the Treaty of Utrecht, and sundry instances that the history of that nation affords us. The English Government, therefore, is in practice what it is not in theory. By the construction of the constitution, as contended for, by giving uncontrollable power to twenty Senators and the President, our Government will be in practice what the English Government is in theory. If this doctrine had been believed, that this was the true construction of the constitution, previous and at the time of its adoption, would the people of the United States have adopted it? If they had been informed that, by this instrument, they were ceding more power to two-thirds of the Senators and President, than even could be practised by the King of England, with his lords spiritual and temporal, under that impression would they have ceded that power? Or, if they had been told that the House of Representatives, under this constitution, had less power than was exercised by the House of Commons in England; that they would be less able to secure their liberties in this country against the approaches of prerogative, would they have, under that belief, accepted of this constitution? I think, Mr. Chairman, I may venture to say they would not.
With respect to the more absolute government of France, where has this power been lodged? In this, as in the monarchy of England, it was, in theory, lodged in a prince; but the theory, even in that despotic government, never could be carried into practice. According to Vattel, in the Treaty made by Francis I., in the Treaty of Madrid, on account of that Treaty encroaching on the fundamentals of their government, it was set aside. How was this done? It was not done by Parliament, for they had none; but the principal people of the kingdom met together at Cogniac and annulled it. I ask again, Mr. Chairman, if the people of this country possess less power than the people of that despotic Government? Or do they possess less power to withstand the usurpations of the Executive, on the subject of Treaties, in their Representatives in Congress, than has ever been maintained in the cramped situation of the people of England by the House of Commons?
Why were these rights ever maintained and so scrupulously attended to by the people of those countries? It was because they considered them as the palladium of their remaining liberty,—they therefore, would not let them go.
Then, with respect to a Republic, the sovereign power is in the people. It therefore follows that whatever can be effected by the people in those countries can be done here—they being the source of power.
Then, with regard to the constitution, it must be construed naturally and liberally in behalf of the people. Not as giving all power that can be given, but as retaining all power and natural right that ought to be retained. It would have been extremely improper to have wantonly discarded natural privilege, or ceded more power than was essential to government; nor was any more intended to be given.