The House then went into Committee of the Whole on the Judiciary bill from the Senate.[66]
Mr. Henderson.—I should not rise to offer my opinion on the great question before the committee, were I not placed in a situation different from that in which I have been since I have had the honor of a seat in this House. The Legislature of the State of North Carolina, one of whose representatives I am on this floor, have seen proper to instruct their Senators and to recommend to their Representatives in Congress, to use their exertions to procure a repeal of the law passed the last session of Congress, for the more convenient organization of the Courts of the United States, and the bill on your table has for its object the repeal of this law, and as I shall probably vote against its passage, a decent respect for the opinions of those who have framed and sent forward those resolutions, demands that I should give the reasons which influence my conduct.
The people of America have obtained and established that the powers of Government shall be vested in three great departments; the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial. They have said that there shall be a House of Representatives, the members of which shall be chosen by the people of the several States every second year. Though this House is composed of members chosen by the people immediately; though they can have no other interest than the great community from which they were sent; though they must return to the common mass in the short period of two years; yet enlightened America did not see proper to intrust the power of making laws to this body alone; they knew that the history of man, and the experience of ages, bore testimony against the safety of committing this high power to any one Assembly not checked by any other body. They have therefore erected another branch of the Legislature, called the Senate, the members of which are not to be elected by the people immediately, but by the sovereignties of the several States; they are to be chosen for six years, and not for two; and the qualifications requisite to entitle those to a seat is different from that of a member of this House. To these bodies are given the power of initiating all laws; but after a bill has passed both of these Houses, before it becomes of binding obligation on the nation, it must be approved of by the President; it is a dead letter until life is given by the Executive. The President is elected not by the people, not by the Legislatures of the several States, not by either House of Congress, but by Electors chosen by the people. He is to hold his office during four years. This is the second great department of the Government. It will be easily discovered from this cursory view of our constitution, the caution and jealousy with which the people have conferred the power of making laws, of commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong. But, sir, after this law was made, after its authoritative mandate was acknowledged by the nation, it became necessary to establish some tribunal to judge of the extent and obligation of this law. The people did not see proper to intrust this power of judging of the meaning of their laws, either to the Legislative or to the Executive, because they participated in the making of these laws; and experience had shown that it is essential for the preservation of liberty that the Judicial and Legislative authorities should be kept separate and distinct. They therefore enacted a third department, called the Judicial, and said that "the Judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges both of the Supreme and inferior courts shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall at stated times receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office."
It is admitted, I understand, by all parties, by every description of persons, that these words, "shall hold their offices during good behavior," are intended as a limitation of power. The question is, what power is thus to be limited and checked? I answer, that all and every power which would have had the authority of impairing the tenure by which the judges hold their offices, (if these words were not inserted,) is checked and limited by these words; whether that power should be found to reside in Congress, or in the Executive. These words are broad and extensive in their signification, and can only be satisfied by being construed to control the Legislative as well as the Executive power. But gentlemen contend that they must be confined to limiting the power of the President. I ask gentlemen, what is there in the constitution to prove their signification to this end alone? When you erect a court and fill it with a judge, and tell him in plain, simple language, that he shall hold his office during good behavior, or as long as he shall behave well; what, I beseech you, sir, will any man, whose mind is not bewildered in the mazes of modern metaphysics, infer from the declaration? Certainly that the office will not be taken from him until he misbehaves; nor that he will be taken from the office during his good behavior. Under this impression he enters upon his duty, performing it with the most perfect satisfaction to all persons who have business before him; and the Legislature, without whispering a complaint, abolishes the office and thereby turns out the judge. The judge is told this is no violation of the compact; although you have behaved well, although we have promised that as long as you did behave well you should continue in office, yet, there is now no further necessity for your services, and you may retire. These words, "during good behavior," are intended to prevent the President from dismissing you from office, and not the Legislature from destroying your office. Do you suppose, sir, that there is a man of common understanding in the nation, whose mind is not alive to the influence of party spirit, that would yield his assent to this reasoning? I hope and believe there is not. But, sir, how is it proved that the President would have had the power of removing the judges from their office, if these words, "during good behavior," had not been inserted in the constitution? Are there any words in that instrument which give the President expressly the power of removing any officer at pleasure? If there are, I call upon gentlemen to point them out; it does not result from the fashionable axiom, that the power which can create can destroy. The President can nominate, but he can appoint to office only by the advice and consent of the Senate. Therefore, it would follow, if the power of displacing results from that of creating, that the Senate should participate in displacing as well as creating officers. But however this may be, it is certainly a mere constructive power which he has exercised, because the Legislature have, from motives of expediency, acknowledged that he had it. If the constitution does not necessarily give the President the right of removing officers at pleasure, and if that right depend upon Legislative acts or constructions, where would have been the necessity for inserting these emphatic words as a check and limitation of Executive power, where without them the President has no such power? You are taking great pains to control a power which does not exist. The persons who framed our constitution knew that a power of removal in ordinary cases must exist somewhere. They took care, therefore, that in whatever hands it might fall, the language of the constitution respecting the tenure of the office of a judge should be co-extensive with the whole power of removal, whether it should reside in one or in more hands.
