Mr. Giles was opposed to this amendment, as interfering with the governments of the several States. All lands (except such as had been sold by the United States) were held from the States; and if this tax were to be agreed to, he believed the State courts would not refuse to admit a deed in evidence which was not stamped. Nothing would give so much alarm to the States as a subject of this sort.
Mr. Sewall did not understand the distinction made between titles to land and titles to money. He thought the objection made to a tax on a deed, might be made with equal propriety to a tax on a bond or note. If they had a right to say these should not be received in evidence in a State court, unless they were stamped, they had a right to say the same with respect to a deed. Except it could be shown that the farmer was less able to pay than the merchant, he thought no other objection had any weight.
Mr. R. Williams thought there was a great difference between a note of hand and a deed. The State had nothing to do with the former, but much with the latter; since every State held grants of its lands, and a man must show his title from the original grant, before his title could be said to be a good one. He did not doubt the people being able to pay the tax; it was the principle which he contended against, which, if carried into effect, would cause a clashing of the authorities of the two Governments. If the United States could lay a tax of this sort, they might lay a tax upon every commission issued by a State.
Mr. Nicholas did not see the smallest difference between the two cases which had been stated. And when they came to the 13th section, he should endeavor to prove that to say a piece of paper should not be received in evidence in a court, which was lawful to be received by the laws of the State, would be a violation of State sovereignty. He was not of opinion, with the gentleman from Connecticut, that they should take up the subject partially, rather than not pass the bill. He thought it best to consider a tax upon its broadest basis. It was not fair to exclude any thing which stood upon the same ground. He wished the principle to be thus fairly tested. He should, therefore, vote for the tax on deeds.
Mr. Lyon hoped, that if this tax was agreed to, purchases of a small amount would be excluded.
Mr. Swanwick said there would doubtless be a difference made in the duty between large and small purchases. He also disagreed with the gentleman from Connecticut. The principle, he said, was either right or not; if it were right, it should be made general: if not, it ought not to be adopted.
The question was put, and negatived—47 to 32.
On motion, the committee rose, and had leave to sit again.