When the envoy was sent to Great Britain, he was principally to demand restitution for the cruel depredations committed on our commerce. We find that object attended to so vaguely that our best-informed men seem doubtful whether much will ever be recovered under the Treaty; they find that in every instance the loser must first pursue his remedy through their tedious and expensive Courts. We find, that by fair construction, we have acknowledged ourselves to have been the infractors of the Treaty of Peace; for what was the ground on which some of the States placed legal impediments to the recovery of British debts? Why, that Lord Dorchester had refused to deliver up or pay for the negroes which, by that Treaty, ought to have been restored, and which slaves would have assisted their masters by their labor to pay those debts; yet we see no mention of them in the Treaty; and we find, to our surprise, men, since this Treaty, defending the construction lately put on the Treaty of Peace by the British, and which had never before been heard of; thus acquiescing in the charge of our being the first aggressors. But this only relates to our honor, and of course can be of little consequence to a nation whose rule of conduct is to submit to every thing, provided, that on the whole account, there appears to be a balance of profit in its favor.
After having thus formed his opinion relative to the Treaty, his next inquiry was, is the Treaty constitutional? On that point he had held himself open to conviction, and waited its discussion. He had not heard any gentleman declare it unconstitutional, except one, (Mr. Page,) who seemed to give his opinion as if he still doubted; and having carefully considered the subject, he was now of opinion that there was nothing directly repugnant to the constitution in the instrument. He then inquired whether, under the existing state of things, the Treaty ought to be rejected? whether it contained stipulations so extremely injurious to the United States as ought to induce the House of Representatives to reject a compact made by the other branches of the Government? In the ten first articles, which are permanent, he found some objections. The third article, which, like many others, cannot be well understood, seems to say that goods imported in British bottoms to the ports of the Lakes, shall pay extra duty. If this be a true construction, it will then be necessary to repeal our restraining duties, to make the Treaty by law consistent with the constitution, which requires that all duties shall be equal. The tenth article ties our hands against sequestration, a power which ought not to be exercised, except on some very extraordinary occasions; yet it was a power which, considering our relative situation to Great Britain, it was imprudent to part with; still, on fair consideration, he did not find that there was sufficient cause, on the account, to reject the Treaty, in the situation we are now placed. The residue will expire in two or three years.
Tuesday, April 26.
Execution of British Treaty.
Mr. Dwight Foster observed, that as the subject before the committee had been minutely discussed, it was not to be expected any new arguments, either on the one side or the other, would be adduced. Hitherto, he had been silent—though silent, he had not been inattentive—he had listened with candor to every thing which had been offered; he had formed his opinion upon serious deliberation, and was ready to give it whenever the question should be taken.
When the resolution requesting the President to lay before the House a copy of the instructions, correspondence, and other documents relative to this Treaty, was under consideration, Mr. F. observed, that he had intended to have expressed his sentiments on the subject; but the great length of time which was spent in that discussion, and the extreme impatience discovered by many members to have the question taken, induced him, as it might several others, to be content with expressing a silent vote, as he did with the minority, on that occasion. This he was the more willing to do, as it was then well known that the Treaty itself would be before the House; that some appropriations would be requisite, on their part, to carry it into effect; and, it was not to be doubted but every gentleman who wished to express his opinion would have an opportunity. The time had now arrived, and several days had been spent already, he believed not unprofitably, in deliberating on an instrument which had been the cause of great agitation in the United States.
He was heretofore one of those who considered the negotiation as advisable; it appeared to him the only means by which the horrors of war were to be avoided. He therefore rejoiced when the President appointed an Envoy for the purpose of negotiation; nor did he yet find any reason to apprehend the measure was injudicious. Far otherwise. He believed it was right, proper, and advisable; and that the result would prove highly advantageous and fortunate for our country. He further said, that he had critically examined the various articles of the Treaty; that he had weighed the arguments for and against them, jointly and severally; that he had considered them all with the attention their importance required; and though, in some instances, we might have wished an extension of advantages on our side, he was bound, in conscience, to declare that he thought the Treaty as beneficial to us as we had a right to expect.
The right of the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, is a principle clearly defined by the constitution. Not a single power delegated by the constitution to any one branch of the Government is defined in terms more explicit, or less liable to be misunderstood, than those which define the Treaty-making power of the United States; and, during the whole course of the former and present debates, Mr. F. observed, he had not been able to raise a doubt in his own mind on the subject. The Treaty under consideration had been duly made and ratified by the proper authority, constituted for this purpose by the people of the United States; as such it was now before the committee and demanded their serious attention and respect. The subject was allowed by all to be of importance. To him it appeared more momentous than any other which, at any time since the establishment of the Government, had engrossed the attention of Congress. He viewed it not as a question of peace or war only, but as involving questions of far greater magnitude. He meant the present unexampled prosperity of this country, our political happiness, our excellent constitution, and probably, in its consequences, the existence of the national Government.
Mr. Kitchell said, he could throw no new light upon the subject under discussion; he wished only to express a few ideas which would lead him to support the resolution in its present form. He did not believe the Treaty to be that box of Pandora, which was to scatter evils of every kind upon the land. He believed there were stipulations in favor of the United States, as well as in favor of Great Britain; and when the Ministers of the two nations enter into contract, it must be expected that stipulations will be agreed to on each side which will not appear perfectly satisfactory to either, as certain concessions must be made on both sides.
He would mention only the probable consequences of rejecting the Treaty. The disposition of the two nations towards each other at the time of entering into negotiation was well known. The spoliations and injuries done to the American vessels had wound up American resentment to the highest pitch. Happily for America, Britain saw cause to change her system of aggression. He believed, with some other gentlemen, that Britain had not only formed the plan of crushing the rising liberties of France, but also of extending her views to America; but, from a reverse of fortune, she found it necessary to employ all her resources against France. There was another thing, the people of England were clamorous on account of the injuries done to the vessels of America; they were seen to be unjust, and were publicly reprobated. These circumstances were favorable to our negotiation, and he believed they could at no time have got a better Treaty, than at the time the present was agreed upon.