He spoke of the respect which the Directory required, and repeated that it would exact as much as was paid to the ancient kings. We answered that America had demonstrated to the world, and especially to France, a much greater respect for her present Government than for her former monarchy: and that there was no evidence of this disposition which ought to be required, that we were not ready to give. He said that we should certainly not be received; and seemed to shudder at the consequences. We told him, that America had made every possible effort to remain on friendly terms with France—that she was still making them, that if France would not hear us, but would make war on the United States, nothing remained for us but to regret the unavoidable necessity of defending ourselves. [Oct. 22.
No. 2.
October 27, 1797.
About twelve we received another visit from M. X. He immediately mentioned the great event announced in the papers, and then said, that some proposals from us had been expected on the subject on which we had before conversed: that the Directory were becoming impatient, and would take a decided course with regard to America, if we could not soften them. We answered, that on that subject we had already spoken explicitly, and had nothing further to add. He mentioned the change in the state of things which had been produced by the peace with the Emperor, as warranting an expectation of a change in our system; to which we only replied, that this event had been expected by us, and would not, in any degree, affect our conduct. M. X. urged, that the Directory had, since this peace, taken a higher and more decided tone with respect to us, and all other neutral nations, than had been before taken; that it had been determined, that all nations should aid them, or be considered and treated as their enemies. We answered, that such an effect had already been contemplated by us, as probable, and had not been overlooked when we gave to this proposition our decided answer; and further, that we had no powers to negotiate for a loan of money; that our Government had not contemplated such a circumstance in any degree whatever; that if we should stipulate a loan, it would be a perfectly void thing, and would only deceive France, and expose ourselves. M. X. again expatiated on the power and violence of France; he urged the danger of our situation, and pressed the policy of softening them, and of thereby obtaining time. M. X. again returned to the subject of money. Said he, you do not speak to the point; it is money: it is expected that you will offer money. We said that we had spoken to that point very explicitly: we had given an answer. No, said he, you have not: what is your answer? We replied, it is no; no; not a sixpence. He again called our attention to the dangers which threatened our country, and asked, if it would not be prudent, though we might not make a loan to the nation, to interest an influential friend in our favor. He said we ought to consider what men we had to treat with; that they disregarded the justice of our claims, and the reasoning with which we might support them; that they disregarded their own colonies, and considered themselves as perfectly invulnerable with respect to us; that we could only acquire an interest among them by a judicious application of money, and it was for us to consider, whether the situation of our country did not require that these means should be resorted to.
He said that all the members of the Directory were not disposed to receive our money; that Merlin, for instance, was paid from another quarter, and would touch no part of the douceur which was to come from us. We replied, that we had understood that Merlin was paid by the owners of the privateers; and he nodded an assent to the fact. He proceeded to press this subject with vast perseverance. He told us that we had paid money to obtain peace with the Algerines and with the Indians; and that it was doing no more to pay France for peace. To this it was answered, that when our Government commenced a treaty with either Algiers or the Indian tribes, it was understood that money was to form the basis of the treaty, and was its essential article; that the whole nation knew it, and was prepared to expect it as a thing of course; but that in treating with France, our Government had supposed that a proposition, such as he spoke of, would, if made by us, give mortal offence. He asked if our Government did not know that nothing was to be obtained here without money? We replied, that our Government had not even suspected such a state of things. He appeared surprised at it, and said, that there was not an American in Paris who could not have given that information. The conversation continued for nearly two hours; and the public and private advance of money was pressed and re-pressed in a variety of forms. At length M. X. said that he did not blame us; that our determination was certainly proper, if we could keep it; but he showed decidedly his opinion to be that we could not keep it. He said that he would communicate, as nearly as he could, our conversation to the Minister, or to M. Y. to be given by him to the Minister; we are not certain which. We then separated. On the 22d of October, M. Z., a French gentleman of respectable character, informed Mr. Gerry, that M. Talleyrand, Minister of Foreign Relations, who professed to be well-disposed towards the United States, had expected to have seen the American Ministers frequently in their