Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, Vol. 2 (of 16)

by United States. Congress

I do not pretend, Mr. Chairman, to have enumerated all the defects which belonged to the former judicial system. But I trust those which I have pointed out, in the minds of candid men, will justify the attempt of the Legislature to revise that system, and to make a fairer experiment of that part of the plan of our constitution which regards the Judicial power. The defects, sir, to which I have alluded, had been a long time felt and often spoken of. Remedies had frequently been proposed. I have known the subject brought forward in Congress or agitated in private, ever since I have had the honor of a seat upon this floor. I believe, sir, a great and just deference for the author of the ancient scheme prevented any innovation upon its material principles; there was no gentleman who felt the deference more than myself, nor should I have ever hazarded a change upon speculative opinion. But practice had discovered defects which might well escape the most discerning mind in planning the theory. The original system could not be more than experiment; it was built upon no experience. It was the first application of principles to a new state of things. The first judicial law displays great ability, and it is no disparagement of the author to say its plan is not perfect.

I know, sir, that some have said, and perhaps not a few have believed, that the new system was introduced not so much with a view to its improvement of the old, as to the places which it provided for the friends of the Administration. This is a calumny so notoriously false, and so humble, as not to require nor to deserve an answer upon this floor. It cannot be supposed that the paltry object of providing for sixteen unknown men could have ever offered an inducement to a great party basely to violate their duty, meanly to sacrifice their character, and foolishly to forego all future hopes.

I now come, Mr. Chairman, to examine the changes which were made by the late law. This subject has not been correctly understood. It has every where been erroneously represented. I have heard much said about the additional courts created by the act of last session. I perceive them spoken of in the President's Message. In the face of this high authority, I undertake to state, that no additional court was established by that law. Under the former system there was one Supreme Court, and there is but one now. There were seventeen district courts, and there are no more now. There was a circuit court held in each district, and such is the case at present. Some of the district judges are directed to hold their courts at new places, but there is still in each district but one district court. What, sir, has been done? The unnatural alliance between the Supreme and district courts has been severed, but the jurisdiction of both these courts remains untouched. The power or authority of neither of them has been augmented or diminished. The jurisdiction of the circuit court has been extended to the cognizance of debts of four hundred dollars, and this is the only material change in the power of that court. The chief operation of the late law is a new organization of the circuit courts. To avoid the evils of the former plan, it became necessary to create a new corps of judges. It was considered that the Supreme Court ought to be stationary, and to have no connection with the judges over whose sentences they had an appellate jurisdiction.

To have formed a circuit court out of the district judges, would have allowed no court of appeal from the district court, except the Supreme Court, which would have been attended with great inconvenience. But this scheme was opposed by a still greater difficulty. In many districts the duties of the judge require a daily attention. In all of them business of great importance may on unexpected occurrences require his presence.

This plan was thought of; it was well examined and finally rejected, in consequence of strong objections to which it was liable. Nothing therefore remained but to compose the circuit court of judges distinct from those of the other courts. Admitting the propriety of excluding from this court the judges of the Supreme and district courts, I think the late Congress cannot be accused of any wanton expense, nor even of a neglect of economy in the new establishment. This extensive country has been divided into six circuits, and three judges appointed for each circuit. Most of the judges have twice a year to attend a court in three States, and there is not one of them who has not to travel further, and who in time will not have more labor to perform than any judge of the State courts. When we call to mind that the jurisdiction of this court reaches the life of the citizen, and that in civil cases its judgments are final to a large amount, certainly it will not be said that it ought to have been composed of less than three judges. One was surely not enough, and if it had been doubtful whether two were not sufficient, the inconvenience which would have frequently arisen from an equal division of opinion, justifies the provision which secures a determination in all cases.

It was, additionally, very material to place on the bench of this court a judge from each State, as the court was in general bound to conform to the law and the practice of the several States.

