FOOTNOTES:
[1] Of this talent, Mr. Gales has lately given a most remarkable instance, in drawing out from notes which had remained as lost for near forty years, a most important speech of Mr. Randolph, delivered shortly before the late war with Great Britain, and in relation to the then condition of public affairs, both with Great Britain and the Emperor Napoleon the First. Mr. Gales had taken down the speech: the notes of it got into the bottom of a trunk, and lay there till a year ago, when Mr. Gales, searching high and low for matter for the Annals, chanced to find them; and immediately drew out the full speech with the freshness and vigor of a morning report of a previous day's debate.
[2] In the first five years of the existence of the Federal Government, there was no publication of debates in the Senate, that body having sat with closed doors, in its legislative as well as in its executive capacity, until the 20th of February, 1794. Until that time there will be no Senate debates to be abridged; but the proceedings of the body were fully kept in journals, and selections from these proceedings will afford much curious and instructive information to the student of American political history, as showing the manner in which the founders of the government put it into operation, their views in relation to important points, and the changes which the constitution of the Senate has undergone.
[3] A list of the Senators and Representatives who composed the First Congress is inserted at page 20.
[4] his address being in the nature of an Inaugural, and confined to general recommendations, only the beginning and the ending, so characteristic of the father of his country, have been given.
[5] These entries in relation to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs show the early method of communicating with the Secretaries, being called before the Senate to give explanations and bring papers—a method now superseded by reports. The early Senators lamented the change, believing the old way to be the best for getting the information that was wanted, and also the best security against the appointment of incompetent Secretaries.
[6] Another instance of the early practice of the government. The President consults the Senate beforehand upon the negotiation of Indian treaties, and sends the Secretary at War in person to give the necessary explanations: this mode of consulting the Senate since so far departed from that that body has no knowledge of the treaty until sent in for ratification.
[7] This message of President Washington is a strong instance of his deference for the Senate, thus giving up upon its objection the nomination of a citizen which he knew to be fit and meritorious. It was also a strong instance of the deference of the Senate to the Senators of the State interested in the nomination, Col. Fishbourn having been rejected simply because the Georgia Senators preferred another.
[8] These proceedings of President Washington and the Senate, in fixing on the mode of communication between them when treaties were to be formed, or appointments to be made, was their interpretation of the clause in the constitution which requires the advice and consent of the Senate on such occasions. Their interpretation was (according to the obvious meaning of language) that the advice and consent should be obtained beforehand; and the practice was in conformity to that interpretation, as will be seen in the proceedings of the next day, when the President and Secretary at War attended the Senate, and the President gave in a statement of facts, which, in his opinion, rendered treaties with the Southern Indian tribes necessary, and asked the advice and consent of the Senate upon their formation. These proceedings will be read with interest by all who study the working of our government, and observe the changes which its practice has undergone. The change has been great in the mode of obtaining this advice and consent, and greatly to the prejudice of the free and independent action of the Senate in such cases. Instead of consultation and concurrence beforehand, as the words of the constitution imply, and as the practice under Washington required (even to the minute provisions of an Indian treaty), the most important, and even unusual and extraordinary treaties, and with foreign powers, have come to be negotiated (oftentimes) without even the knowledge of the Senate, concealed from it until concluded, and then laid before the body for ratification, as an administration measure—the ratification to be pressed under all the influences of an executive measure, and upon all the considerations of inconvenience and danger to attend the rejection of a measure executively concluded with a foreign power. Under such circumstances treaties are often ratified, and appointments often confirmed, under a moral duress of the Senate, the weight of the executive and the inconveniences of rejection leaving no chance for the free action of the body. President Polk revived the Washingtonian mode of consulting the Senate, in the formation of the Oregon Treaty in 1846, asking the advice of the Senate beforehand on the point of establishing the boundary line with Great Britain on the parallel of 49 degrees; whereof the secret as well as the public history may be seen in the "Thirty Years' View," under the proper year. The personal attendance of the President and Secretaries being found to be inconvenient, that part of the mode of communication was dispensed with in Washington's time.
[9] The question in relation to North Carolina arose out of the circumstance that she had not then accepted the Federal Constitution, and was not at that time a member of the Union.