The honorable member from Virginia has given us a history of the judicial system, and in the course of it has told us, that the Judges of the Supreme Court knew, when they accepted their offices, the duties they had to perform, and the salaries they were to receive. He thence infers, that if again called on to do the same duties, they have no right to complain. Agreed: but that is not the question between us. Admitting that they have made a hard bargain, and that we may hold them to a strict performance, is it wise to exact their compliance to the injury of our constituents? We are urged to go back to the old system; but let us first examine the effects of that system. The Judges of the Supreme Court rode the circuits, and two of them, with the assistance of a district judge, held circuit courts and tried causes. As a Supreme Court, they have in most cases only appellate jurisdiction. In the first instance, therefore, they tried a cause, sitting as an inferior court, and then on appeal tried it over again, as a Supreme Court. Thus, then, the appeal was from the sentence of the judges to the judges themselves. But say, that to avoid this impropriety, you will incapacitate the two judges who sat on the circuit, from sitting in the Supreme Court to review their own decrees. Strike them off; and suppose either the same or a contrary decision to have been made on another circuit, by two of their brethren, in a similar case. For the same reason you strike them off, and then you have no court left. Is this wise? Is it safe? You place yourselves in the situation where your citizens must be deprived of the advantage given to them of a court of appeals, or else run the greatest risk that the decision of the first court will carry with it that of the other.
The same honorable member has given us a history of the law passed the last session, which he wishes now to repeal. That history is accurate, at least in one important part of it. I believe that all amendments were rejected, pertinaciously rejected; and I acknowledge that I joined heartily in that rejection. It was for the clearest reason on earth. We all perfectly understood, that to amend the bill was to destroy it; that if ever it got back to the other House, it would perish. Those, therefore, who approved of the general provisions of that bill, were determined to adopt it. We sought the practicable good, and would not, in pursuit of unattainable perfection, sacrifice that good to the pride of opinion. We took the bill, therefore, with its imperfections, convinced that when it was once passed into a law, it might be easily amended.
We are now told, that this procedure was improper; nay, that it was indecent. That public opinion had declared itself against us. That a majority (holding different opinions) was already chosen to the other House; and that a similar majority was expected from that in which we sit. Mr. President, are we then to understand that opposition to the majority in the two Houses of Congress, is improper, is indecent? If so, what are we to think of those gentlemen, who, not only with proper and decent, but with laudable motives, (for such is their claim,) so long, so perseveringly, so pertinaciously opposed that voice of the people, which had so repeatedly, and for so many years, declared itself against them, through the organ of their representatives? Was this indecent in them? If not, how could it be improper for us to seize the only moment which was left for the then majority to do what they deemed a necessary act? Let me again refer to those imperious demands of the constitution, which called on us to establish inferior courts. Let me remind gentlemen of their assertion on this floor, that centuries might elapse before any judicial system could be established with general consent. And then let me ask, being thus impressed with the sense of the duty and the difficulty of performing that arduous task, was it not wise to seize the auspicious moment?
Among the many stigmas affixed to this law, we have been told that the President, in selecting men to fill the offices which it created, made vacancies and filled them from the floor of this House; and that but for the influence of this circumstance, a majority in favor of it could not have been found. Let us examine this suggestion. It is grounded on a supposition of corrupt influence derived from a hope, founded on two remote and successive contingencies. First, the vacancy might or might not exist; for it depended as well on the acceptance of another, as on the President's grant; and secondly, the President might or might not fill it with a member of this House. Yet, on this vague conjecture, on this unstable ground, it is inferred that men in high confidence violated their duty. It is hard to determine the influence of self-interest on the heart of man. I shall not, therefore, make the attempt. In the present case, it is possible that the imputation may be just, but I hope not, I believe not. At any rate gentlemen will agree with me, that the calculation is uncertain, and the conjecture vague.
But let it now, for argument sake, be admitted, saving always the reputation of honorable men, who are not here to defend themselves. Let it, I say, for argument sake be admitted, that the gentlemen alluded to acted under the influence of improper motives. What then? Is a law that has received the varied assent required by the constitution, and is clothed with all the needful formalities, thereby invalidated? Can you impair its force by impeaching the motives of any member who voted for it? Does it follow, that a law is bad because all those who concurred in it cannot give good reasons for their votes? Is it not before us? Must we not judge of it by its intrinsic merit? Is it a fair argument, addressed to our understanding, to say, we must repeal a law, even a good one, if the enacting of it may have been effected in any degree by improper motives? Or is the judgment of this House so feeble, that it may not be trusted?
