Mr. Harper was not surprised that the gentleman from Pennsylvania should defend these petitions, for reasons which every man must know. What he has said upon the subject is no more than a repetition of some things which we have before heard. He agreed that, when grievances are complained of, they ought to be examined; and if the people were to complain of a maladministration of justice, the fact ought to be inquired into; but when the repeal of a law is prayed for, it certainly cannot be proper for petitioners to go into charges against the administration of courts and juries, by saying that prosecutions are carried on under party malice and party revenge. To do this is to strike at the vitals of our constitution. The gentleman from Pennsylvania likes this, perhaps, from party motives, but he ought to remember that it is an instrument which will cut both ways; and the use of which, if he has any respect for the laws and rights of his country, he may live to regret having countenanced. Mr. H. said, if in order, he would move to refer this part of the memorial to a select committee, with a view of inquiring into the subject-matter, and report their opinion thereon to the House.
The Speaker declared such a motion out of order; and, after some observations from Mr. Nicholas, in which he said the gentleman from South Carolina had answered himself, by allowing the propriety of a reference at all; and observed, if because these petitions complained of the administration of one part of our Government (which, however, he did not allow they do) they were to be rejected, it might be expected that, hereafter, no petition would be received that complained of the maladministration of any department of the Government.
The reference was carried, there being 55 votes for it.
Mr. Gallatin presented petitions from six hundred and seventy-eight inhabitants of Chester County, praying for the repeal of the alien and sedition laws, in the same words with those presented yesterday.
On expelling Matthew Lyon.
Mr. Bayard called up for consideration the following resolution, which he had laid upon the table a day or two ago:
The resolution having been read, Mr. B. presented to the House a copy of the record of Mr. Lyon's trial, which was read by the Clerk, after which,
Mr. B. observed, it would not be necessary to trouble the House with many observations in support of this resolution. The facts upon which the resolution is founded, are proved to be incontrovertibly true, by the record which had just been read. The only question, therefore, before the House was, as to the consequence of the fact, or whether the crime of which the member in question had been convicted, is a sufficient cause for expulsion. Mr. B. referred the House to that clause of the constitution which gives the House the power of expulsion. The power, said he, is unlimited. The House has the power to expel a member for any crime, or for any cause, which, in their discretion, they conceive has rendered him unfit to remain a member of the body. Perhaps some gentlemen may think that it is improper for the House to take notice of acts done by its members out of the House, but he believed the fallacy of such a doctrine would be easily seen. It was certainly possible, and might, therefore, be imagined, that a member of this House, might be guilty of murder, treason, perjury, or other infamous crime, and would it be asserted that a man, defiled by crimes of this kind, ought to be suffered to represent a portion of the people of the United States in the National Legislature? He trusted that no gentleman, who valued reputation, would contend for such a point. The question, then is, said Mr. B., whether the act in question is an act of that description, the commission of which ought to induce the House to expel the convicted member? In his opinion, the crime was of the first political magnitude. A crime not only affecting the members of this House, but the whole community, as its consequences go to the subversion of the Government. This Government, said Mr. B., depends for its existence upon the good will of the people. That good will is maintained by their good opinion. But, how is that good opinion to be preserved, if wicked and unprincipled men, men of inordinate and desperate ambition, are allowed to state facts to the people which are not true, which they know at the time to be false, and which are stated with the criminal intention of bringing the Government into disrepute among the people. This was falsely and deceitfully stealing the public opinion; it was a felony of the worst and most dangerous nature. The member from Vermont has been convicted of doing this, with a view of exciting the hatred of the people against the President and Senate, and of stirring up sedition in the country. This, in his opinion, was a crime of the greatest magnitude, since it is all-important that the channel by which information is conveyed to the people should be preserved as pure as possible; for, if men are allowed to state things as facts, which they know to be false, what will be the consequence? However upright the Government, or however correct the First Magistrate may be, the hatred of the people may be excited against them by means of false information; and when a foreign foe, or domestic traitors, join the standard of rebellion, the best constitution and government may be subverted. Therefore, that falsehood which deprives men of the means of forming a true judgment of public affairs, in this country, where the Government is elective, is a crime of the first magnitude. The member from Vermont has been convicted, under aggravated circumstances. He was on this floor when the law, against which he has offended, was passed. He, therefore, was well acquainted with the law; yet, with this knowledge, he has falsely, scandalously and maliciously, defamed the President of the United States, with a view of exciting hatred, and stirring up sedition. These facts are recorded and incontrovertible; and he conceived it would be out of order to call them in question.
Mr. B. concluded with appealing to the candor and honor which he expected to find in the House, whether a member, the malice of whose heart, and the falsehood of whose pen, stood recorded; who had, from the worst and basest motives, violated a law which he had himself assisted to make, was fit to hold a seat in that House. Will any one say that a man who does not keep the laws ought to be allowed to make them? Certainly, nothing was more repugnant to principle and propriety; and, as he conceived the member from Vermont was notoriously and exemplarily guilty in this respect, an obligation rested on the House to expel him. Mr. B. said he brought forward this resolution from a sense only of public duty, from a strong feeling for national character. He knew but little, and should be happy if it were less, of the member who was the object of it. He could not be suspected of having been induced to the step he had taken by the miserable gratification of offering violence to the feelings of the member. He believed that nothing he had said, nor any thing which could be said, would awaken a single feeling. His sensations were of another sort, and excited in another manner. Mr. B. conceived he had done his duty, and if the House refused to purify itself by the expulsion of the member, it was a satisfaction to him to reflect that it would appear to the world that he had no share in the disgrace.
Mr. Nicholas had hoped that the gentleman from Delaware would have shown to the House something in this transaction which made the character of the member alluded to so infamous as to have rendered him unfit to hold a seat in this House. He should have thought that, after a member of this House had suffered so severely as the member from Vermont has suffered by fine and imprisonment, it would have been thought necessary to go into a consideration of the nature of the offence of which he is said to have been guilty, and to have shown that the guilt attaching to him was such as to defile the characters of the rest of the members to sit with him, before a vote of expulsion was taken. Indeed, Mr. N. had supposed that there had been but one opinion on this subject, and that no attempt would have been made to have inflicted a second punishment. The gentleman from Delaware, Mr. N. said, had confined himself in his declaration about this offence, to its being an offence against one of the laws of the United States, without showing the House what the offence was, or wishing them to form a judgment upon it.