"That no soldier shall be enlisted for any longer term than four years, except in time of war, and then for no longer term than the continuance of the war."
The Convention of North Carolina had proposed the same three amendments in the same words.
On a review of these proceedings, may not, said he, the question be fairly asked, whether it ought to be supposed that the several Conventions who showed so much jealousy with respect to the powers of commerce, of the sword, and of the purse, as to require, for the exercise of them, in some cases two-thirds, in others three-fourths of both branches of the Legislature, could have understood that, by the Treaty clauses in constitution, they had given to the President and Senate, without any control whatever from the House of Representatives, an absolute and unlimited power over all those great objects?
3. It was with great reluctance, he said, that he should touch on the third topic—the alleged interest of the smaller States in the present question. He was the more unwilling to enter into this delicate part of the discussion, as he happened to be from a State which was in one of the extremes in point of size. He should limit himself, therefore, to two observations. The first was, that if the spirit of amity and mutual concession from which the constitution resulted was to be consulted on expounding it, that construction ought to be favored which would preserve the mutual control between the Senate and House of Representatives, rather than that which gave power to the Senate not controllable by, and paramount over those of the House of Representatives, whilst the House of Representatives could in no instance exercise their powers without the participation and control of the Senate. The second observation was, that, whatever jealousy might unhappily have prevailed between the smaller and larger States, as they had most weight in one or the other branch of Government, it was a fact, for which he appealed to the journals of the old Congress from its birth to its dissolution, and to those of the Congress under the present Government, that in no instance would it appear, from the yeas and nays, that a question had been decided by a division of the votes according to the size of the States. He considered this truth as affording the most pleasing and consoling reflection, and as one that ought to have the most conciliating and happy influence on the temper of all the States.
4. A fourth argument in the Message was drawn from the manner by which the Treaty power had been understood by both parties in the negotiations with foreign Powers. "In all the Treaties made we have declared and they have believed," &c. By we, he remarked, was to be understood the Executive alone, who had made the declaration, and in no respect the House of Representatives. It was certainly to be regretted, as had often been expressed, that different branches of the Government should disagree in the construction of their powers; but when this could not be avoided, each branch must judge for itself; and the judgment of the Executive could in this case be no more an authority overruling the judgment of the House than the judgment of the House could be an authority overruling that of the Executive. It was also to be regretted that any foreign nation should at any time proceed under a misconception of the meaning of our constitution. But no principle was better established in the laws of nations, as well as in common reason, than that one nation is not to be the interpreter of the constitution of another. Each nation must adjust the forms and operations of its own government, and all others are bound to understand them accordingly. It had before been remarked, and it would be proper to repeat it here, that of all the nations Great Britain would be the least likely to object to this principle, because the construction given to our Government was particularly exemplified in her own.
5. In the fifth and last place, he had to take notice of the suggestion, that every House of Representatives had concurred in the construction of the Treaty power, now maintained by the Executive; from which it followed that the House could not now consistently act under a different construction. On this point, it might be sufficient to remark, that this was the first instance in which a foreign Treaty had been made since the establishment of the constitution; and that this was the first time the Treaty-making power had come under formal and accurate discussion. Precedents, therefore, would readily be perceived to lose much of their weight. But whether the precedents found in the proceedings preparatory to the Algerine Treaty, or in the provisions relative to the Indian Treaties, were inconsistent with the right which had been contended for in behalf of the House, he should leave to be decided by the committee. A view of these precedents had been pretty fully presented to them by a gentleman from New York, (Mr. Livingston,) with all the observations which the subject seemed to require.
On the whole it appeared that the rights of the House on the two great constitutional points had been denied by a high authority in the Message before the committee. This Message was entered on the journals of the House. If nothing was entered in opposition thereto, it would be inferred that the reasons in the Message had changed the opinion of the House, and that their claims on those great points were relinquished. It was proper, therefore, that the questions, brought fairly before the committee in the propositions of the gentleman (Mr. Blount) from North Carolina, should be examined and formally decided. If the reasoning of the Message should be deemed satisfactory, it would be the duty of this branch of the Government to reject the propositions and thus accede to the doctrines asserted by the Executive. If, on the other hand, this reasoning should not be satisfactory, it would be equally the duty of the House, in some such firm, but very decent, terms as are proposed, to enter their opinions on record. In either way the meaning of the constitution would be established, as far as depends on the vote of the House of Representatives.
April 7.—The order of the day being called for on the consideration of the President's Message, the House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on that subject, and the resolutions of Mr. Blount having been read—
Mr. Swift and Mr. W. Smith rose together, but Mr. Smith giving way, Mr. Swift proceeded to remark, that he did not rise for the purpose of going into the subject, but to move that the question might be then taken. The same principles which were involved in the present question, had already undergone a discussion of three weeks, and no doubt could remain on the mind of any gentleman in that House on the subject; nor did he think that if three weeks more were to be consumed in the discussion, one opinion would be changed. Therefore, as business of the utmost consequence called for their attention, as it was of the last importance that the Treaties lately formed with foreign nations should be carried into effect, he hoped they would enter upon the question of the state of the Union. If gentlemen wished to carry the Treaties into effect, he entreated them to come forward and do so; or, if they meant to defeat them, he wished them at once to say so. If they went into the present discussion at length, there would not be time sufficient to determine upon the Treaties. He was willing to let the matter rest upon the representation of the gentleman from Virginia. He himself had taken no share in the debate, though if it were to be again gone into, he should desire to be heard as well as others. But he was fully satisfied that gentlemen who had spoken on a former occasion would unite with him in wishing the question to be then taken.
The resolutions were then severally put and carried—51 members rising for each.