Let us, however, examine the clause objected to on the ground of the constitution. It is said, that by this law the district judges in Tennessee and Kentucky are removed from office, by making them circuit judges. And again, that you have by law appointed two new offices, those of circuit judges, and filled them by law, instead of pursuing the mode of appointment prescribed by the constitution. To prove all this, the gentleman from Virginia did us the favor to read those parts of the law which he condemns, and if I can trust to my memory, it is clear, from what he read, that the law does not remove these district judges, neither does it appoint them to the office of circuit judges. It does indeed put down the district courts; but it is so far from destroying the offices of district judge, that it declares the persons filling those offices shall perform the duty of holding the circuit courts. And so far is it from appointing circuit judges, that it declares the circuit courts shall be held by the district judges. But gentlemen contend, that to discontinue the district courts, was in effect to remove the district judge. This, sir, is so far from being a just inference from the law, that the direct contrary follows as a necessary result; for it is on the principle that these judges continue in office after their courts are discontinued, that the new duty of holding other courts is assigned to them. But, gentlemen say, this doctrine militates with the principles we contend for. Surely not. It must be recollected, sir, that we have repeatedly admitted the right of the Legislature to change, alter, modify, and amend the judiciary system, so as best to promote the interests of the people. We only contend that you shall not exceed or contravene the authority by which you act. But, say gentlemen, you forced this new office on the district judges, and this is in effect a new appointment. I answer, that the question can only arise on the refusal of those judges to act. But is it unconstitutional to assign new duties to officers already existing? I fear that if this construction be adopted, our labors will speedily end; for we shall be so shackled, that we cannot move. What is the practice? Do we not every day call upon particular officers to perform duties not previously assigned to, or required of them? And must the Executive in every such case make a new appointment?
But as a further reason to restore, by repealing this law, the old system, an honorable member from North Carolina has told us, the judges of the Supreme Court should attend in the States, to acquire a competent knowledge of local institutions, and for this purpose should continue to ride the circuits. I believe there is great use in sending young men to travel; it tends to enlarge their views and give them more liberal ideas than they might otherwise possess. Nay, if they reside long enough in foreign countries they may become acquainted with the manners of the people and acquire some knowledge of their civil institutions. But I am not quite convinced that riding rapidly from one end of this country to the other is the best way to study law. I am inclined to believe that knowledge may be more conveniently acquired in the closet than in the high road. It is moreover to be presumed that the first Magistrate would, in selecting persons to fill these offices, take the best characters from the different parts of the country, who already possess the needful acquirements. But admitting that the President should not duly exercise, in this respect, his discretionary powers, and admitting that the ideas of the gentleman are correct, how wretched must be our condition! These, our judges, when called on to exercise their functions, would but begin to learn their trade, and that too at a period of life when the intellectual powers with no great facility can acquire new ideas. We must, therefore, have a double set of judges. One set of apprentice-judges to ride circuits and learn; the other set of master-judges, to hold courts and decide controversies.
We are told, sir, that the repeal asked for is important, in that it may establish a precedent, for that it is not merely a question on the propriety of disbanding a corps of sixteen rank and file; but that provision may hereafter be made, not for sixteen but for sixteen hundred or sixteen thousand judges, and that it may become necessary to turn them to the right about. Mr. President, I will not, I cannot presume, that any such provision will ever be made, and therefore I cannot conceive any such necessity; I will not suppose, for I cannot suppose, that any party or faction will ever do any thing so wild, so extravagant. But I will ask, how does this strange supposition consist with the doctrine of gentlemen, that public opinion is a sufficient check on the Legislature, and a sufficient safeguard to the people? Put the case to its consequences, and what becomes of the check? Will gentlemen say it is to be found in the force of this wise precedent? Is this to control succeeding rulers in their wild, their mad career? But how? Is the creation of judicial officers the only thing committed to their discretion? Have they not, according to the doctrine contended for, our all at their disposition, with no other check than public opinion, which, according to the supposition, will not prevent them from committing the greatest follies and absurdities? Take then all the gentleman's ideas, and compare them together, it will result that here is an inestimable treasure put into the hands of drunkards, madmen, and fools.
But away with all these derogatory suppositions. The Legislature may be trusted. Our Government is a system of salutary checks: one Legislative branch is a check on the other. And should the violence of party spirit bear both of them away, the President, an officer high in honor, high in the public confidence, charged with weighty concerns, responsible to his own reputation and to the world, stands ready to arrest their too impetuous course. This is our system. It makes no mad appeal to every mob in the country. It appeals to the sober sense of men selected from their fellow-citizens for their talents, for their virtue; of men advanced in life, and of mature judgment. It appeals to their understanding, to their integrity, to their honor, to their love of fame, to their sense of shame. If all these checks should prove insufficient, and alas! such is the condition of human nature, that I fear they will not always be sufficient, the constitution has given us one more: it has given us an independent judiciary. We have been told that the Executive authority carries your laws into execution. But let us not be the dupes of sound. The Executive Magistrate commands indeed your fleets and armies; and duties, imposts, excises, and other taxes are collected, and all expenditures are made by officers whom he has appointed. So far indeed he executes your laws. But these, his acts, apply not often to individual concerns. In those cases so important to the peace and happiness of society, the execution of your laws is confided to your judges; and therefore are they rendered independent. Before then that you violate that independence, pause. There are State sovereignties, as well as the sovereignty of the General Government. There are cases, too many cases, in which the interest of one is not considered as the interest of the other. Should these conflict, if the Judiciary be gone, the question is no longer of law, but of force. This is a state of things which no honest and wise man can view without horror.
Suppose, in the omnipotence of your Legislative authority, you trench upon the rights of your fellow-citizens, by passing an unconstitutional law. If the Judiciary Department preserve its vigor, it will stop you short. Instead of a resort to arms, there will be a happier appeal to argument. Suppose a case still more impressive. The President is at the head of your armies. Let one of his generals, flushed with victory and proud in command, presume to trample on the rights of your most insignificant citizen: indignant of the wrong, he will demand the protection of your tribunals, and, safe in the shadow of their wings, will laugh his oppressor to scorn.