private capacities; and to have conferred with them individually on the object of their mission; and had authorized M. Z. to make this communication to Mr. Gerry. The latter sent for his colleagues; and a conference was held with M. Z. on the subject; in which General Pinckney and General Marshall expressed their opinions, that, not being acquainted with M. Talleyrand, they could not, with propriety, call on him; but that, according to the custom of France, he might expect this of Mr. Gerry, from a previous acquaintance in America. This Mr. Gerry reluctantly complied with on the 23d, and with M. Z. called on M. Talleyrand, who, not being then at his office, appointed the 28th for the interview. After the first introduction, M. Talleyrand began the conference. He said that the Directory had passed an arrêt, which he offered for perusal, in which they had demanded of the Envoys an explanation of some part, and a reparation for others, of the President's speech to Congress, of the 16th of May: he was sensible, he said, that difficulties would exist on the part of the Envoys relative to this demand; but that by their offering money, he thought he could prevent the effect of the arrêt. M. Z., at the request of Mr. Gerry, having stated that the Envoys have no such powers, M. Talleyrand replied, they can, in such a case, take a power on themselves; and proposed that they should make a loan. A courier arriving at this moment from Italy, and M. Talleyrand appearing impatient to read the letters, Mr. Gerry took leave of him immediately. He followed to the door, and desired M. Z. to repeat to Mr. Gerry what he, M. Talleyrand, had said to him. Mr. Gerry then returned to his quarters with M. Z., took down the particulars of this interview, as before stated, sent for Gens. Pinckney and Marshall, and read it to them in the presence of M. Z., who confirmed it. Generals Pinckney and Marshall then desired M. Z. to inform M. Talleyrand that they had nothing to add to this conference, and did not wish that the arrêt might be delayed on their account.
October 29.
M. X. again called upon us. He said M. Talleyrand was extremely anxious to be of service to us, and had requested that one more effort should be made to induce us to enable him to be so. A great deal of the same conversation which had passed at our former interviews was repeated. He said that, without this money, we should be obliged to quit Paris; and that we ought to consider the consequences: the property of the Americans would be confiscated, and their vessels in port embargoed. We told him that, unless there was a hope of a real reconciliation, these evils could not be prevented by us; and the little delay that we might obtain would only increase them; that our mission had induced many of our countrymen to trust their vessels in the ports of France; and if we remained at Paris, that very circumstance would increase their number; and, consequently, the injury which our countrymen would sustain, if France could permit herself so to violate her own engagements and the laws of nations. He expressed a wish, that M. Y. should see us once more. We told him that a visit from M. Y., as a private gentleman, would always be agreeable to us; but if he came only with the expectation that we should stipulate advances of money, without previously establishing a solid and permanent reconciliation, he might save himself the trouble of the application, because it was a subject we had considered maturely, and on which we were immovable. He parted with us, saying, if that was the case, it would not be worth while for M. Y. to come. In the evening, while General Pinckney and General Marshall were absent, M. Y. and M. X. called, and were invited by Mr. Gerry to breakfast with us the next morning.
October 30.
Immediately after breakfast the subject was resumed. M. Y. spoke without interruption for near an hour. He said that he was desirous of making a last effort to serve us, by proposing something which might accommodate the differences between the two nations; that what he was now about to mention, had not, by any means, the approbation of the Directory; nor could M. Talleyrand undertake further than to make from us the proposition to the Directory, and use his influence for its success; that, last week, M. Talleyrand could not have ventured to have offered such propositions; but that his situation had been very materially changed by the peace with the Emperor; by that peace he had acquired, in a high degree, the confidence of the Directory, and now possessed great influence with that body; that he was also closely connected with Buonaparte and the Generals of the Army in Italy, and was to be considered as firmly fixed in his post, at least for five or six months; that, under these circumstances, he could undertake to offer, in our behalf, propositions which, before this increase of influence, he could not have hazarded. M. Y. then called our attention to our own situation, and to the force France was capable of bringing to bear upon us. He said that we were the best judges of our capacity to resist, so far as depended on our own resources, and ought not to deceive ourselves on so interesting a subject. The fate of Venice was one which might befall the United States.
The American Ministers determined to have no more of these conferences, and broke them off altogether; but shortly after, they were approached indirectly and in a new way, as thus detailed by General Pinckney to his Government: