Mr. Ames.—The gentleman from Pennsylvania set out with informing us that nothing new had or could be offered on the subject, yet you found, Mr. Chairman, the gentleman had a good deal to say, which I thought new and much to the purpose. As to applying the observation to myself, in common with the advocates for low duties, I shall decline it, only noting that the long discussion which the subject has had, would restrain me from rising on this occasion, more than any remarks of the nature made by the gentlemen from Pennsylvania and Connecticut; but I am actuated by higher motives than a regard to my own feelings, otherwise I should come reluctantly forward to press arguments which the committee may be fatigued with listening to. But I feel such strong impressions on my mind, with regard to the effects our impost law is likely to produce, that I cannot pass it over with a silent vote. I must admonish gentlemen, that the events which may result from our present measures are of the most alarming nature. When I was up before, I endeavored to show the degree of power the Government could exercise without being charged with an ill administration. I shall now proceed briefly to consider the arguments used in reply to what has been advanced by the advocates for moderate duties. I believe it is a good rule to judge of the strength of a cause by the arguments used to defend it; and here I must take the liberty of saying, that the gentlemen on the other side of the question have adduced not one to support their opinion that has carried conviction to my mind. I consider that, by a decision of this question, the good which the new Government is expected to produce may be rendered problematical. Though I am fully impressed with the necessity there is for revenue to supply the public expenses, yet I cannot believe we are likely to obtain more by heavy duties than by temperate ones, and it is to this point that my arguments tend. I do not believe that in either case we shall procure fully sufficient to supply the public demands. If we have to procure 8,000,000 dollars, I venture to say, not near the half could be raised by an impost system; but admitting that it could by a high scale of duties for the first year, it could not be done in the subsequent ones. Now I regard this as a permanent system of revenue, rather than a productive one; if it is laid high, you will find your collection annually diminish. Now, will any Government take such measures in gathering in its harvest, as to ruin the soil? Will they rack-rent their tenants in such a manner as to deprive them of the means of improving the estate? Such can never be the policy of this enlightened country. We know, from the fundamental principles of republics, that public opinion gives the tone to every action of the Government—the laws ought to correspond with the habits and manners, nay, I may almost add, wishes of the people. Well, Mr. Chairman, we are told a tax upon rum is popular; I will agree with the gentlemen; but still a high duty will induce people to run it, and though the consumer may pay the tax without complaining, yet it will go into the pockets of individuals who defraud your revenue. Gentlemen have complained that we do not offer a substitute for what we find fault with. I will endeavor to explain a system I would place in the room of this. I would reduce the duties generally so low as to hold out no encouragement to smuggling; in this case, it is more than probable, the amount of the impost, at the end of one year, would exceed the collection under the present rate. By giving this proof of moderation and wisdom, we should obtain the public favor and confidence; the Government would be acquiring strength, its movements would be more certain, and we could in every subsequent year extend the system, and make the whole productive; then it would be in the power of Government, by aids, to improve our agriculture, manufactures, and commerce. Our imports are now very great; by the increase of our commerce, we shall probably find our revenue produce twice as much seven years hence as it can be expected to do at present.
Mr. Madison.—Let us compare the probable amount of the revenue proposed to be raised by this system, with what is raised in Great Britain, and we shall be apt to infer that they are not so oppressive as gentlemen seem to insinuate. Taking the highest estimate that I have heard mentioned, and it will not produce three millions of dollars. The population of the United States exceeds three millions of souls, hence the tax does not amount to one dollar per head. Great Britain, on the highest estimation, does not contain eight millions of inhabitants, and has an annual revenue to provide of thirteen millions sterling. It is true, she has recourse to other means besides an impost for the purpose of obtaining such a revenue; but those other means are certainly more objectionable in that country, and would be much more so here. Each individual of that kingdom pays eight times as much as is required by the United States; now, where is the propriety of making a comparison between them?
Mr. Baldwin asked if the Government of the United States of America was four or five times worse to be administered than the Governments in Europe? Whether the public opinion was four or five times more unfavorable to such an administration? If these questions are answered in the affirmative, then the inferences which gentlemen have drawn, of the impracticability of collecting the duties laid in the bill, are just. But this is not allowing the General Government the common chance of executing its laws. If it were the worst Government on earth, it might be allowed a chance of doing one quarter of what others perform. If we find by experience, that we are too weak to execute a system which is so much easier than other nations have adopted, it may be proper to alter it. We shall be better able to judge how far we are likely to succeed, when the bill for the collection of the revenue is brought forward. Such a bill is now in the hands of a committee, and it is to be hoped, when they report it, it will be found sufficient to insure the collection; till then, it will be best to continue the rate as it stands.
Mr. Boudinot.—When we consider the arguments of gentlemen on both sides of this question, we shall find they do not differ so much as, on a superficial view, gentlemen may be led to imagine. It is agreed, that a revenue must be obtained adequate to our wants; but some gentlemen think we shall not receive a greater sum, because we lay a high duty; in this opinion I am with them. I think the present is a favorable time to lay an impost duty, and expect very considerable aid from the public spirit; but I am in favor of a low duty, because I would do nothing to check that spirit. If we lay high duties, and a man finds smuggling the most profitable business he can follow, we shall have to contend with private interest. If we lay a light duty of thirty or forty per cent., the temptation will be too strong for resistance, and the sum collected may not amount to ten per cent. on the whole importation; whereas, if we lay twenty or fifteen per cent. the whole may probably be collected, and the treasury be better filled, because it does not hold out so strong an inducement to evade the payment of the duties.
Another objection has been stated, which is of great weight: a system of high duties will necessarily engage us in a system of drawbacks. If we are forced into this measure, it will be a great injury to the revenue.
We ought also to consider the inconvenience to which high duties will subject our merchants. It is a common case in America, that our mercantile capitals are limited. Gentlemen engaged in commerce can ill spare so large a proportion in the payment of duties.
It has been mentioned by gentlemen, that Great Britain collects four shillings sterling per gallon on rum; yet she is exposed to great difficulties in obtaining it. But I ask gentlemen, whether Great Britain ever laid such a high duty in the first instance, as we are about to impose? I believe they did not: they began, I apprehend, with moderate duties, and increased them as circumstances authorized, when the people became habituated to the imposition. This is the very principle I wish to adopt, and show the world that our conduct is founded in wisdom, propriety, and experience. If we shall discover our mistake in laying high duties, and are driven by necessity to reduce them, such measures will operate to the injury of the fair trader; whereas, if we increase them by degrees, it will be rather favorable to their interest than otherwise; at all events, it will injure none.
If a sense of the committee could be obtained on a general reduction of ten or fifteen per cent. on the rate the articles now stand at, I should be glad to vote in favor of such a motion; but I could not approve of reducing the article of rum alone, because I do not think it charged out of proportion with the others.
Mr. Jackson differed from his colleague, (Mr. Baldwin.) He thought, although the British laid four shillings on rum, they did not collect it; and that their custom-house establishments were so expensive, as to leave a mere trifle for the net produce of the impost duty. If America employed such a host of revenue officers as to secure the payment of high duties, there would be very little left, after compensating their services, to supply the federal treasury.
Mr. Wadsworth desired gentlemen to consider, that the citizens of the United States owned vessels as well calculated for smuggling, as any that were employed between the Netherlands and England; therefore, they had little more security against smuggling than Great Britain.