But if it were true, Mr. Chairman, that Holland had afforded no protection to her commerce by the navy which she has been able to keep up, does it follow that the same thing will happen to us? Will the same navy be more efficacious in our case, than in the case of Holland, or Spain, or Portugal? This must be taken for granted in order to give any solidity to the argument of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, and yet nothing can be more untrue. Those States are situated at the very door of the great maritime powers, and their dominions are also exposed to invasion by land. They must, therefore, either singly or by combinations with other powers, contend against the whole maritime force of those great States, and must maintain navies adequate to that purpose. But we are under no such necessity. Placed at a vast distance from those great powers, and in the neighborhood of those possessions which contribute most to the support of their commerce and their navies, we can attack them in a weak, and yet a vital part, with our whole force, while but a small part of their force can at any time be brought to act against us. It is with this part only that we shall have to contend, should they at any time drive us into a war. Let us take England as an instance. Her great and valuable possessions lie at our threshold. The uniform course of the trade-winds compels all her vast and rich commerce with those possessions, to pass almost in sight of our shores. The force which she can send to protect this commerce and annoy us, in case of a rupture, will not be her whole force, but that part of it only which she can spare from Europe, after securing her preponderance there. France, notwithstanding the prostrate condition of her navy at present, possesses maritime means which will speedily enable her to raise it up again, whensoever those means come to be directed, as one day they must, by a Government of some understanding. This navy, and the maritime combinations which will be formed under its protection, England must watch and keep under. Her existence will depend upon it. She will, therefore, have but little force to spare which she can bring to act against us. A comparatively small maritime force, therefore, will compel her to respect us, and to avoid a quarrel with us by all just and reasonable means.
It follows that a moderate navy, a much smaller one than Holland, Spain, or even Portugal, have supported, would be sufficient for our protection, aided by the peculiar advantages of our situation. Those nations, inconsiderable as they are when compared to us in population, wealth, and extent of territory, have supported navies which, however unequal to that of England, have yet afforded some degree of protection to their trade, rendered their flags in some degree respectable, and given them a weight in the scale, a consequence among nations, which otherwise they could not have had. And shall not we, with our great and increasing resources, and the peculiar advantages of our situation, be able to effect still more?
Mr. Nicholas said this question was different from any former question, with respect to the Navy, which had been before the House. Whatever gentlemen may have heretofore said with respect to the advantages of a navy for the protection of our commerce, they must agree that the present question has a different aspect, as no man can say that seventy-four gun ships are calculated to resist the kind of force which has heretofore made attacks upon our commerce in the West Indies.
Mr. N. was far from believing that our armed vessels had produced the effect which the committee, who reported this bill, stated them to have done. He thought the gentleman from Pennsylvania had adduced many sufficient reasons for the fall which had taken place in the price of insurance, independent of our navy; and that, therefore, the committee were wholly mistaken that the advantages already derived from our navy have exceeded the cost of it; and that, if it had been established several years ago, it would have proved a great saving to the United States.
Mr. N. confessed he had always been opposed to a naval force for the purpose of warring with European nations, and whether the force now proposed is considered as necessary for defence or offence, it must have that character. The propriety of a naval force for this purpose never appeared to him in a questionable point of view; he thought every consideration of policy and interest forbids it. We are well informed, said he, by the best historians, that the British navy has been the means of sinking that nation to its present state; for he could not admire, like the gentleman from South Carolina, the splendor and prosperity of a nation, which is brought into such a situation as to render it doubtful whether it can exist for a day, a month, or any other period. If the navy of Great Britain, then, commenced under different circumstances from those in which we are placed—which, according to the gentleman from South Carolina, was not only for the protection of her commerce, but as a defence against neighboring nations, and to guard against the worst revolutionary principles—has nearly ruined that country by the immense sums necessary for its support, shall we, who, according also to the confession of that gentleman, have nothing to fear from European nations—[Mr. Harper interrupted Mr. N. to deny that he had said we had nothing to fear from Europe. He had said we had nothing to fear but from the sea.] Mr. N. said this was the way in which he understood the gentleman, and that no danger exists of any invasion by a land force. If this is the case, the use to which a navy can be put will only be to defend our commerce from cruisers, and passing fleets. We have not, therefore, half the inducements to the establishment of a navy which influence European nations, and many powerful reasons against such a force.
