He then adverted to that part of the Message which contained an extract from the Journal of the convention, showing that a proposition "that no Treaty should be binding on the United States, which was not ratified by law," was explicitly rejected. He allowed this to be much more precise than any evidence drawn from the debates in the convention, or resting on the memory of individuals. But, admitting the case to be as stated, of which he had no doubt, although he had no recollection of it, and admitting the record of the convention to be the oracle that ought to decide the true meaning of the constitution, what did this abstract vote amount to? Did it condemn the doctrine of the majority? So far from it, that, as he understood their doctrine, they must have voted as the convention did; for they do not contend that no Treaty shall be operative without a law to sanction it; on the contrary, they admit that some Treaties will operate without this sanction; and that it is no further applicable in any case than where Legislative objects are embraced by Treaties. The term "ratify" also deserved some attention; for, although of loose signification in general, it had a technical meaning different from the agency claimed by the House on the subject of Treaties.
But, after all, whatever veneration might be entertained for the body of men who formed our constitution, the sense of that body could never be regarded as the oracular guide in expounding the constitution. As the instrument came from them it was nothing more than the draft of a plan, nothing but a dead letter, until life and validity were breathed into it by the voice of the people, speaking through the several State Conventions. If we were to look, therefore, for the meaning of the instrument beyond the face of the instrument, we must look for it, not in the General Convention, which proposed, but in the State Convention, which accepted and ratified the constitution. To these also the Message had referred, and it would be proper to follow it.
2. The debates of the convention in three States (Pennsylvania, Virginia, and North Carolina) had been before introduced into the discussion of this subject, and were believed the only publications of the sort which contained any lights with respect to it. He would not fatigue the committee with a repetition of the passages then read to them. He would only appeal to the committee to decide whether it did not appear, from a candid and collected view of the debates in those conventions, and particularly in that of Virginia, that the Treaty-making power was a limited power; and that the powers in our constitution, on this subject, bore an analogy to the powers on the same subject in the Government of Great Britain. He wished, as little as any member could, to extend the analogies between the two Governments; but it was clear that the constituent parts of two Governments might be perfectly heterogeneous, and yet the powers be similar.
At once to illustrate his meaning, and give a brief reply to some arguments on the other side, which had heretofore been urged with ingenuity and learning, he would mention, as an example, the power of pardoning offences. This power was vested in the President; it was a prerogative also of the British King. And, in order to ascertain the extent of the technical term "pardon," in our constitution, it would not be irregular to search into the meaning and exercise of the power in Great Britain. Yet, where is the general analogy between an hereditary Sovereign, not accountable for his conduct, and a Magistrate like the President of the United States, elected for four years, with limited powers, and liable to impeachment for the abuse of them?
In referring to the debates of the State Conventions as published, he wished not to be understood as putting entire confidence in the accuracy of them. Even those of Virginia, which had been probably taken down by the most skilful hand, (whose merit he wished by no means to disparage,) contained internal evidence in abundance of chasms and misconceptions of what was said.
The amendments proposed by the several conventions were better authority, and would be found, on a general view, to favor the sense of the constitution which had prevailed in this House. But even here it would not be reasonable to expect a perfect precision and system in all their votes and proceedings. The agitations of the public mind on that occasion, with the hurry and compromise which generally prevailed in settling the amendments to be proposed, would at once explain and apologize for the several apparent inconsistencies which might be discovered.
He would not undertake to say that the particular amendment referred to in the Message, by which two States require that "no Commercial Treaty should be ratified without the consent of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and that no Territorial right, &c. should be ceded without the consent of three-fourths of the members of both Houses," was digested with an accurate attention to the whole subject. On the other hand, it was no proof that those particular conventions, in annexing these guards to the Treaty power, understood it as different from that espoused by the majority of the House. They might consider Congress as having the power contended for over Treaties stipulating on Legislative subjects, and still very consistently wish for the amendment they proposed. They might not consider the Territorial rights and other objects for which they required the concurrence of three-fourths of the members of both Houses, as coming within any of the enumerated powers of Congress, and, therefore, as not protected by that control over Treaties. And although they might be sensible that Commercial Treaties were under that control, yet, as they would always come before Congress with great weight after they had passed through the regular forms and sanctions of the Treaty department, it might be deemed of real importance that the authority should be better guarded which was to give that weight to them.
He asked, whether it might not happen, even in the progress of a Treaty through the Treaty department, that each succeeding sanction might be given, more on account of preceding sanctions than of any positive approbation? And no one could doubt, therefore, that a Treaty which had received all these sanctions would be controlled with great reluctance by the Legislature, and, consequently, that it might be desirable to strengthen the barriers against making improper Treaties, rather than trust too much to the Legislative control over carrying them into effect.
But, said Mr. M., it will be proper to attend to other amendments proposed by the ratifying conventions, which may throw light on their opinions and intentions on the subject in question. He then read from the Declaration of Rights proposed by Virginia to be prefixed to the constitution, the seventh article, which is as follows:
"That all power of suspending laws, or the execution of laws, by any authority, without the consent of the Representatives of the people in the Legislature, is injurious to their rights, and ought not to be exercised."