I trust, sir, the committee are satisfied that the number of judges which compose the circuit court is not too great, and that the Legislature would have been extremely culpable to have committed the high powers of this court to fewer hands. Let me now ask, if the compensation allowed to these judges is extravagant? It is little more than half the allowance made to the judges of the Supreme Court. It is but a small proportion of the ordinary practice of those gentlemen of the bar, who are fit, and to whom we ought to look to fill the places. You have given a salary of two thousand dollars. The puisne judges of Pennsylvania, I believe, have more. When you deduct the expenses of the office, you will leave but a moderate compensation for service, but a scanty provision for a family. When, Mr. Chairman, gentlemen coolly consider the amendments of the late law, I flatter myself their candor will at least admit that the present modification was fairly designed to meet and remedy the evils of the old system.

The Supreme Court has been rendered stationary. Men of age, of learning, and of experience, are now capable of holding a seat on the bench; they have time to mature their opinions in causes on which they are called to decide, and they have leisure to devote to their books, and to augment their store of knowledge. It was our hope, by the present establishment of the court, to render it the future pride, and honor, and safety of the nation. It is this tribunal which must stamp abroad the judicial character of our country. It is here that ambassadors and foreign agents resort for justice; and it belongs to this high court to decide finally, not only on controversies of unlimited value between individuals, and on the more important collision of State pretensions, but also upon the validity of the laws of the States, and of this Government. Will it be contended that such great trusts ought to be reposed in feeble or incapable hands? It has been asserted that this court will not have business to employ it. The assertion is supported neither by what is past, nor by what is likely to happen. During the present session of Congress, at their last term, the court was fully employed for two weeks in the daily hearing of causes. But its business must increase. There is no longer that restraint upon appeals from the circuit court, which was imposed by the authority of the judge of the court to which the appeal was to be carried; no longer will the apprehension of a secret unavoidable bias in favor of the decision of a member of their own body, shake the confidence of a suitor, in resorting to this court, who thinks that justice has not been done to him in the court below. The progressive increase of the wealth and population of the country, will unavoidably swell the business of the court. But there is a more certain and unfailing source of employment, which will arise in the appeals from the courts of the National Territory. From the courts of original cognizance in this Territory, it affords the only appellate jurisdiction. If gentlemen will look to the state of property of a vast amount in this city, they must be satisfied that the Supreme Court will have enough to do for the money which is paid them.

Mr. Randolph said that he did not rise for the purpose of assuming the gauntlet which had been so proudly thrown by the Goliath of the adverse party; not but that he believed even his feeble powers, armed with the simple weapon of truth, a sling and a stone, capable of prostrating on the floor that gigantic boaster, armed cap-à-pie as he was; but that he was impelled by the desire to rescue from misrepresentation the arguments of his colleague, (Mr. Giles,) who was now absent during indisposition. That absence, said Mr. R., is a subject of peculiar regret to me, not only because I could have wished his vindication to have devolved on abler hands, but because he had to-day lost the triumph which, yesterday, he could not have failed to enjoy; that of seeing his opponent reduced to the wretched expedient of perverting and mutilating his arguments through inability to meet and answer them. Mr. R. said, that this was the strongest proof which could be given of inadequacy to refute any position. He, therefore, left to the gentleman the victory which he had obtained over his own arguments; but, while he felt no disposition to disturb him in this enjoyment, he hoped he should be permitted to correct some of the misstatements which had been made of his colleague's observations.

In the view which he had taken of the conduct of our predecessors, in the chain of whose measures the law now proposed to be repealed formed an important link, the funding of the debt of the United States, and the assumption of those of the individual States, were comprehended. An attempt is made to construe this disapprobation into a design of violating the public faith. Mr. R. denied that one syllable had fallen from his colleague, indicative of a right, or disposition on his part, to withhold the payment of any public engagements. Against these destructive measures his colleague had raised his voice; against the fatal and absurd maxim, that a public debt was a public blessing, he had indeed protested; but not a word escaped his lips, because no such sentiment lurked in his heart, which could be construed into a declaration that the present Legislature possessed the same power over the engagements of former Legislatures which they possessed over ordinary laws; that of modifying or abrogating them with the same freedom which had been exercised in their establishment. Since the gentleman had betrayed such peculiar sensibility on the subject of the debt, Mr. R. relied on his support, when a measure should be brought forward for its final and rapid extinguishment, not by a sponge, but by a fair reimbursement of one hundred cents for every dollar due.