The European nations have, most of them, distant colonies, which they have to protect, and with which they have to keep up a constant communication across the ocean, which renders a navy in some degree necessary. But all the European nations commenced their navies under the delusion that a small force would only be necessary, and that one or two ships would give them an ascendency over other nations. Can we expect this, said Mr. N.? No; we begin the business with fewer inducements than any other nation ever begun a navy, and without necessity; for it is acknowledged we have nothing now to apprehend from invasion, (and if we had, this force could not be provided in time,) we have no colonies to protect, and no intercourse which calls for a naval force.
We cannot, therefore, said Mr. N., embark in this business with the same motives which influenced all European nations in establishments of this kind. They built small navies because they would be equal to cope with the small navies of their neighbors; but we are about to begin the business with a navy staring us in the face, the most formidable that any man could suppose to exist. According to his colleague, the British have 140 sail-of-the-line; and yet our navy is undertaken with the avowed purpose of keeping her, as well as the other nations of Europe, in check. Mr. N. asked whether we could ever hope to succeed in a plan of this kind? We certainly could not, since Great Britain would always even in war have more than a sufficient force to meet all the ships which we can build. Besides, if our situation, as gentlemen say, will make a small force so operative in our hands in time of European wars, will not our possessing it be sufficient to produce war with Great Britain, when it is always a sufficient cause for war, in the opinion of Great Britain, for any other maritime power to put a few more ships in commission than their ordinary establishment? And, if Congress were to order the building of fifty ships, it would only increase the certainty of this effect. How is a naval force to guard us, which Great Britain can destroy, whenever she pleases, even in time of war? For she has frequently ships sufficient on our coast to destroy all the vessels which are contemplated to be built. In short, this navy will be the means of keeping this country in continual broils. On the first appearance of arming any additional vessels on the part of Great Britain, for whatever cause, we must set on foot a negotiation to combine the other powers of Europe in our favor; and this country will become the centre of intrigue and tricks for the agents of every country.
But the gentleman from South Carolina says, this is the cheapest mode of defence; but does the gentleman prove this? Can he prove that £10,000,000 sterling is only the third part of the expense of defence, as he says? Does he not recollect how much of the revenue of that country goes to pay the interest of their enormous debt, and, therefore, cannot be considered as a part of the expenditure for defence? The gentleman will find, on reflection, he is much mistaken in his calculation in this respect. The gentleman from South Carolina has been loud in his encomiums on the British navy, on account of its usefulness to the world; and he calls the calculation of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, relative to the expenses of a navy, a paltry, schoolboy calculation, because it has not taken into view this usefulness. That gentleman, said Mr. N., only referred to the British navy so far as it was useful in the way gentlemen say they expect ours to be advantageous. But from the contradictions which the gentleman from South Carolina seemed to run into on this subject, he did believe that he had not an eye to a navy, merely for the defence of our commerce; he appeared to wish that this country should take a stand like that of Great Britain, that the safety of the world may, at a future day, depend upon us, as it now does upon Great Britain. Mr. N. believed the ambition of this country, the pride of its Government, and naval commanders, will all operate this way; and we may, one day or other, if we proceed with this navy scheme, be as aspiring, as domineering, as any other nation in the world, and by this means be embroiled in continual war, and be saddled with a debt equal to that of Great Britain.
Mr. N. believed there existed no good reason for going into the establishment of a navy at all, because he believed it would never be really useful to this country; but if it should be otherwise determined by a majority of Congress, this, he thought, of all times the most improper to commence the work.
Mr. J. Williams then moved to strike out what relates to 18-gun vessels, on the ground that the thirty-nine small vessels which we have are sufficient. The motion was negatived without a division.