Mr. C. Pinckney, of South Carolina, thought it a very dangerous practice to endeavor to amend the constitution by making laws for the purpose. The constitution was a sacred deposit, put into their hands; they ought to take great care not to violate or destroy the essential provisions made by that instrument. He remembered very well that in the Federal Convention great care was used to provide for the election of the President of the United States, independently of Congress; to take the business as far as possible out of their hands. The votes are to be given by Electors appointed for that express purpose, the Electors are to be appointed by each State, and the whole direction as to the manner Of their appointment is given to the State Legislatures. Nothing was more clear to him than that Congress had no right to meddle with it at all; as the whole was intrusted to the State Legislatures, they must make provision for all questions arising on the occasion.
Mr. Dexter, of Massachusetts, did not feel himself at all in doubt as to the right of the Legislature to make such provisions on this subject as appeared to be necessary. It was directed by the constitution that a President should be appointed, that he should be of not less than thirty-five years of age, that he should have been at least fourteen years a citizen of the United States, &c. The proceedings in the election of a President may be defective in all these particulars, and can it be supposed that there is no way to correct them? The constitution is not silent on this head; among the powers given to Congress in the 5th section is this, "to pass all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof." The law now proposed appears to be necessary to carry into effect the power of appointing the President; it is, therefore, clearly constitutional.
Mr. Livermore, of New Hampshire never felt less doubt on any subject than the one now under consideration: the constitution has given many directions as to the appointment of the President, some of which he read. It is possible (said Mr. L.) that gentlemen can suppose all these may be violated and disregarded, and yet that it is nobody's business to interpose and make provision to prevent it? He trusted the honorable Senate would agree to the resolution to appoint a committee for that purpose.
Mr. Baldwin, of Georgia, expressed his regret that the mover of this resolution had not thought proper to bring forward a subject so new and important, in the form commonly used in parliamentary assemblies, by a single proposition, viz: "that it is expedient that further provision be made respecting disputed votes for President and Vice President of the United States." It was manifest from the debate that several different questions had been under consideration at the same time, and different gentlemen were in fact directing their remarks to different questions.
The first question was, the one he had just mentioned, whether there was so great a defect in the present provisions, which exist on this subject, as to render further provisions necessary?
The second is, if further provisions are necessary, must they be made by amendment to the constitution? or,
Thirdly, whether they can be made by law?
He must say for himself, that he did not agree that the present provisions on this subject were so defective and absurd as had been represented. His general respect for those who had gone before him in this House, and especially for the venerable assembly of the most experienced statesmen of the country by whom the constitution had been formed, forbade him to entertain the belief that the subject, which is the strong feature that characterizes this as an Elective Government, could have been till now so entirely out of sight and neglected. Gentlemen appeared to him, from their observations, to forget that the constitution in directing Electors to be appointed throughout the United States equal to the whole number of the Senators and Representatives in Congress, for the express purpose of intrusting this constitutional branch of power to them, had provided for the existence of as respectable a body as Congress, and in whom the constitution on this business has more confidence than in Congress. Experience had proved that a more venerable selection of characters could not be made in this country than usually composed that electoral body. And what are the questions which can arise on the subject intrusted to them to which they are incompetent, or to which Congress is so much more competent? The questions which present themselves seem to be:
1. Those which relate to the elections, returns, and qualifications, of their own members. Shall these be taken away from that body, and submitted to the superior decision and control of Congress, without a particle of authority for it from the constitution?
2. The legality or constitutionality of the different steps of their own proceedings, as, whether they vote for two persons both of the same State; whether they receive votes for a person under thirty-five years of age, or one who has not been fourteen years a citizen of the United States, &c. It is true they, as well as any other constitutional branch of this Government acting under that instrument, may be guilty of taking unconstitutional or corrupt steps, but they do it at their peril. Suppose either of the other branches of the Government, the Executive, or the Judiciary, or even Congress, should be guilty of taking steps which are unconstitutional, to whom is it submitted, or who has control over it, except by impeachment? The constitution seems to have equal confidence in all the branches on their own proper ground, and for either to arrogate superiority, or a claim to greater confidence, shows them in particular to be unworthy of it, as it is in itself directly unconstitutional.