To what source, then, shall we resort for a knowledge of what constitutes this thing, called misbehavior in office? The constitution, surely, did not intend that a circumstance so important as the tenure by which the judges hold their offices, should be incapable of being ascertained. Their misbehavior, certainly, is not an impeachable offence; still it is the ground upon which the judges are to be removed from office. The process of impeachment, therefore, cannot be the only one by which the judges may be removed from office, under, and according to the constitution. I take it, therefore, to be a thing undeniable, that there resides somewhere in the Government, a power to declare what shall amount to misbehavior in office, by the judges, and to remove them from office for the same, without impeachment. The constitution does not prohibit their removal by the Legislature, who have the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers vested by the constitution in the Government of the United States. But, says the gentleman from New York, the judges are officers instituted by the constitution, to save the people from their greatest enemies, themselves; and therefore, they should be entirely independent of, and beyond the control of the Legislature. If such was the design of the wise men who framed and adopted the constitution, can it be presumed they would have provided so ineffectual a barrier, as these judges can readily be shown to be? It is allowed, on all hands, the Legislature may modify the courts; they may add judges, they may fix the times at which the courts shall sit, &c. Suppose the Legislature to have interests distinct from the people, and the judges to stand in the way of executing any favorite measure—can any thing be more easy than for the Legislature to declare that the courts, instead of being held semi-annually, or oftener, shall be held only once in six, eight, ten, or twenty years? Or, in order to free themselves from the opposition of the present Supreme Court, to declare, that court shall hereafter be held by thirteen judges. An understanding between the President and the Senate, would make it practicable to fill the new offices with men of different views and opinions from those now in office. And what, in either case, would become of this boasted protection of the people against themselves? I cannot conceive the constitution intended so feeble a barrier; a barrier so easily evaded.
It is not alone the sixteen rank and file, which the gentleman from New York has so ludicrously depicted, that I apprehend immediate danger from, but it is the principle which converts the office of judge into a hospital of incurables, and declares, that an expiring faction, after having lost the public confidence, may add to those sixteen, until they become sixteen hundred or sixteen thousand; and that the restored good sense of the Legislature, the whole Government and constitution, retains no means of casting them off, but by destroying itself, and resorting to revolutionary principles. The Legislature may repeal unnecessary taxes, may disband useless and expensive armies, may declare they will no longer be bound by the stipulations of an oppressive treaty; and if war should follow, the constitution is still safe. But if the construction which gentlemen contend for, be correct, a band of drones, to any amount in number, under the denomination of judges, may prey upon the substance of the people, and the Government retains not the power to remove them but by destroying the constitution itself.
Thursday, January 14.
Judiciary System.
The Senate resumed the consideration of the motion made on the 6th instant, that the act of Congress passed on the 13th day of February, 1801, entitled "An act to provide for the more convenient organization of the Courts of the United States," ought to be repealed.
Mr. Olcott, of New Hampshire, said this subject was of the most important kind, and though many able arguments had been already offered, he could not pass it over with a silent vote.
It has been suggested that the act now proposed to be repealed, came in on the influx of passion, and that the influx of reason should sweep it away. He did not know that this was the case. Some gentlemen contend that it was adopted with great deliberation.
He thought the reasons for a repeal of this law insufficient. It is not said, that if the constitution vests a right to office in the judges, that we can affect them. He thought the constitution did vest the right, and he held it to be sacred.
The provisions of the constitution appeared to him so plain, that they scarcely admitted of illustration. He who undertakes to explain the text, must find more explicit terms than those contained in it. He could not find any.
After dwelling upon the different provisions of the constitution, Mr. O. went upon the question of expediency, at some length, and concluded that a repeal was as inexpedient as unconstitutional.