Again: nothing can have a greater tendency to ensure obedience to law, and nothing can be more likely to check every propensity to resistance to Government, than virtuous and wise education; therefore Congress must have power to subject all the youth of the United States to a certain system of education. It would be very easy to connect every sort of authority used by any government with the well-being of the General Government, and with as much reason as the committee had for their opinion to assign the power to Congress, although the consequence must be the prostration of the State Governments.
But enough has been said to show the necessity of adhering to the common meaning of the word "necessary," in the clause under consideration, which is, that the power to be assumed must be one without which some one of the enumerated powers cannot exist or be maintained. It cannot escape notice, however, that the doctrine contended for, that the Administration must be protected against writings which are likely to bring it into contempt, as tending to opposition, will apply with more force to truth than falsehood. It cannot be denied that the discovery of maladministration will bring more lasting discredit on the government of a country, than the same charges would if untrue.
This is not an alarm founded merely on construction; for the governments which have exercised control over the press, have carried it the whole length. This is notoriously the law of England, from whence this system has been drawn; for there, truth and falsehood are alike subject to punishment, if the publication brings contempt on the officers of government.
I have shown, as I promised, that the authority on which this act is supported, gives unlimited power over the press, as to its investigation of public affairs, which is its most important function; and I will now endeavor to show, that the effect of the present law is very little short of the complete restraint of all useful discussion on public men and measures.
The law has been current by the fair pretence of punishing nothing but falsehood, and by holding out to the accused the liberty of proving the truth of the writing; but, it was from the first apprehended, and it seems now to have been adjudged, (the doctrine has certainly been asserted on this floor,) that matters of opinion, arising on notorious facts, come under the law. If this is the case, where is the advantage of the law requiring that the writing should be false, before a man shall be liable to punishment, or of his having the liberty of proving the truth of his writing? Of the truth of facts there is an almost certain test; the belief of honest men is certain enough to entitle it to great confidence; but their opinions have no certainty at all. The trial of the truth of opinions, in the best state of society, would be altogether precarious; and, perhaps, a jury of twelve men could never be found to agree in any one opinion. At the present moment, when, unfortunately, opinion is almost entirely governed by prejudice and passion, it may be more decided, but nobody will say it is more respectable; chance must determine whether political opinions are true or false, and it will not unfrequently happen, that a man will be punished for publishing opinions which are sincerely his, and which are of a nature to be extremely interesting to the public, merely because accident, or design, has collected a jury of different sentiments.
If the effect of the present law is to restrain the free communication of opinion, and its principle will justify any control Government chooses to exercise over the press, an inquiry may safely be entered on, whether Congress ought to possess the power, even if the clause giving necessary and proper power would extend to such remote cases? It is the more necessary to inquire into the usefulness of this power in the hands of Congress, since the opinion is becoming current, that that alone will give Congress a right to assume it, upon the principle that Government must have a right to do every thing proper for its safety. This doctrine may be very fallacious, if not taken in the restricted sense to be found in the clause giving necessary powers. No government can assume a power not delegated, on pretence of its being necessary; for none have a right to judge of what is necessary but the makers of the constitution, otherwise all governments would be competent to make every alteration in a constitution they might think proper, and the constitution would rank with the laws, and not above them. For the execution of powers expressly given, there must have been some latitude allowed to those who were to execute them, the same in fact which is expressed in the clause respecting necessary powers.
Is the power claimed proper for Congress to possess? It is believed not, and will readily be admitted, if it can be proved, as I think it can, that the persons who administer the Government have an interest in the power to be confided, opposed to that of the community. It must be agreed that the nature of our Government makes a diffusion of knowledge of public affairs necessary and proper, and that the people have no mode of obtaining it but through the press. The necessity for their having this information, results from its being their duty to elect all the parts of the Government, and, in this way, to sit in judgment over the conduct of those who have been heretofore employed. The most important and necessary information for the people to receive is, of the misconduct of the Government; because their good deeds, although they will produce affection and gratitude to public officers, will only confirm the existing confidence, and will, therefore, make no change in the conduct of the people. The question, then, whether the Government ought to have control over the persons who alone can give information throughout a country, is nothing more than this, whether men interested in suppressing information necessary for the people to have, ought to be intrusted with the power, or whether they ought to have a power which their personal interest leads to the abuse of? I am sure no candid man will hesitate about the answer; and it may also safely be left with ingenuous men to say whether the misconduct which we sometimes see in the press, had not better be borne with, than to run the risk of confiding the power of correction to men who will be constantly urged by their own feelings to destroy its usefulness.
The mode of thinking which countenances this law, and the doctrines on which it is built, are derived from a country whose government is so different from ours, that the situation of public officers ought to be very different. In Great Britain, the King is hereditary, and, according to the theory of their government, can do no wrong. Public officers are his representatives, and derive some portion of his inviolability from theory, but more from the practice of the government, which has, for the most part, been very arbitrary. It was, therefore, of course, that they should receive a different sort of respect from that which is proper in our Government, where the officers of government are the servants of the people, are amenable to them, and liable to be turned out of office at periodical elections. In Great Britain, writings are seditious, though they are true, if they tend to bring a public officer into contempt.
In this country, it is seen that the same principle is contended for, and that in practice, with respect to matters of opinion, we have gone the whole length of the principle. How long can we expect to maintain the other distinctive qualities of the magistracy of the two countries, when this sameness is established? How long can it be desirable to have periodical elections, for the purpose of judging of the conduct of our rulers, when the channels of information may be choked at their will?
But, sir, I have ever believed this question as settled by an amendment to the constitution, proposed with others, for declaring and restricting its powers, as the preamble declares, at the request of several of the States, made at the adoption of the constitution, in order to prevent their misconstruction and abuse. This amendment is in the following words: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for a redress of grievances." There can be no doubt about the effect of this amendment, unless the "freedom of the press" means something very different from what it seems; or unless there was some actual restraint upon it, under the Constitution of the United States, at the time of the adoption of this amendment, commensurate with that imposed by this law. Both are asserted, viz: that the "freedom of the press" has a defined, limited meaning, and that the restraints of the common law were in force under the United States, and are greater than those of the act of Congress; and that, therefore, either way the "freedom of the press" is not abridged.