But it has been said that the powers of each Congress are equal, and that a subsequent Legislature can repeal the acts of a former; and as this law was passed by the last Congress, we have the same power to repeal it which they had to enact it. This objection is more plausible than solid. It is not contended by us that legislatures who are not limited in their powers have not the same authority. The question is not what omnipotent Assemblies can do, but what we can do under a constitution defining and limiting with accuracy the extent and boundaries of our authority. The very section in the constitution (sec. third, art. first) which I have read, is a proof against the power of every Congress to repeal the acts of their predecessors. In the latter part of the eighth section it is proposed that the judges shall receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office; and yet the salary was ascertained and fixed by a former Congress. The same observations may be made with respect to compensation for the President, which can neither be increased nor diminished during the period for which he shall have been elected. It is not competent for this Congress to vary the compensation to him which has been fixed by a prior Legislature. It is clearly seen, upon a little investigation, that the position which gentlemen take is too extensive, and leads immediately to a destruction of the constitution. It does away all check, and makes the Legislature omnipotent. It has been asked, that if a corrupt and unprincipled Congress should make an army of judges, have not a subsequent Congress the right of repealing the law establishing this monstrous judicial system? I answer that they have not; the same mode of reasoning which attempts to prove this right from an abuse of power will also prove that you may lessen the compensation of your judges. May not equal oppression be imposed upon the people by giving your judges exorbitant salaries as by increasing their numbers? May not the same corrupt and unprincipled motive which would lead men to the raising of an army of judges lead them to squander the public money? And may they not, instead of giving their judges two thousand dollars a year, give them two hundred thousand? And yet, sir, if it were to take place, I know of no authority under the constitution to lessen that exorbitant compensation. The Government of our country is predicated upon a reasonable confidence in those who administer our public affairs. They must have the power of acting for the public welfare, and this would never have been given them if the possible abuse of this power were a sufficient reason for withholding it.
Again, sir, the construction which gentlemen on the other side of the House contend for, tends to the concentration of Legislative and Executive powers in the same hands. If Congress, who have the power of making laws, can also displace their judges by repealing that which creates the offices they fill, the irresistible consequence is, that whatever law is passed the judges must carry into execution, or they will be turned out of office. It is of little importance to the people of this country whether Congress sit in judgment upon their laws themselves, or whether they sit in judgment upon those who are appointed for that purpose. It amounts to the same despotism; they in fact judge the extent and obligations of their own statutes by having those in their power who are placed on the sacred seat of justice. Whatever the Legislature declares to be law must be obeyed. The constitutional check which the judges were to be on the Legislature is completely done away. They may pass ex post facto laws, bills of attainder, suspend the writ of habeas corpus in time of peace, and the judge who dares to question their authority is to be hurled from his seat. All the ramparts which the constitution has erected around the liberties of the people, are prostrated at one blow by the passage of this law. The monstrous and unheard of doctrine which has been lately advanced, that the judges have not the right of declaring unconstitutional laws void, will be put into practice by the adoption of this measure. New offences may be created by law. Associations and combinations may be declared treason, and the affrighted and appalled citizen may in vain seek refuge in the independence of your courts. In vain may he hold out the constitution and deny the authority of Congress to pass a law of such undefined signification, and call upon the judges to protect him; he will be told that the opinion of Congress now is, that we have no right to judge of their authority; this will be the consequence of concentrating Judicial and Legislative power in the same hands. It is the very definition of tyranny, and wherever you find it, the people are slaves, whether they call their Government a Monarchy, Republic, or Democracy.
Mr. Chairman, I see, or think I see, in this attempt, that spirit of innovation which has prostrated before it a great part of the old world—every institution which the wisdom and experience of ages had reared up for the benefit of man. A spirit which has rode in the whirlwind and directed the storm, to the destruction of the fairest portion of Europe; which has swept before it every vestige of law, religion, morality, and rational government; which has brought twenty millions of people at the feet of one, and compelled them to seek refuge from their complicated miseries in the calm of despotism. It is against the influence of this tremendous spirit that I wish to raise my voice, and exert my powers, weak and feeble as they are. I fear, sir, on the seventh of December, it made its appearance within these walls, clothed in a gigantic body, impatient for action. I fear it has already begun to exert its all-devouring energy. Have you a judiciary system extending over this immense country, matured by the wisdom of your ablest and best men? It must be destroyed. Have you taxes which have been laid since the commencement of the Government? And is the irritation consequent upon the laying of taxes worn off? Are they paid exclusively by the wealthy and the luxurious part of the community? And are they pledged for the payment of the public debt? They must be abolished. Have you a Mint establishment, which is not only essentially necessary to protect the country against the influx of base foreign metals, but is a splendid attribute of sovereignty? It must be abolished. Have you laws which require foreigners coming to your country to go through a probationary state, by which their habits, their morals, and propensities may be known, before they are admitted to all the rights of native Americans? They must be repealed, and our shores crowded with the outcasts of society, lest oppressed humanity then should find no asylum on this globe!
Thursday, February 18.
A message was received from the President of the United States, transmitting a letter from the Secretary of War on the subject of certain lands in the neighborhood of our military posts, on which it might be expedient for the Legislature to make some provisions. A letter was also received from the Governor of Indiana, on the same subject. The said Message and letter were read, and ordered to lie on the table.